APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant pled "no contest" to aggravated assault and assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent sentences of three years for the aggravated assault conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction, for an effective sentence of three years. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Corrie J. Johnson, was convicted by a jury of selling cocaine, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to eight years, to be served consecutively to two other sentences, for which the Defendant was on probation. The trial court also revoked the Defendant's probation on the two prior convictions. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents three issues: whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction, whether the trial court erred in its application of enhancing and mitigating factors when deciding the Defendant's sentence, and whether the trial court erred by revoking the Defendant's probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, James M. Powers, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years on each of the four counts and ordered that three of the sentences run consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixty years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant argues two issues on appeal: (1) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his four convictions of child rape, and (2) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the Defendant's convictions. We reverse the trial court's order that the sentences be served consecutively and remand for the entry of an order reflecting concurrent sentences.

Petitioner was convicted by jury of one count of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner now appeals from the denial of relief from the post-conviction court. We affirm the denial of relief.

On December 15, 1997, a Coffee County jury convicted Appellant Kim Hickerson of selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a class C felony. After a sentencing hearing on January 23, 1998, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a career offender to a term of fifteen years imprisonment. Appellant challenges both his conviction and his sentence, raising the following issues: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; 2) whether the State established a proper chain of custody for the cocaine that was introduced into evidence; and 3) whether the Appellant was properly sentenced as a career offender. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellants, Andre Mays and Cortez Bennett, were convicted by a Davidson County Jury of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. Mays and Bennett were sentenced to life imprisonment plus fifty years. On appeal, Mays argues that the trial court erred in allowing a juror to remain on the panel after reading a prejudicial newspaper article during the trial. Bennett raises the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in not suppressing the photographic line-up; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; and (3) whether his sentence was proper. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Appellant, Richard Russell Brandt, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of voluntary manslaughter and received a fifteen-year sentence, as a persistent offender. On appeal, Brandt raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and (2) whether his sentence was proper. After review, we find that Brandt's issues are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Bedford County Circuit Court is affirmed.

Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Bobby L. Marshall, of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to sixteen months in the workhouse and fined two thousand dollars. The defendant appeals his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on consent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant appeals his conviction in the Williamson County Circuit Court for one count of aggravated sexual battery. Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; 2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on attempted aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery, attempted sexual battery, or attempted assault; 3) whether the trial court erred in approving and adopting the jury imposed fine of $10,000; and 4) whether the trial court erred in imposing a ten-year sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Keith Leranso Wells, was indicted on four counts of especially aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault. The Defendant pled guilty to two counts of especially aggravated robbery; the remaining counts were held in abeyance pending resolution of the charges against the Defendant's co-defendants. The Defendant agreed that his sentencing would be delayed until those charges were resolved. Subsequent to entry of the judgments of conviction against the Defendant, but prior to his sentencing, the Defendant requested to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the Defendant's request and this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Donald R. Mobbley, of burglary, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the workhouse. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on theft of property as a lesser included offense. We hold that the evidence is sufficient and that theft is not a lesser included offense of burglary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kevin Island, was convicted by a jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years and twelve years, respectively, to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his convictions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1986, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner of first degree murder and aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of life plus twenty-seven and a half years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2000, alleging that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because: (1) count one of the indictment, charging the Petitioner with felony murder, contains no reference to the applicable statute; (2) count two of the indictment, charging him with aggravated rape, fails to state an offense because it omits the required allegation of the appropriate mens rea for aggravated rape; and (3) count one of the indictment is not signed by the district attorney general. The trial court denied the Petitioner's request for habeas corpus relief, finding that the sufficiency of an indictment cannot be properly challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding and finding that the Petitioner failed to establish that the indictment was insufficient. After review, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish a claim for habeas corpus relief, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On March 29, 2000, a Davidson County jury convicted the defendant on one count of conspiracy to sell three hundred grams or more of a substance containing cocaine and one count of possession with intent to deliver twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. For the conspiracy conviction the trial court sentenced him to thirty-six years as a multiple offender, and for the possession charge the defendant received a sixteen-year sentence also as a multiple offender. In addition, the trial court fined the defendant one hundred thousand dollars on each count. The court then determined that the possession conviction should run consecutively to the conspiracy conviction resulting in an effective sentence of fifty-two years. After unsuccessfully pursuing a motion for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial motion, the defendant brings this appeal raising a variety of issues. More specifically, the defendant alleges 1) that the trial court erred by not granting him a judgment of acquittal on the amended possession count; 2) that the charge of "possession of over 26 grams of cocaine fatally varied with the conviction of possession of over 26 grams of c[o]caine with intent to sell"; 3) that the conspiracy count is void for failing "to allege an overt act in pursuit of the conspiracy"; 4) that the evidence is insufficient to support both convictions; 5) that the trial court erred in failing to provide the lesser-included instruction regarding conspiracy to sell or deliver under three hundred grams of cocaine; 6) that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a multiple offender; and 7) that the trial court excessively sentenced the defendant as a result of improperly ordering that the sentences arising from this case are to be served consecutively. After considering each of these, we find that none of them merit relief and, therefore, affirm the defendant's convictions.

The defendant, Jason Hamilton, was convicted of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and attempted aggravated robbery. The victim was named Thomas Spivey. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to serve life in prison for the merged conviction. For his attempted aggravated robbery conviction, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve a four-year sentence concurrently with his life sentence. The defendant now appeals those convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his self-incriminating statement and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James F. Massengale, who had been charged with eight counts of theft of property valued at greater than $10,000, three counts of theft of property valued at more than $1,000, three counts of attempted theft of property with a value greater than $10,000, and one count of burglary of an automobile, was convicted of five counts of theft over $10,000, one count of attempted theft over $10,000, and one count of burglary of a vehicle. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years, with ten years to be served in the Department of Correction and eight years to be served on probation. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Christopher Lee Cooper, pled guilty to theft over $500, a class E felony. The length and manner of service of the sentence were to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender. The Defendant now appeals as of right the length and manner of service of his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1999, petitioner pled guilty to three counts of first degree pre-meditated  murder and received three concurrent life sentences without possibility of parole. Petitioner now appeals from the denial of his post-conviction relief petition, contending that his plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily and that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief.