Brian Gauldin v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Brian Gauldin, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court for Dyer County. He was convicted of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug free zone and the sale of cocaine under .5 grams in a drug free zone and received an effective sentence of twenty years' incarceration. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to (1) present current photos of the location where the drug sales occurred to demonstrate that it was a “vacant lot” rather than a city park; (2) present an expert witness to rebut the State's explanation of a change in drug amounts listed in its reports between his first and second trials; (3) advise him that he would be sentenced as a Range III, Persistent Offender; and (4) challenge the racial composition of the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Wilkerson
A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Johnny Wilkerson, guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of twenty years for each conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony L. Woods v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Anthony L. Woods, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of driving on a revoked license and received an effective six-year sentence to be served on probation. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary. The post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Javonta Marquis Perkins
This is Defendant’s, Javonta Marquis Perkins, direct appeal from his conviction of evading arrest, a Class D felony. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by giving a jury instruction on criminal responsibility. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee - Javonta Marquis Perkins - Concurring in part and dissenting in part
I agree with most of the conclusions set forth in the majority opinion. I write separately, however, to respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Sergeant Sanderson qualified as an endangered third party, which elevated the evading arrest to a Class D felony. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas L. Dowlen
A jury convicted the defendant, Thomas L. Dowlen, of first degree (premeditated) murder. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of guilt and that he is entitled to a new trial based on the prosecutor’s remarks during opening argument. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Samuel C. Clemmons, et al v. Johnny Nesmith
In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Appellants appeal from separate orders denying two motions for recusal filed in this case. As to denial of the first motion for recusal, we hold that Appellants failed to file a timely appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. As to the denial of the second recusal motion, we hold that the recusal motion was ineffective because it was not signed by local counsel as required by Rule 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. In the absence of a timely filed appeal from an effective recusal motion, we dismiss this appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County v. Wood Ridge Development, Inc., et al
The developer of a Nashville subdivision and its surety entered into three performance agreements by which they bound themselves to complete the infrastructure in the subdivision. The Metropolitan Government brought an action to enforce the agreements against both parties when the developer failed to complete the infrastructure. The surety filed an answer as well as a cross claim against the developer and a third-party complaint against a group of investors who had executed a separate agreement to indemnify the surety for any amounts the surety might pay or be held liable. After settling with the Metropolitan Government, the surety sought summary judgment against the developer and investors; the cross and third-party defendants also sought summary judgment asserting that, since the surety did not issue a separate bond, they had no obligation to indemnify the surety. The court granted summary judgment to the surety upon holding that the performance agreement operated as a bond and entitled the surety to indemnification. The developer and investors appeal the grant of the surety’s motion and the denial of their motion. We hold that the surety’s execution of the performance agreements operated as an “undertaking[] or other writing[] obligatory in nature of a bond” as contemplated by the indemnity agreement and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher A. Hamilton v. Tennessee Board Of Probation And Parole, et al.
This appeal involves an incarcerated inmate’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari, claiming that the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole acted arbitrarily and without material evidence in denying his request for parole. The trial court granted the petition but ultimately affirmed the denial of parole. The petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
M & M Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Cumberland Electric Membership Corporation
This appeal involves the termination of a contract between an electric power distributor and an independent contractor. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the electric power distributor was justified in terminating the contract because the independent contractor materially breached the contract by violating a safety policy and an oral directive from the power distributor. The independent contractor appeals, claiming that the evidence did not support a finding that it violated the safety policy or directive, that such a violation, even if it did occur, did not constitute a material breach of the contract, and that the power distributor was required to give notice and an opportunity to cure any default prior to terminating the contract. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sedrick Darion Mitchell
Sedrick Darion Mitchell (“the Defendant”) was convicted offailure to appear after a jury trial. The trial court sentenced him to serve six years at sixty percent release eligibility in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive and contrary to law. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryant Jackson Harris - concurring
I write separately to express my opinion that the trial court erred in its attempted curative instruction to the jury during cross-examination of Defendant. As noted in the majority opinion in its analysis of the mistrial issue, the prosecutor asked Defendant, “And it’s true . . . that you never told any police officer that came to the scene any of this, right?” Defendant objected on the basis that the question violated his constitutional right to remain silent. The trial court sustained Defendant’s objection. However, in the trial court’s attempt to minimize damage caused by the prosecutor’s question, the instruction to the jury included that, “The defendant has a constitutional right against self-incrimination.” |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathon Wayne Thompson
Defendant, Jonathon Wayne Thompson, was convicted of theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1000. He received a sentence of one year and six months, with 90 days to serve in incarceration on consecutive weekends and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s decision to deny full probation. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryant Jackson Harris
The Defendant, Bryant Jackson Harris, was convicted by a Hawkins County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), (2) (2014) (first degree murder), 39-14-402 (2014) (aggravated burglary). The Defendant received an effective life sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial, and (4) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case to the trial court for corrected judgments reflecting merger of the first degree felony murder conviction with the first degree premeditated murder conviction. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Gerald Smith
Stephen Gerard Smith, the Defendant, filed a pro se Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 in which he asked the trial court to either reduce his sentence or to grant a new sentencing hearing. Because the Defendant was erroneously sentenced as a career offender rather than a persistent offender for Class C felony aggravated assault and because the sentence was entered as the result of an agreement between the State and the Defendant, the trial court granted a new sentencing hearing. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to thirteen years’ incarceration as a Range III persistent offender for Class C felony aggravated assault and to a consecutive sentence of twelve years’ incarceration as a career offender for Class D felony attempted aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the three domestic assault convictions to be served concurrently with each other and with the felony sentences. The Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in allowing him to proceed pro se in the motion hearing and in the imposition of the sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Thomas Jackson v. Susan Denise Jackson
In this divorce action, the trial court granted the wife a divorce, divided the marital assets, and awarded her alimony in solido but denied her request for alimony in futuro. The wife appeals. We reverse and grant a divorce without fault to either party. We also modify the judgment to reflect an award of alimony in futuro in the amount of $2,000 per month. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Kent L. Booher v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kent L. Booher, appeals the Loudon County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2014 guilty plea convictions for two counts of statutory rape and his effective three-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. We conclude that the Petitioner stated sufficient facts to constitute a colorable claim, and we remand the case to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing. |
Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leroy Myers, Jr.
After a bench trial, the trial court issued a written order finding the Defendant, Leroy Myers, Jr., not guilty of the charged offense, aggravated assault, but guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. On appeal the Defendant asserts that reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault under the facts of this case and that there was not an implicit amendment to the indictment to include reckless endangerment. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corrin Kathleen Reynolds
We granted this appeal to determine whether the warrantless blood draw violated the defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, and, if so, whether the exclusionary rule applies and requires suppression of the evidence. We conclude that the warrantless blood draw violated the defendant’s federal and state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Nevertheless, we adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), and as a result, hold that any evidence derived from testing the defendant’s blood need not be suppressed because the warrantless blood draw was obtained in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance on binding precedent. On this basis, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Corrin Kathleen Reynolds - Dissenting
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the warrantless blood draw violated Ms. Reynolds’ right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. I dissent from the Court’s decision to excuse these constitutional violations by adopting a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The adoption of this exception for a constitutional violation erodes our citizens’ rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Therefore, I would hold that the test results of Ms. Reynolds’ warrantless blood draw must be suppressed. Moreover, given the unusual facts of this case, the adoption of a good-faith exception for a constitutional violation based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on binding judicial precedent, as set forth in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011), is ill-conceived for many reasons. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Estate of J. Don Brock
This is an appeal of an order dismissing a will contest for lack of standing. The Contestants sought to challenge the testator's will, alleging that it was the product of fraud and/or undue influence. The Estate introduced multiple prior wills that appeared to be facially valid and properly executed in which all or some of the Contestants were disinherited. The chancery court found that the Contestants would not benefit if the testator's will was set aside and dismissed the contest for lack of standing. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Knox C.
Shane L.B. (“Father”) appeals the judgment of the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child, Knox C. (“the Child”), after finding and holding that grounds for terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the Child's best interest for Father's parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings made by clear and convincing evidence that grounds were proven to terminate Father's parental rights to the Child and that the termination was in the Child's best interest. We, therefore, affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Kempson, et al. v. Pamela Casey, et al., - DISSENTING
I cannot concur in the majority’s decision. The issue of whether the collision of the vehicles “caused damage to the Plaintiffs” was fairly presented to the jury. The jury rejected the Plaintiffs’ theory that Mr. Kempson was injured in the accident. I would affirm the jury’s verdict in toto. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand for a new trial on damages. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
J.A.C., by and through her next friend and mother, Lesha Carter v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, et al.
In this health care liability action, Defendants moved to dismiss based on the Plaintiffs‘ failure to provide the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") medical authorization required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Based on its determination that the Plaintiffs failed to substantially comply with the foregoing statute, the trial court held that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to an extension of the applicable statutes of limitations and repose under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) and accordingly concluded that the Plaintiffs‘ claims were time-barred. The trial court also concluded that the Plaintiffs‘ constitutional challenges to the viability of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 were without merit. We affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quincy Terrell Brando Sharpe
Defendant, Quincy Terrell Sharpe, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury, along with his co-defendant DeAndre D. Rucker, for premeditated first degree murder. Defendant and Rucker were tried jointly, and both were convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct by the State during closing argument. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |