APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jimmie Lee Hart, was convicted of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment as a career offender. He appeals his conviction, contending (1) that the convicting evidence was insufficient and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the meaning of the use of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

With great reluctance, I must part ways with the court regarding the dismissal of this will contest. Based on the facts of this case, I have concluded that the trial court erred by dismissing the will contest without first disposing of Don Brown’s motion to implead additional parties and Alton Brown’s petition to intervene.

Four years after the contest of his uncle’s will was filed, Alton Brown filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24 Motion to Intervene in the contest of his uncle’s will. The motion, however, was not accompanied by a proposed pleading setting forth the claim for which intervention was sought as required by Rule 24.03. Subsequent to the filing of the motion, an order of dismissal of the will contest was entered.  Thereafter, the movant filed his proposed pleading following which the trial court denied the Motion to Intervene based upon a finding the movant had slept on his rights. Finding no error, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The Petitioner has appealed the habeas corpus court’s order dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court was correct in dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

Appellant challenges trial court’s order setting aside the consent order acknowledging paternity and ordering no child support after July 1, 2005, based on the results of DNA tests which conclusively prove that Appellee is not the father of the child.  We affirm and remand.

Both the petitioner and his co-defendant were convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree murder, one count of aggravated rape and one count of first degree burglary. The petitioner was unsuccessful in his direct appeal to this Court. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. The petitioner was also unsuccessful in his appeal of that judgment. The petitioner filed a motion to amend his post-conviction petition to request DNA testing of evidence. The second post-conviction court denied that motion. The petitioner appeals this decision. We affirm the decision of the second post-conviction court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The defendant, Corrections Corporation of America, has appealed the trial
court’s award of 60% whole body impairment to the plaintiff, Mr. Craven. Corrections Corporation
of America contends that the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Craven sustained a compensable
psychological workers’ compensation injury, in permitting Dr. Randall Moskovitz and Dr. David
Strauser to testify as experts, and in finding that Mr. Craven gave proper notice of the work-related
injury. Corrections Corporation of America also contends that the award of temporary total  disability benefits was in error and that the award of 60% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole was excessive. After carefully considering the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We remand the case for a determination of the personal representation of Mr. Craven and a determination as to the effect of his death on the award.

This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Theressa Joanne Booker (“Wife”) a divorce from Ricardo Baytonia Booker, Jr. (“Husband”), divided the parties’ property, and decreed an award of alimony in solido and alimony in futuro. Husband appeals, asserting that the division of marital
property was not equitable.  He also challenges the propriety of each of the alimony awards.  We modify the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro so as to make it an award of rehabilitative alimony.  As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of appointed counsel seeking permission to withdraw from further representation of the Appellant in the above-captioned appeal pursuant to Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel claims that there are no meritorious issues available for appellate review. Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Mack T. Transou, has filed a responsive brief pursuant to Rule 22(E), Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review of the motion, the accompanying Anders brief, and the appellate record, we agree with counsel’s assertion that the appeal has no merit and is, accordingly, frivolous within the meaning of Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Shinny Leverette, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the accompanying pleadings, this Court concludes that the trial court properly dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the trial court’s dismissal is affirmed.

This is a garnishment action. The plaintiff lawyer filed a lawsuit against the defendant to collect on a promissory note. This lawsuit was settled by a consent decree requiring the defendant to make installment payments. The defendant became delinquent in the agreed payments. The plaintiff then issued a garnishment request to the defendant’s employer, based on the consent decree. In response, the defendant filed a motion in the trial court to stay the garnishment and establish installment payments. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order as to the monthly amount to which the plaintiff was entitled in garnished wages. This amount was less than the maximum statutory amount permitted for garnishment. The plaintiff now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by not awarding the maximum statutory amount. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate’s civil action for failure to pay costs in prior lawsuits. The plaintiff inmate, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in the trial court against the defendant municipality alleging violations of the government tort liability act, proceeding as a pauper. The City filed a motion to dismiss the case based on Tennessee Code Annotated §41-21-812, because the plaintiff had failed to pay costs in previous lawsuits filed by him. Realizing that his lawsuit was subject to dismissal under the statute, the plaintiff then paid the initial filing fee
and cash bond for the instant lawsuit, but did not pay the costs for the prior lawsuits. The plaintiff subsequently filed a response to the City’s motion to dismiss, claiming that, although he initially was prohibited from filing the lawsuit, because he subsequently paid his filing fees for the instant lawsuit, Section 41-21-812 was not applicable. The trial court dismissed the case pursuant to the statute.  The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

This is a divorce case in which grounds were stipulated.  Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Wife.  He asserts, in the alternative, that if this Court affirms the award of alimony the matter must be remanded for reconsideration of the division of property. We vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand.

This is a parental relocation case. The parties were divorced and, under their MDA, the mother was designated the primary residential parent for the parties’ two children. Within a month after the divorce decree was entered, the mother wrote the father a letter saying that she was moving to Canada with the children. The father filed an objection to the relocation in the trial court. The mother filed a response and a petition to relocate with the children to Canada, stating that she intended to marry a citizen of Canada who was currently serving in the Canadian armed services.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the mother’s petition, finding that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose and that the relocation was not in the children’s best interest. The mother now appeals. We reverse, holding that the evidence  preponderates against the trial court’s finding of no reasonable purpose under the parental relocation statute.

This is an appeal from an unusual order in a termination of parental rights case.  The child involved in this action was placed into state custody soon after the child’s birth, because both the mother and the child tested positive for cocaine.  The child was placed in the custody of a foster mother who was a single parent.  The state filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the biological parents of the child. After a trial, the trial court terminated the parents’ parental rights. Additionally, the trial court sua sponte ordered the state to find a suitable dual-parent home in which to place the child and ordered the state to consult with private adoption agencies to accomplish this task.  The state now appeals the portion of the trial court’s order requiring it to place the child in a dual-parent home.  There is no appeal from the termination of parental rights. We reverse the trial court’s order regarding placement of the child, concluding that the trial court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate placement of the child after the parents’ rights were terminated and the state was given complete guardianship over the child.

The defendant, Ashley Martin, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery: aggravated robbery by violence and aggravated robbery by fear. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant to thirty years as a Range III, career offender. This appeal follows the denial of his motion for a new trial in which he alleged that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred in ruling his nine prior convictions for aggravated robbery were admissible for purposes of impeachment if he chose to testify. After careful review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The appellant, Thurman Randolph, was arrested in February of 2005 for rape. After a preliminary hearing in the Madison County Municipal Court the charge was dismissed. Subsequently, the State presented the matter to the Madison CountyGrand Jury, which returned an indictment on two counts of rape. The appellant was later re-indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury on two counts of rape and two counts of statutory rape. Upon learning that part of the audiotape of the preliminary hearing was not available due to a technical glitch in the recording, the appellant filed a motion seeking dismissal of the indictment and a remand of the matter to the Jackson Municipal Court for a new preliminary hearing pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1(a). The trial court denied the motion and the appellant sought an interlocutory appeal. In this interlocutory appeal, the appellant asserts that the trial court improperly denied the motion to dismiss the indictment and remand the matter to the Jackson Municipal Court. Because the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Husband appeals the type and amount of alimony awarded to Wife after the termination of a twenty-seven year marriage. The decision of the trial court is affirmed as modified.

The appellant, Jacques Sherron, was convicted by a jury of criminal responsibility for introducing a controlled substance into a penal institution, conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance into a penal facility, possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. The appellant received an effective sentence of ten years on March 18, 2005. The appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on April 6, 2005. On July 1, 2005, trial counsel for the appellant filed a motion for new trial alleging that the evidence was insufficient, that the verdict was based on circumstantial evidence and that the appellant’s sentence was excessive.  The appellant subsequently filed a motion in this Court requesting dismissal of his appeal without prejudice due to the fact that the trial court had not yet ruled on the motion for new trial. This Court denied the motion. The appellant filed an amended pro se motion for new trial. The trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial on September 14, 2005, at which time the appellant filed a third amended motion for new trial. The trial court denied relief, and the appellant filed a second notice of appeal on September 14, 2005. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the conspiracy charge should have been dismissed for failure to state a crime; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; and (3) whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to give an accomplice instruction to the jury. For the following reasons, we reverse and dismiss the conspiracy conviction, and affirm the conviction for introducing a controlled substance into a penal facility.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Derrick Walton, was convicted of one count of second degree murder. He was sentenced to twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant, Candice Alene Peery, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000. In return, she received an effective eight-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender with the manner of service of her sentence to be determined by the trial court. The court ordered the defendant to serve her sentence in confinement and she appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to multiple indictments, Defendants Jevon Bryant, Keith Ezell and Torrez Talley were charged with fourteen counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and five counts of aggravated robbery.  Defendant Bryant was also charged with one count of felon in possession of a firearm.  Following a trial, the jury found Defendants Bryant and Ezell guilty on all counts. The jury found Defendant Talley guilty of ten counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Defendant Bryant to an effective sentence of 364 years, Defendant Ezell to an effective sentence of 198 years, and Defendant Talley to an effective sentence of 140 years. On appeal, the following issues are presented for review: (1) whether the trial court properly denied a motion to suppress physical evidence; (2) whether the trial court properly denied a motion for mistrial during jury selection; (3) whether the trial court properly found purposeful discrimination by the defendants in their exercise of peremptory challenges; (4) whether the trial court erred by failing to require the state prosecutor to elect facts supporting Defendant Bryant’s conviction for felonious possession of a handgun; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to rehabilitate the credibility of state witnesses; (6) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial or provide curative instruction following an improper statement made by a state witness; (7) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to bring in Defendant Ezell’s twin brother to rehabilitate a state witness’ pretrial misidentification; (8) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial in response to the improper remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument; (9) whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit counsel to review the jury instructions prior to charging the jury; (10) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt; (11) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the defendant’s right not to testify; (12) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on false imprisonment as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping; and (13) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendants. Because we conclude that no reversible error exists, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, the record reflects that the defendants’ especially aggravated kidnapping convictions were not properlymerged. Therefore, we remand for merger and entry of corrected judgments as to those convictions.

The Appellant, Faron Douglas Pierce, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pierce was convicted of aggravated robbery by a Blount County jury and was sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Pierce argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was deficient in: (1) failing to seek suppression of evidence at trial; (2) failing to adequately inform Pierce of his right to testify at trial; and (3) calling a witness which prejudiced the defense. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.