APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Johnny L. Butler, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis.  In this appeal, he asserts that his conviction is void because the indictment was defective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In 1980, the Appellant, Willie Joe Frazier, was indicted for multiple counts of armed robbery and related assaults stemming from his participation, along with two other accomplices, in the robbery of a number of employees and customers of a pharmacy in Lewisburg. However, Frazier escaped from jail before his scheduled trial and was not apprehended until 2002. In 2003, Frazier was convicted by a Marshall County jury of two counts of malicious shooting, one count of assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter, one count of assault with intent to commit first degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, six counts of armed robbery, and two counts of assault with intent to commit robbery. The jury sentenced Frazier to indeterminate sentences for all the convictions except the six armed robberies, for which the jury fixed sentences of life imprisonment. The trial court grouped the thirteen convictions into three categories for purposes of consecutive sentencing, resulting in six concurrent life sentences consecutive to concurrent sentences of eight to twenty years and consecutive to a ten to twenty-five year sentence. This resulted in an effective sentence of life plus eighteen to forty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Frazier argues: (1) he was sentenced to crimes for which no guilty verdicts were returned by the jury; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for assault with intent to commit robbery of Ollie Bagley and assault with intent to commit robbery of Goldie Crabtree; (3) the jury's sentencing verdicts reflect two sentences which were not authorized for the crimes for which he was convicted; (4) his convictions for malicious shooting must be set aside because (a) he was never indicted for these crimes, (b) they are not lesser offenses of any indicted offenses, and (c) his dual convictions for malicious shooting and assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter of Judy Watson constitute double jeopardy; and (5) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we find no error with regard to issues (1) and (5). With regard to issue (2), we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support his two convictions of assault with intent to commit robbery; therefore, the convictions are modified to reflect convictions for aggravated assault, with the respective sentences fixed at not less than two years nor more than ten years. Issue (3) is rendered moot in view of our holding in issue (2). With regard to issue (4), we conclude that double jeopardy principles preclude dual convictions for assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter and malicious shooting. Accordingly, we merge the Appellant's conviction for assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter into his conviction for malicious shooting and remand for entry of a single judgment of conviction for malicious shooting.

This is a public nuisance case. The Shelby County district attorney general filed a petition in general sessions court, asking the court to declare a local nightclub a public nuisance and to enjoin the nightclub from further operation. This division of the general sessions court was designated as an environmental court pursuant to Tennessee statute. After a hearing, the environmental court found that the nightclub was a public nuisance and permanently enjoined operation of the nightclub. The nightclub appealed this ruling to both the circuit court, requesting de novo review, and to this Court.  The circuit court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the appeal would lie with this Court. Because the environmental court had concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court, we affirm the trial court’s holding that the appeal from environmental court lies in this Court.  Further, we affirm the environmental court’s finding that the nightclub is a public nuisance and the grant of a permanent injunction.

The defendant, Frankie Sue Dees, pled guilty to one count of theft over $1,000. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of two years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court should have placed her on community corrections or full probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Billy Ray Riley, of theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from an order granting summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for one of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed to this Court. After reviewing the record, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This is a child custody dispute involving the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The parties agreed to the appointment of a guardian ad litem. After an investigation, the guardian ad litem recommended that primary custody be awarded to the father. The mother filed a motion to remove the guardian ad litem. The trial court did not do so. After a bench trial, the father was designated the primary residential parent. The mother asserts that the guardian ad litem appointed by the trial court appeared biased towards the father because the guardian ad litem knew the father’s sister. The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to remove the guardian ad litem.

The Petitioner, Jorge Acosta Rubio, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Christopher Robert Smith, seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After being convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell over 300 grams of cocaine, the petitioner appealed. On direct appeal this Court affirmed both his conviction and sentence. State v. Christopher Robert Smith, No. M2001-02297-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31202132 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 27, 2002), perm. app. denied (Feb. 24, 2003). The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

This case is about the sale of a business. The owner of a copy machine business sold the assets of the
business to a competitor. The buyer purchased the company through a promissory note that required monthly payments. After the sale, the seller and the seller’s son became employees of the buyer.  However, while employed by the buyer, the seller continued to deal in copy machines on the side.  The seller voluntarily left employment, and his son was fired. After the buyer learned of the seller’s side dealings in copiers, the buyer stopped making payments on the promissory note. The seller sued the buyer for failing to make the agreed upon payments. The buyer counter-sued for breach of contract. After a trial, the trial court rescinded the purchase agreement. We reverse, finding that rescission was not an appropriate remedy in this case, and remand for a determination of the appropriate damages.

The Trial Court granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiff's claim for malpractice. Defendant had represented plaintiff in her representative capacity as conservator, and subsequently as administrator of deceased's estate. The Trial Court held the statute of limitations applied because she knew she had been harmed by defendant's actions more than one year prior to the filing of this action. On appeal, we affirm.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Mark S. Armstrong, of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty years, as a Range I offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to grant the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial when inadmissible evidence was admitted through an inadequate redaction of a videotaped statement; (2) the trial court erred in failing to provide an adequate limiting instruction to the jury regarding a videotape sound malfunction; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to require the State to make an election of the offense for which it sought a conviction; (4) the trial court erred in failing to grant the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a legal malpractice action in which Plaintiff, incarcerated at Turney Center Industrial Prison, appeals the dismissal by the trial court of his action against his court-appointed assistant public defender. Holding the defendant immune from suit under Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-14-209, the trial court dismissed the Complaint. We affirm the action of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court’s order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus.  In that petition the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to release him from his sentence for facilitating aggravated robbery. We are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Husband appeals the division of marital property. The trial court found Husband did not bring into the marriage as many assets as Wife did, thus awarding a greater portion of the parties' home to Wife rather than Husband. The trial court further found that Husband had dissipated marital assets when he sold the parties' horse riding rings in violation of the statutory injunction. Husband claims that the division of property was not equal and challenges the finding that he dissipated marital assets while not making the same finding with regard to Wife. We affirm.

The Trial Court entered Judgment for plaintiff for damages from destruction of road over easement and reformed deed. On appeal, we affirm.

The petitioner, Christopher Cook, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

In an opinion filed June 24, 2005, this court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief, concluding that the single issue presented in the petition, whether the waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary, had been previously determined by this court on direct appeal. On July 11, 2005, the petitioner, Anthony Forster, filed a petition to rehear pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39. He complains that this court misapprehended a material fact and that this court ruled on an issue upon which the parties had not been heard. He asserts that this court erred by concluding that the issue had been previously determined because the propriety of this court's opinion on direct appeal had not been addressed.  Further, he contends that the parties were not heard on the issue because the state in its brief asserted that the issue had been waived and did not address the merits of the claim.

The petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Johnson County Circuit Court of multiple offenses, and he received a total effective sentence of twenty-two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), renders his sentences void. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, which dismissal the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Christopher A. Johnson, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Steven Andrew Tidwell, tried for aggravated burglary and theft of property between $500 and $1,000, was convicted of theft. The trial court imposed a two-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred by ruling that the state could cross-examine him with a prior burglary offense for which he had received judicial diversion, and that the sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Jeffery Yates, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to thirty years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following challenges to his conviction: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court’s handling of the victim’s statement to the police; (3) the trial court’s admission of testimony regarding the Defendant’s involvement in a prostitution sting; (4) the trial court’s refusal to allow the Defendant to cross-examine his co-defendant about gang affiliation; (5) the trial court’s decision to allow the State to cross-examine the Defendant about prior convictions; and (6) the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of theft.  Finding no reversible error in the issues raised by the Defendant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a direct appeal as of right by the State from a denial of its petitions to have Defendants Daniel Cleveland and Matthew Harville declared habitual offenders pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-601 et seq. On appeal, the State argues that the language of section 603(2)(A) of the MVHO statute contains an error, and therefore legislative intent and the “entire scheme” of the statute require this Court to interpret the provision in question by changing its conjunctive construction to disjunctive. We disagree, and we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, William P. Livingston, Jr., appeals the dismissal by the Hamblen County Criminal Court of his petition for post-conviction relief. After review of the record, we affirm.

The state appeals the McNairy County Circuit Court’s order suppressing drug-related evidence seized from the home of the defendant, Billy Dewayne Walker, pursuant to a search warrant. The state contends that the trial court erred in finding that the information contained in the affidavit accompanying the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. We agree and reverse the trial court’s ruling.