State vs. Charles Ricky Deason M2000-00497-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III
The appellant, Charles Ricky Deason, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to one count of driving under the influence (hereinafter "DUI"), seventh offense; one count of leaving the scene of an accident; one count of driving on a revoked license, fourth offense; one count of DUI, second offense; and two counts of misdemeanor assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Montgomery County Jail for DUI, seventh offense. The trial court also sentenced the appellant to thirty days incarceration for leaving the scene of an accident, to be served concurrently with the sentence for DUI, seventh offense. Additionally, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an eleven month and twenty-nine day suspended sentence for driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, and ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the DUI, seventh offense, and leaving the scene of an accident. The trial court further sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration, with ninety days to be served in incarceration and the remainder suspended, for the DUI, second offense, and ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the DUI, seventh offense, and leaving the scene of an accident, and consecutively to the driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. Finally, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days probation for each of the assault convictions and ordered these sentences to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the other sentences. Subsequently, the appellant violated his probation by driving on a revoked license, violating the Light Law, and improper vehicle registration. The trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered the appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. The appellant presents the following issue for our review: whether the judgment of the trial court compelling the appellant to serve the full balance of his sentences in confinement was supported by the evidence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Montgomery
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. ThomasLawrence and Joseph Hatton M2000-00493-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee
The appellant, Thomas Lawrence, was convicted by a jury in the Marshall County Criminal Court of one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a class C felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Lawrence, as a Range II offender, to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the possession of crack cocaine conviction and assessed a $2000 fine. The trial court further sentenced Lawrence to eleven months incarceration in the Marshall County Jail for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. The trial court ordered Lawrence to serve these sentences concurrently. The appellant, Joseph Hatton, was convicted by a jury in the Marshall County Criminal Court of two counts of selling crack cocaine, a class C felony, one count of possession of crack cocaine with the intent to sell, a class C felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Hatton, as a Range I offender, to four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each sale of crack cocaine conviction and four years incarceration for the possession of crack cocaine with the intent to sell conviction. The court assessed a total of $4250 in fines. The trial court further ordered Hatton to serve his sentences for selling crack cocaine concurrently with each other but consecutive to the sentence for possession of crack cocaine with the intent to sell.
Cunningham vs. Cunningham W1999-02054-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
This appeal involves a divorce after seven years of marriage. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, divided the property, awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido, awarded child support for the parties' minor child, established an educational trust fund, and ordered the husband to maintain life insurance for so long as he is obligated to pay child support. On appeal, husband takes issue with all of the above and also raises the constitutionality of the child support guidelines. In addition, wife takes issue with the failure of the trial court to award her litigation expenses. We have determined that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Madison
Court of Appeals
American Indemnity vs. Foy Trailer W2000-00397-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
American Indemnity Company sought a declaratory judgment that its commercial general liability (CGL) policy did not cover claims made by Ms. Johnson against the Appellants in her federal court complaint and that it did not have a duty to defend Appellants in the federal action. The Chancery Court for Shelby County held that there was no coverage and no duty to defend. Appellants appealed. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Matter of Fannie Barnhill W2000-00289-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield
Will contestant voluntarily dismissed chancery court proceeding to contest will. Subsequently, contestant filed another notice to contest the will. The trial court, on motion, dismissed the proceeding as barred, because it had previously been dismissed, and such an action is within an exception to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 41.01 (1). Contestant has appealed.
Fayette
Court of Appeals
Denley Rentals vs. Howard Etheridge W2000-00189-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This case involves the assignability of a chose in action. The plaintiffs are two related limited liability companies and the person who was the owner/manager of both. The owner/manager contracted to purchase real property from the defendants, and later assigned his interest under the contract to one of the limited liability companies. The first limited liability company closed the transaction with the defendants. After the transaction was closed, the first company discovered a landfill located on the property that had not been disclosed by the defendants. The first company then transferred the property to the second limited liability company for de minimis consideration. The owner/manager of both companies made a "mental assignment" of the chose in action from the first company to the second company, and the second company incurred the cost of clearing the landfill debris. The plaintiffs jointly sued the defendants for breach of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that there was not a valid assignment of the chose in action, that the first company was precluded from recovery because it suffered no damages, and that the second company was precluded from recovery because it took the property with full knowledge of the defect. On appeal, we reverse and remand, finding that the chose in action was validly assigned.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
The Pointe vs. Lake Mgmt. W2000-00211-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action to determine rights in a privately-owned lake. Plaintiffs purchased land adjacent to the artificially-created lake for the purpose of developing residential lots. Subsequent to the sale of the property, Plaintiffs' grantor conveyed title to the lake to Defendant. Defendant claims it has the right to control use of the lake and that Plaintiffs have no right to lake access without Defendant's permission. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the lake is unnavigable, and no riparian rights can therefore flow to adjoining landowners; (2) the Defendant, as owner of the land subjacent to the lake, has a right to the unimpeded use and control of the property; and (3) any use of the lake by the adjoining property owners without Defendant's consent would constitute a trespass. Plaintiffs appeal.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Trial Court Judge: William Charles Lee
Bedford
Court of Criminal Appeals
Scott Yother vs. Laine Yother E2000-01046-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jacqueline E. Schulten
In this post-divorce case, Elaine Hines Yother ("Mother") appeals from an order awarding primary residential custody of the parties' minor child, Avery Raechelle Yother (DOB: April 2, 1995), to the child's father, Scott Christopher Yother ("Father"). Mother argues (1) that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the custodial arrangement decreed in the parties' divorce judgment; and, alternatively, (2) that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's judgment changing custody. Because we find that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the issue of custody, we reverse the judgment below.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Edward F. Curtis vs. Stephen T. Nash, et al E1999-01135-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
This appeal arises in the Knox County Circuit Court from a grant of a motion for summary judgment. Edward F. Curtis appeals the grant of summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of appeal against Mr. Curtis and his surety.
Knox
Court of Appeals
E1999-01909-R3-CV E1999-01909-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
Anderson
Court of Appeals
Jerry Wayne Terry vs. Donna Brazier Terry E2000-00825-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Steven C. Douglas
This appeal from the Cumberland County Probate and Family Court concerns whether the Trial Court erred in making an equitable division of the marital estate of Jerry Wayne Terry, the Appellant, and Donna Brazier Terry, the Appellee. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary. We adjudge costs of appeal against Mr. Terry and his surety.
Cumberland
Court of Appeals
Whittington-Barrett vs. Johnson E2000-00700-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley
This is a suit between two inmates of the State of Tennessee. The Plaintiff, a transsexual, seeks a declaratory judgment "to establish the rights of the Plaintiff," and damages, attorney fees and costs against the Defendant because of sexual harassment. The cause of action alleges violation of various sections of the Constitutions of the State of Tennessee and the United States of America and of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Trial Judge dismissed the complaint because there was "no claim of state action in Plaintiff's complaint, nor is this an employer/employee situation." We affirm.
Johnson
Court of Appeals
Kenneth L. Storey vs. David J. Poss E1999-00192-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Daryl R. Fansler
Plaintiff/Appellant is an inmate at West Tennessee High Security Prison in Hennig, Tennessee, pursuant to a conviction for aggravated rape. Defendant, a Tennessee attorney, was appointed by the General Sessions Court to represent Plaintiff at a preliminary hearing on that charge. After that hearing, Plaintiff was bound over to the grand jury for trial. Plaintiff asked the Criminal Court to dismiss Defendant as his counsel and to appoint another attorney. The Criminal Court granted Plaintiff's request and appointed new counsel on April 18, 1996. On August 29, 1997, Plaintiff filed this legal malpractice action against Defendant in Chancery Court asking for damages of $730,000. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the one-year statute of limitations for attorney malpractice claims bars Plaintiff's claim. The Chancellor granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
State vs. Scarlett Rose Bender M2000-1070-CCA-R3-CD
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace
The Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to possessing with the intent to sell or deliver over one hundred pounds of marijuana, which is a Class B felony. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the Defendant to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that she should have been sentenced as an especially mitigated offender and that she should have been allowed to serve her sentence on probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Dickson
Court of Criminal Appeals
James C. Barbra v. Clarendon National Insurance E1999-00232-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Peoples, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant, Clarendon National Insurance Company, is the workers' compensation insurance carrier for United Marine Corporation (hereafter "the employer"). The issue is whether an award of 62-1/2 percent partial disability to the body as a whole is excessive in light of the medical and vocational testimony. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
State vs. Warner Powell and Charlie Stokes M1999-00661-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Robert W. Wedemeyer
This is an appeal as of right by the State of Tennessee, which argues that the trial court erred by suppressing the evidence obtained against the Defendants pursuant to a search warrant. The State asserts that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the search warrant was invalid because the agent who provided the information in the affidavit establishing probable cause to search did not have the authority to execute the warrant or arrest the Defendants. In response, the Defendants assert that the State's notice of appeal was not timely filed, and they argue that the evidence was properly suppressed because the agent did not have the authority to obtain or execute the search warrant and because the affidavit did not establish the veracity of the confidential informant. We conclude that the State's notice of appeal was not timely filed, but we will consider the appeal in the interest of justice. We further conclude that the search warrant was valid; thus the trial court erred by suppressing the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. Accordingly, the trial court's order suppressing the evidence is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Montgomery
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Roderick Johnson M1999-00605-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
A Davidson County jury convicted defendant of second degree murder. In this appeal as a matter of right, defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the jury based his conviction. Our review of the record reflects sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs.Robert Lewis Herrin M1999-00856-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee
The appellant, Robert Lewis Herrin, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to one count of theft of property worth one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more but less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), a class D felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I offender to three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspending all but 120 days of the appellant's sentence and granting him supervised probation for a term of ten years. As a special condition of probation, the trial court prohibited the appellant from engaging in "any type [of] construction business or solicitation for business." In this appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing this special condition of probation. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.
Marshall
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Bobbie Joe Rollins M1999-02457-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee
The defendant was convicted by a Marshall County jury of reckless aggravated assault and sentenced by the trial court to ten years imprisonment as a Range III offender. In this appeal as a matter of right, the defendant claims the conflict between the trial court's erroneous written jury instruction requiring proof of venue in "Lincoln County," and the oral instruction requiring proof of venue in "Marshall County," requires reversal. After a through review of the record, we conclude that the issue has been waived. Furthermore, regardless of waiver, any error in the written jury instruction was clearly harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Marshall
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Richard C. Silk M1999-02526-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: J. Steve Daniel
The appellant, Richard C. Silk, was convicted by a jury in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of one count of resisting arrest, a class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to six (6) months incarceration in the Rutherford County Jail, assigning a service percentage of seventy-five percent (75%). The appellant now presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the appellant's conviction of resisting arrest; (2) whether the trial court erred in sustaining certain objections by the State to the appellant's testimony concerning a statement made to him by an arresting officer; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
State vs. Bernard Jerome Jones M2000-00018-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn
The defendant was convicted by a Davidson County jury of possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced defendant to 16 years incarceration as a Range II multiple offender. In this appeal as a matter of right, defendant makes the following allegations of error: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt; (2) the trial court erred by ruling that if defendant testified, the state could impeach his credibility by introducing defendant's prior drug convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to 16 years incarceration. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. William Lewis Houston M1999-01430-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
Defendant was convicted by a Giles County jury of eight drug offenses and one count of aggravated assault. He received an effective sentence of seventy-two years. In this appeal, the defendant makes the following allegations: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error by consolidating all nine indictments for trial; (3) the process of selecting the jury venire was unconstitutional; (4) the trial court improperly limited the defendant's cross-examination of the undercover agent; (5) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence transcripts of certain tape recorded conversations and failed to properly instruct the jury concerning the transcripts; and (6) the trial court erred in its sentencing determinations. We conclude the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant and reduce the sentences to an effective term of forty-six years. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.