APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this case, the plaintiff claims that the defendant made an intentional misrepresentation in connection with the sale of a tract of unimproved real property. Following a bench trial, the court found that the defendant, Dean Russell Carrico (“Carrico”), had fraudulently misrepresented a material fact, resulting in a judgment of $21,911.97 for the plaintiff, Dr. Robert W. Bagby (“Bagby”). The trial court also found that Carrico’s conduct violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, T.C.A. § 47-18-101, et seq. (“the Act”). Carrico appealed, raising three issues that present the following questions for our review:

In this action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff on defendants’ premises, the Trial Judge granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to T.R.C.P. 12.02(6), and plaintiff has appealed.

The petitioner, Napoleon Momon, appeals pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted in 1991 of second degree murder in the shooting death of his wife, Jacqueline Daniel Momon, and received a twenty-five-year sentence.1 His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to this Court. State v. Napoleon Momon, No. 03C01-9205-CR-00174 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Nov. 20, 1992).

This is a post-divorce case. Paul William McGaffic filed a petition seeking to modify his child support and periodic alimony in futuro obligations. As pertinent to the issues on
this appeal, the trial court refused to modify its existing child support and alimony in futuro decrees. Mr. McGaffic appealed, raising issues that essentially present the following questions: 1. Does the evidence preponderate against the trial court’s refusal to modify its alimony in futuro award by either terminating it, or reducing it and/or converting it to an award of rehabilitative alimony? 2. Does the evidence preponderate against the trial court’s refusal to modify its child support award?

This is a suit for declaratory judgment. The petitioner, TRW Koyo Steering Systems Company (“TRW Koyo”), seeks a declaration that a document filed by the defendant, John D. Snavely (“Snavely”), in the Monroe County Register of Deeds’ office is a cloud on its title to real property in Monroe County. The trial court granted TRW Koyo summary judgment, decreeing that the purported lien filed by Snavely “is...of no legal effect and, thus, is lifted and removed from [TRW Koyo’s] title.” Snavely appealed pro se.

The appellant, Brenda Starks (defendant), appeals as of right from the judgment of the trial court affirming the sentence, as amended, imposed by the General Sessions Court of Wilson County. After the defendant entered a plea of guilty to passing a worthless check, a Class A misdemeanor, she was sentenced to serve 364 days at 100% in the Wilson County Jail. Her entire sentence was suspended and she was placed on unsupervised probation. The General Sessions Court subsequently revoked the probation, and she appealed to the Criminal Court for Wilson County. The trial court affirmed the judgment of the General Session Court, but amended the judgment. The amended judgment provided for confinement in the Wilson County Jail for 364 days at 75%. In this court, the defendant contends: [T]he sentence she was given by the Criminal Court for Wilson
County, Tennessee, an eleven (11) month, twenty-nine (29) day sentence at seventy-five percent (75%), for the misdemeanor offense of passing a worthless check, T.C.A. 39-14-121, was excessive, in that the Court did not sentence Defendant pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, T.C.A. 40-35-101, et. seq. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the laws applicable to this case, it is the opinion of this court the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and this cause dismissed because the defendant has served the entire sentence prior to the institution of the revocation proceedings in the General Sessions Court.

The plaintiff, Wade Spurling, D.C., appeals from the order of the trial court granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) T.R.C.P. Spurling filed a complaint titled “Complaint For Deceit in Inducement to Contract, Promissory Fraud, Fraud, Intentional Interference With Performance ofContractual Obligations and Breach of Contract.” The complaint alleges that Plaintiff owned and operated Spurling Chiropractic Clinic (SCC). He entered into negotiations with Defendant Michael K. Plambeck (Plambeck) for Plambeck to purchase SCC.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant and his wife, Diane, alleging that defendant “entered into agreement with plaintiff for plaintiff to grade and excavate . . . in order to make said land usable”. Plaintiff further averred that he expended over $29,000.00 for heavy equipment and operators on excavation, and “purchased and installed piping at the cost of $3,604.00, for a total due in the amount of $33,530.09".

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

VANDALISM CONVICTION AFFIRMED; FALSE REPORT CONVICTION REVERSED

In this contract action, the Trial Judge entered judgment for plaintiff against defendant in the amount of $50,431.29, and dismissed defendant’s counterclaim which had sought damages for plaintiff’s alleged breach of the distributorship agreement.

The defendant has filed a petition for rehearing of this appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39. We have considered all of the arguments raised in the petition and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is denied.
 

In this capital case, the defendant, Glenn Bernard Mann, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, aggravated rape and aggravated burglary.¹ In the sentencing hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;” and (2) “[t]he murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing burglary.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) and (7) (1991). Finding that the two aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution. 

This dispute arose out of the sale of a residence in Signal Mountain, Tennessee. The trial court found that the sellers, Thomas F. Cofer and wife, Cynthia H. Cofer, had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (“the Act”) in connection with the sale of their five-bedroom, two and a halfbath residence to the plaintiffs, Theoren J. Murvin and wife, Melody S. Murvin. The Cofers appealed, arguing that the Act does not apply to this transaction, and that the evidence does not show that the Cofers “knowingly withheld information from the [Murvins] to constitute fraud.”

I concur in the result reached in Judge Todd’s opinion. My only reasonfor writing separately is to focus on what I perceive to be decisive in this case: the fact that the defendant did not violate a duty to the plaintiff. In that way, I avoid the nagging problem of the court apportioning fault in a case in which the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial.

This appeal involves a posthumous paternity dispute. While the decedent’s estate was pending in probate court, a person claiming to be the decedent’s son filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Van Buren County against the decedent’s estate and his widow seeking to establish the petitioner’s right to inherit part of the decedent’s estate. The trial court  heard the evidence without a jury and determined that the petitioner had presented clear and convincing evidence that he was the decedent’s  biological son. The decedent’s wife asserts on this appeal that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion. We affirm the judgment.

The plaintiff, Fredrika A. Steiner, has appealed from the summary dismissal of her suit against the defendant, The Parman Corporation, for damages for personal injury sustained in a fall on the premises of  defendant.

This is a legal malpractice action. The trial court dismissed the action as time-barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. We affirm.

This appeal involves a trial court’s authority to enter and enforce a child support award when proceedings involving the child were already pending in another court. After the Wayne County Juvenile Court gave custody of the child to the State in a dependent and neglect proceeding, the Department of Human Services filed separate petitions in the Chancery Court for Wayne County seeking to require the child’s divorced parents to pay child support. The trial court directed both parents to pay child support to the State. After the State’s repeated efforts over five years to require the mother to pay child support, she questioned the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction because the dependent and neglect proceeding was still pending in the juvenile court. The trial court denied the mother’s motion to dismiss, and on this appeal, the mother renews her claim that the trial court should have deferred to the juvenile court. We agree and, therefore, reverse the order denying the mother’s motion to dismiss.

This appeal involves the dissolution of a nineteen-year marriage. The wife filed suit for divorce in the Chancery Court for Sumner County but then suspended the proceedings while the parties attempted to reconcile. The efforts proved fruitless, and, following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the grounds of adultery. The trial court also awarded the wife custody of the parties’ two children, divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife spousal support as well as additional funds for her legal expenses. The husband takes issue on this appeal with the financial aspects of the divorce decree, including the division of the marital property, the long-term spousal support award, and the additional award to defray the wife’s legal expenses at trial. While the trial court properly divided the marital property and awarded the wife funds for her legal expenses at trial, we modify the spousal support award to provide for rehabilitative alimony and for reduced longterm spousal support.

This interlocutory appeal involves the right of a party to discover the appraisal report of a testifying expert in a condemnation case. The Circuit Court for Sumner County denied the property owners’ request for the appraisal report in order to prepare to depose the appraiser on the grounds that the report is “privileged, as work porduct [sic]” but granted the property owners permission to apply for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation in this case. Because the application and the response thereto fully set forth the parties’ positions and the material facts, we dispense with further briefing and oral argument and proceed to the merits in order to save the parties additional time and expense.1 We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case with instructions to enter an order compelling the production of the testifying appraiser’s reports.
 

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Antonio Sweatt, from an order of the Davidson County Chancery Court dismissing Appellant’s petition against respondents/appellees Robert Conley, William Calhoun, Dale Basham, Shelia Roberts, Hattie Moore, Edna Freeman, and Dr. Harold Butler. The chancery court dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice after determining Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows

The plaintiffs, Ginger C. Snead and James D. Snead, sued the defendant, Lois A. Metts as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on July 22, 1994. It is undisputed that the car driven by Ms. Metts struck the car driven by Ms. Snead in the rear while the Snead vehicle was stopped at a stop sign. Ms. Snead sued for injuries and damages and Mr. Snead sued for loss of consortium.