APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Malcolm Whiteside, entered pleas of guilty to forgery, assault, resisting arrest, aggravated burglary, two counts of evading arrest, and four counts of theft under $500. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seven years to be served in the community corrections program. A violation warrant was filed less than one month after the defendant was placed on community corrections. A second violation warrant was filed three years later. At a hearing held six years after the filing of the second warrant, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered service of the balance of the sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by revoking community corrections and ordering service of the sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants based on Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendants' statements of undisputed facts. We affirm.

The petitioner, Tony Willis, appeals from the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition. The judgment is affirmed.

This is a breach of contract action wherein the trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the grounds that the contract was too uncertain and indefinite to be enforced. The action of the trial court is reversed, and the case remanded for trial on its merits.

The defendant, Morgan Roa, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Relying upon a common law rule, the trial court continued the defendant's trial on the charge of accessory after the fact to first degree murder until after the trial and conviction of the principal offender. The defendant sought interlocutory review of the trial court's order, asserting that her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated by application of the common law rule. The Court of Criminal Appeals refused to grant the defendant's application for an interlocutory appeal, finding no reason to deviate from the general practice of evaluating speedy trial claims on direct appeal. We granted the defendant permission to appeal to consider the following issues of law: (1) whether the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 591 ("Reform Act"), abrogated the common law rule that a principal must be tried and convicted before an accessory after the fact may be tried; (2) if not, should this Court judicially abrogate the common law rule; and (3) whether a defendant is entitled to interlocutory review of the trial court's order denying her motion to dismiss the indictment because of an alleged violation of her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. We hold that the common law rule has not been abrogated by the Reform Act, and we decline to judicially abrogate it. We also hold that the defendant is not entitled to seek interlocutory review of the trial court's order rejecting her alleged Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation. Applying these holdings, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it denied the defendant interlocutory review of her speedy trial claim, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court which continued the defendant's trial on the charge of accessory after the fact until after the trial of the principal offender. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Nursing home brought suit against former resident's daughters seeking to recover amounts owed for resident's care by setting aside alleged fraudulent conveyances to the daughters. We affirm the judgment of the trial court setting aside a portion of the conveyances as fraudulent.

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits to the injured employee for the period prior to the date the employee notified the employer of his gradually-occurring injury. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel held that the trial court correctly determined that the employee had timely notified the employer of his injury, but reversed the trial court's determination that the injury was compensable prior to the date of notification. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel. We hold that the notice was timely, that the employee is entitled to temporary total disability benefits for the period he was off work following his surgery, and that the trial court correctly determined that the employee sustained a 70% vocational disability, affirming the trial court on the separate grounds set forth herein.

Emerson E. Russell ("the plaintiff") and his wife, Angie Russell, brought this suit for medical malpractice against Dr. Ted W. Brown, Jr., seeking damages associated with injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff as a result of a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Brown. The plaintiff also named as a defendant Dr. S. Morgan Smith, the anesthesiologist who attended the plaintiff's surgery. In the complaint, the plaintiff averred, among other allegations, that he was not adequately informed of alternative treatments for his snoring problem, and that he was not fully advised of the attendant risks of the procedure performed by Dr. Brown. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Following the trial, the defendants filed separate motions for discretionary costs, which motions were granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff and his wife appeal, arguing that the plaintiff was not furnished sufficient information to enable him to give "informed" consent to the surgery performed by Dr. Brown. They also contend that the trial court's charge to the jury on the issue of informed consent did not adequately instruct the jury on the subject. Finally, they raise several issues pertaining to evidentiary matters. As a separate issue, the defendants contend that the trial court's awards of discretionary costs were inadequate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the jury's verdict. We modify the trial court's two awards of discretionary costs. As modified, those awards are affirmed.

Defendant, Felix Tyrone Smith, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault and one count of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. Defendant was sentenced to an effective eight-year sentence on supervised probation. In 2002, Defendant was found to be in violation of the conditions of his probation but the trial court reinstated Defendant's probation. Approximately two years later, after the filing of another probation violation warrant, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered Defendant to serve the original eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by relying on evidence not included in the record when revoking Defendant's probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join Judge Hayes in concurring in the result regarding the trial court’s failure to instruct on lesser included offenses. I believe that an analysis of various jury instructional errors suggests that the legislature was empowered to enact the 2001 amendment (effective 2002) to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110.

This is a direct appeal from a conviction on a jury verdict of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, Timothy Lloyd, to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 120 days to be served in the county jail. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to support his DUI conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Cocke County jury found the defendant, Mitchell Presnell, guilty of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty (20) years as a Range II multiple offender. In this appeal the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial
court erred when it failed to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of  ssault and aggravated assault; (3) the trial court erred in applying enhancement factor (3), that the defendant was a leader in the offense; and (4) the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the employee suffered no permanent impairment and no vocational disability as the result of an injury sustained during the course of her employment with Dana Corporation. We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

With respect to the defendant’s issue (2), whether the trial court erred in not charging lesser offenses, I join in the result, but for reasons other than those reached by the majority.

The Appellant, Harold Holloway, Jr., was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of second degree murder, attempted theft over $10,000, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted carjacking. After a sentencing hearing, Holloway was sentenced to an effective forty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Holloway raises seven issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to hear an ex parte motion for the appointment of a forensic psychiatrist and a neuropsychological examiner; (2) whether the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and attempted theft over $10,000 violate double jeopardy principles; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for attempted carjacking; (4) whether the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on any lesser included offenses of carjacking; (5) whether the court erred in allowing the State to question a defense expert in addiction medicine regarding prior bad acts committed by Holloway which were enumerated in reports relied upon by the expert; (6) whether the State improperly impeached a defense witness by questioning the witness regarding prior convictions which were not admissible under Tenn. R. Evid. 609; and (7) whether the trial court properly sentenced Holloway. After review of the record, we conclude that the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and attempted theft over $10,000 violate principles of double jeopardy. The Appellant's remaining issues are without merit. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences for second degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and attempted carjacking are affirmed. The judgment of conviction for attempted theft over $10,000 is merged with the Appellant's conviction for attempted aggravated robbery, and the sentence for attempted theft is vacated.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted the defendant, David Gene Hooper, of rape, a Class B felony, and incest, a Class C felony, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of eight years for the rape and three years for the incest to be served on community corrections after serving eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred (1) in failing to grant a mistrial based upon the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence until the middle of trial and in prohibiting him from cross-examining the victim concerning the exculpatory evidence; (2) in repeatedly admitting testimony which bolstered the victim's complaint through multiple witnesses; (3) in allowing testimony from various witnesses concerning the fact that victims of sexual abuse frequently delay reporting an attack; (4) in allowing the state to cross-examine the defendant concerning his possession of marijuana on the day he was arrested, approximately two years after the crime; and (5) in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of attempted rape, attempted sexual battery, and assault pursuant to State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). We conclude that although the trial court should have allowed the defendant to cross-examine the victim concerning the evidence the state failed to disclose until trial, the error was harmless. We affirm the trial court.

The petitioner, Damion Carrick, appeals the trial court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief. In that petition, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to release him from his sentences for two (2) counts of especially aggravated robbery based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that
this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Trial Court held appellant's retirement was not a material change of circumstances so as to enable appellant to reduce his alimony payments. On appeal, we reverse.

Defendant, Roger Knoblock, was convicted, following a jury trial, of aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of a prior conviction for aggravated sexual battery to be introduced during Defendant's testimony on cross-examination. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Patrick Deshun Paris, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in not stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order denying Petitioner post-conviction relief. Petitioner also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal because his counsel (1) failed to request the removal of juror, Daisy Foster; (2) questioned Marco Brooks about his family's criminal history to the detriment of Petitioner's case; (3) failed to adequately investigate Petitioner's case and prepare for trial; and (4) failed to object to the prosecutor's leading questions during Mr. Brooks' direct examination. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Michael W. Smith, proceeding pro se, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Smith was convicted of rape in Shelby County and received an eight-year Department of Correction sentence, to be served consecutively to a three-year Department of Correction sentence in a separate case. On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because his eight-year sentence has expired.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition on grounds that Smith has failed to establish that his sentence has expired.

Plaintiff was injured in a fall and the jury returned a verdict for damages against defendant which was approved by the Trial Court. On appeal, we affirm.

Cathy L. Chapman, Brandon Chapman, Kaylan L. Chapman, and Dana L. Chapman (“Plaintiffs”) retained attorney Rick J. Bearfield ("Defendant") to represent them in a medical malpractice action. During the course of this representation, Defendant filed an amended complaint repudiating a theory of the case originally alleged. Plaintiffs later hired new counsel and filed a legal malpractice action against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted on the grounds that Plaintiffs' expert's affidavit was deficient technically and did not comply with the locality rule. We vacate the grant of summary judgment.

This appeal involves protracted litigation over a parcel of land conveyed by the City of New Johnsonville, Tennessee, to a member of the New Johnsonville City Council. The mayor, on behalf of the city, subsequently filed suit against the councilman seeking to nullify the transaction. During the pendency of that litigation, several taxpayers filed their own suit against the councilman alleging the same causes of action set forth in the city’s complaint. The city and the councilman ultimately settled their lawsuit. The taxpayers’ lawsuit continued, ultimately naming the city as a defendant.  The trial court partially granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment by ruling that the taxpayers did not have standing to contest the land transaction between the city and the councilman.  The court ruled that the taxpayers did have standing to continue with their other causes of action concerning allegations that the councilman engaged in illegal business transactions with the city.  The taxpayers subsequently took a voluntary nonsuit on their remaining claims and filed an appeal to this Court to contest the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on their claim regarding the land transaction. We vacate the trial court’s decision regarding the land transaction, and we remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.