Michael Angelo Coleman v. Tennessee Board of Parole, et al.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
The River Oak, GP, et al v. IOAN Bucse, et al.
This property dispute involves adjacent commercial property owners. When defendants revealed their intent to erect a fence between the adjoining properties, plaintiffs sued under the theories of adverse possession, prescriptive easement, and implied easement to use a portion of defendants’ property for parking, trash removal, and receiving deliveries. After a bench trial, the trial court found that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing their asserted rights over the area in dispute. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s conclusions as to prescriptive easement and easement by implication only. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Selvin Calderon v. Auto Owners Insurance Company, et al.
Selvin Calderon (“Employee”) suffered a compensable injury to his spine when he fell from a two-story roof. The trial court found Mr. Calderon to be permanently and totally disabled and ordered Auto Owners Insurance Company (“Insurer”) to pay benefits and provide medical care for the injury. Seven months after entry of the judgment, Employee filed a “Motion to Compel Appropriate Medical Accommodations and Expenses and for an Award of Attorney’s Fees,” seeking to have Insurer pay the difference in rent between his present apartment and a wheelchair accessible residence and also for a bus pass to be used for daily activities unrelated to his disability. Insurer is willing and able to modify any apartment for wheelchair accessibility, and it provides transportation to Employee for his medical appointments. Insurer argued it is fulfilling its obligations under the workers’ compensation law. The trial court denied Employee’s motion, and he appealed. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Norris Bettis v. Rebecca Bettis
This is an appeal of a trial court's award of alimony and valuation of marital assets. Husband appeals the trial court's decision to award a percentage of his bonus income as alimony as well as the trial court's valuation of stock allocated to Husband. Wife appeals the trial court's decision not to award her alimony in futuro. We affirm both the trial court's finding with respect to the value of the stock and its decision to not award alimony in futuro. However, we vacate the trial court's decision to award a percentage of Husband's bonus income as alimony and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Martin v. Gregory Powers, et al.
This case arises out of an incident in which the Defendant, Gregory Powers, drove a car he had rented from Enterprise Rent-A-Car (“Enterprise”) into the Plaintiff, Edward Martin. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant, the Defendant’s automobile liability insurer, and Enterprise. Additionally, the Plaintiff provided notice of the lawsuit to his own automobile liability insurance carrier, IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company (“IDS”), in order to recover through the uninsured motorist coverage provision of the Plaintiff’s policy (“the Policy”). IDS denied coverage and moved for summary judgment, arguing that the rental car (“the Rental Car”) did not qualify as an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the Policy. The trial court granted IDS’s motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted review to determine whether the Rental Car qualified as an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the Policy. We hold that the Rental Car was an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the Policy. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to IDS and remand this matter for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Edward Martin v. Gregory Powers, et al. - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The majority concludes that the Policy exclusion for any vehicle “owned or operated by a self-insurer under any applicable motor vehicle law” is ambiguous. I disagree. As explained below, under the plain Policy language, the rental car driven by the Defendant was not an “uninsured motor vehicle” because it was owned by a “self-insurer” under Tennessee’s Financial Responsibility Act. For this reason, I would conclude that the Policy does not provide UM coverage to the Plaintiff in this case. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harold Smith
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Harold Smith, of reckless aggravated assault, vandalism over $1,000, and attempted theft of property over $1,000. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years as a career offender at sixty-five percent. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kelvin Townsel v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kelvin Townsel, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his guilty plea to second degree murder and the resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Heath
A jury convicted the Defendant, William Heath, of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a sentence of forty years for especially aggravated robbery after merging the reckless endangerment and aggravated assault convictions into the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State, ex rel., Melody Kay Rogers v. Donnie O'Keith Lewis
This appeal involves a mother’s petition to set child support. The father objected to the petition, citing a prior order in which the parties agreed that no child support would be ordered but that he would remit payment for medical insurance or medical expenses as needed. The trial court granted the petition, set a current support obligation, and awarded retroactive child support and attorney fees, finding that the prior order was void as against public policy. The father appeals. We reverse the award of retroactive child support, vacate the attorney’s fees awarded and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demarcus Holman
The trial court found that the Defendant, Demarcus Holman, was guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, a Class C felony. The Defendant asserts that the conviction should be overturned on the basis of insufficient evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eddie Medlock v. State of Tennessee
A jury convicted the Petitioner, Eddie Medlock, of two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping perpetrated during the brutal assault of his ex-girlfriend. On direct appeal, this court vacated one count of especially aggravated kidnapping but affirmed the other convictions and the Petitioner‘s sentence of one hundred and twenty years. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief on June 27, 2003, but the post-conviction court did not enter a final disposition until October 1, 2015, when it denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred in denying him funding for expert analysis during the post-conviction proceeding and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rose Coleman v. Bryan Olson
This appeal concerns two disputes between the widowed husband and mother of a deceased woman: (1) the proper party to whom the woman’s life insurance proceeds are owed; and (2) a request for grandparent visitation. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to return the life insurance beneficiary to the status quo that existed prior to wife’s violation of the automatic injunction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-4-106(d)(2). The proceeds from the life insurance policy are therefore awarded to husband. We vacate, however, the trial court’s seizure of the grandmother’s Bank of America account and remand for further proceedings to determine if the funds contained therein represent the remainder of the life insurance proceeds improperly paid to the grandmother. We further conclude that the trial court erred in awarding grandparent visitation, where there was no evidence of opposition to visitation prior to the filing of the grandparent visitation petition. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
The City of Chattanooga Ex Rel. Don Lepard, Qui Tam, v. Electric Power Board of Chattanooga
This is a qui tam action brought by the plaintiff on behalf of himself and the City of Chattanooga (“the City”) against the Electric Power Board of Chattanooga (“EPB”). The plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to the Tennessee False Claims Act (“TFCA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-18-101 to -108, alleging that EPB had overbilled the City for approximately twenty years by billing for lights not in existence and applying an incorrect energy cost calculation. EPB subsequently filed a motion to dismiss with supporting memorandum and attachments, asserting, inter alia, that EPB and the City were the same entity and that the City could not sue itself. Upon the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03, treated EPB’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court denied EPB’s motion upon finding that the relationship between the City and EPB was an issue of disputed material fact. However, upon EPB’s request for reconsideration and the filing of additional pleadings and attached documents, the trial court found that the issue of EPB’s relationship to the City was a matter of law. Following a second summary judgment hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of EPB based on a finding that an action brought by the City against EPB would constitute an impermissible case of the City’s suing itself. The plaintiff appeals. Although we determine that the trial court erred by denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, we further determine this error to be harmless because the plaintiff’s additional claims would not have been able to survive summary judgment. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
David A. Mayes v. City of Tullahoma, Tennessee
David A. Mayes (“Employee”) suffered an injury to his left foot in April 2010 while working as a custodian for the City of Tullahoma, Tennessee (“Employer”). Employee’s injury occurred when he twisted his left foot while stepping off a high step. Despite undergoing two surgeries, Employee continued to experience pain associated with the injury and was diagnosed with complex regional pain syndrome (“CRPS”). While being treated for his left foot injury, Employee fell and hurt his right foot, which also developed CRPS. Further, while recovering from these injuries, Employee became severely depressed. Based upon these physical and mental injuries, the trial court determined that Employee was permanently and totally disabled. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its determination of permanent and total disability. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Workers Compensation Panel | |
City of La Vergne v. Randall T. LeQuire
This appeal arises from a traffic citation issued to the appellant by a municipal police officer. The citation charged the appellant with a violation of “SPEEDING 55-8-152,” a reference to Tennessee’s statutory prohibition on speeding codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-152 (2012). The appellant was found guilty of speeding in the municipal court and appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court judge entered a judgment against the appellant for a violation of a municipal ordinance rather than for a violation of the state statute charged on the citation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the citation was insufficient to provide him with notice of the charge for which he was convicted. We agree. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the circuit court and dismiss this case. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Emily Mae Kelly v. Ryan Marshall Kelly
This is an appeal of an order denying Father’s petition to modify custody and visitation and for Rule 60.02 relief from a previous judgment of the court. Father appeals the trial court’s finding that no material change in circumstance existed that warranted a change in the parties’ parenting plan. Additionally, Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that Father is not voluntarily underemployed. We affirm. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Denise Cross v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dorothy Denise Cross, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. The State concedes that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for an evidentiary hearing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank C. Massengill
Pro se petitioner, Frank Massengill, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his motion, his sentences have not expired, and the trial court failed to follow the sentencing procedures under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210(b). Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachary Gale Rattler
A Sevier County jury convicted Zachary Gale Rattler (“the Defendant”) of attempted first degree murder, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, and possession of a prohibited weapon. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of sixty years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on flight, violating the Defendant's right to trial by jury; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant's subsequent arrest in North Carolina as evidence of flight; (3) the trial court erred when it would not permit backstriking of potential jurors; (4) the trial court erroneously refused to reconvene the jury for the Motion for New Trial hearing; (5) the Defendant was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury because a juror failed to disclose knowledge of two of the State's witnesses; (6) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant's conviction for especially aggravated robbery; (7) the trial court erred in failing to require the jury to further deliberate after returning an “incorrect verdict”; (8) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive; (9) the jury improperly considered the Defendant's decision not to testify to the prejudice of the Defendant; and (10) cumulative error requires a new trial. Following a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Myrtle Robinson, et al. v. Edward Todd Robbins, MD
This is a health care liability action. The plaintiffs timely filed suit against the defendant concerning the inadequate care and treatment received by the decedent. After voluntarily dismissing the initial suit, the plaintiffs provided pre-suit notice before filing a second suit pursuant to the saving statute. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the saving statute did not apply because there was no identity of parties between the actions. He explained that the second complaint was filed against him in his individual capacity while the initial complaint was lodged against him in his corporate capacity. The court agreed and held that the second action was barred for failure to file within the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger Dale Stewart
The defendant, Roger Dale Stewart, was convicted of one count of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment, Class E felonies. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; that the trial court erred when it refused to provide a requested jury instruction; that his convictions violate the principles of double jeopardy and the Due Process Clause; and that the trial court erred by imposing a two-year sentence to be served in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger Dale Stewart - concurring and dissenting
I agree with most of the conclusions set forth in the majority opinion. I write separately, however, to respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s merger of the defendant’s reckless endangerment convictions does not constitute plain error. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Cole
Nicholas Cole (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to fifteen counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less and eighteen counts of burglary of an automobile. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. In this delayed direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him to serve partially consecutive sentences, erred in sentencing him to continuous confinement, erred in denying probation, and erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon a thorough review of the record below and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s order as to the length of the Defendant’s sentences, the partial consecutive sentence alignment, and the denial of probation, but reverse the trial court’s order of continuous confinement for his convictions of “burglary of an auto,” a specifically enumerated non-violent property offense in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(c)(18). We remand for resentencing consistent with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(a) and section 40-35-104(c). |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Lynn Brummitt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David Lynn Brummitt, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals |