Betty L. Fox vs. Food Lion, Inc., Store #539
E1911-00015-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Harold Wimberly
Betty L. Fox sued Food Lion, Inc., Store #539, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained when she fell in an aisle of the defendant's store. The trial court approved the jury's verdict for the plaintiff and entered judgment in her favor for $112,000. The defendant appeals, raising three issues, which we restate as follows: (1) whether there is material evidence that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition that caused the plaintiff's fall; (2) whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; and (3) whether there is material evidence to support the jury's allocation of fault. We affirm.

Stephenson vs. Carlton
E1998-00202-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Lynn W. Brown
We granted this appeal to determine whether the appellant's sentence of life without parole for first- degree murder was an illegal sentence and, if so, whether the appellant was entitled to habeas corpus relief. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We conclude, and the State concedes, that the sentence of life without parole was not a statutorily authorized punishment at the time the appellant committed the offense of first-degree murder and that the illegal sentence was properly challenged in a habeas corpus petition. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Ernestyne M. Webb v. Shoe City, Inc.,
W1998-00741-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Karen R. Williams, Judge
This case involves a back injury sustained in 1995 by Ernestyne M. Webb, an employee of Shoe City, Incorporated. The employee brought suit against the employer and its insurer, The Traveler's Insurance Company. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a herniated disk at the L-4 level of her spine and suffered a 15 percent anatomical impairment rating as a result. The court awarded benefits based upon 67.5 percent disability to the body as a whole. The court also found that the employee was not returned to work and declined to apply the two and one-half (2.5) times cap in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 50-6-241(a). The defendants have presented the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the plaintiff was not returned to work as required by Tennessee Code Annotated _ 50-6-241(a); and (2) whether the evidence preponderates against the court's finding that the plaintiff suffered a 15 percent anatomical impairment to the body as a whole. We find that we must affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.

Antonia Regina Rose v. Emerson Motor Company
W1999-02705-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: J. Steven Stafford, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis, Chancellor
This is an appeal by the defendant/employer. The only issue presented is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of 35% permanent partial disability to each of the plaintiff's arms. We find it does not and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Anthony Layne
M1997-00025-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Gerald L. Ewell, Sr.

State v. Charles Ray Allen
M1999-00818-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
The Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and criminal attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder, and to a consecutive four year term for the attempted manslaughter. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; the trial court's exclusion of proof about the victim's prior violent conduct; the trial court's instruction to the jury about the penalties for first degree murder; and his sentencing. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State vs. Anthony Roberts
M1999-00750-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Defendant appeals his conviction by a Davidson County jury of DUI second offense. He raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress based upon the lack of probable cause to arrest; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (3) whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during final argument, and (4) whether records pertaining to his prior DUI conviction were properly admitted. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Brentol Calvin James
M1999-02533-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
The appellant, Brentol Calvin James, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of an offense, a class E felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant, as a Range I offender, to a one- year sentence of incarceration in the Davidson County Workhouse. The appellant raises the following issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in allowing a verdict to stand when there was insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support the conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Peter George Crehan
M1999-02542-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Robert W. Wedemeyer
The defendant was convicted by a Robertson County jury of driving under the influence ("DUI"), third offense, and reckless driving. Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) sustaining his conviction for DUI, third offense, despite the indictment's failure to allege the specific court in Davidson County where he received his two prior DUI convictions; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless driving. After a through review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Re: Paul's Bonding Company, Inc.
M1999-02528-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
The appellant, Paul's Bonding Company, Inc., appeals the judgments of the Davidson County Criminal Court ordering complete forfeiture of bail bonds in the cases of criminal defendants Carlos Ramon Ruiz and Castulo Morales Vasquez and partial forfeiture of the bail bond in the case of criminal defendant Reyes Castro. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State vs. Kenneth Sisco
M2000-00036-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Steve R. Dozier
The Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of robbery. His plea agreement provided that he would be sentenced as a Range II multiple offender, with the length of the sentence to be determined by the trial judge. Following a sentencing hearing, the judge sentenced him to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial judge erred by setting his sentence at ten years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shanta Fonton McKay vs. State
M2000-00016-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn
After his transfer from juvenile court, appellant pled guilty to second degree murder and, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, received a sentence of 19 years. Appellant sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court. In this appeal as a matter of right, appellant seeks relief alleging a double jeopardy violation, an involuntary guilty plea, and ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

State of Tennessee v. Beverly K. Meeks
M2000-00435-CCA-MR3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee

State vs. Kenneth Ray Jarman
M1999-01382-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III
The appellant, Kenneth Ray Jarman, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Criminal Court to one count of driving under the influence (hereinafter "DUI"), fourth offense or over, a class E felony; one count of driving on a revoked license, sixth offense, a class A misdemeanor; and one count of violating the open container law, a class C misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the appellant to two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the DUI conviction, and imposed a $3000 fine. The trial court also sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Montgomery County Jail for the driving on a revoked license conviction, and imposed a $350 fine. The trial court further sentenced the appellant to thirty days incarceration in the Montgomery County Jail for the violation of the open container law. Additionally, the trial court ordered the appellant's sentences to be served concurrently. The appellant raises the following issues for review: (1) whether the enhancing factors applied by the trial court were inapplicable to this case; and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant to serve the full term of his two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm in part and modify the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Jerry Belew
M1999-02143-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Jones
The defendant was convicted by a Maury County jury of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of nine years for attempted second degree murder and three years for aggravated assault. In this appeal defendant alleges that the trial court: (1) improperly limited defense counsel's closing argument; (2) improperly denied his requested jury charges; and (3) improperly sentenced him to consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Anthony Ewing vs. State
M1999-01079-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Steve R. Dozier
On February 12, 1998, the petitioner, Anthony Ewing, entered a best interest guilty plea in the Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of attempt to sell over .5 grams of cocaine, a class C felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years incarceration in the Davidson County Workhouse. The trial court further ordered this sentence to be served concurrently with sentences the petitioner was already serving. The petitioner filed a post-conviction petition for relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his best interest guilty plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding that the petitioner had received effective assistance of counsel and that the best interest guilty plea had been made knowingly and voluntarily. The petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State vs. James D. Brazelton
M1999-02477-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn
The appellant, James D. Brazelton, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of one count of possession of marijuana, over 10 pounds but less than 70 pounds, with the intent to deliver, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant, as a Range II offender, to seven years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence; and (2) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. James Edward Cowan
M1999-02572-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
Defendant was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated burglary. At sentencing his conviction for especially aggravated burglary was reduced to aggravated burglary. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to thirty-six years for the Class A felony of attempted first degree murder, sixteen years for the Class B felony of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and eight years for the Class C felony of aggravated burglary. The attempted first degree murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery sentences were run consecutively to each other, and the aggravated burglary sentence ran concurrently, for an effective fifty-two year sentence. In this appeal, defendant makes the following allegations: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the bullet which was removed from defendant during surgery; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder; (3) his separate convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated burglary violate due process since they were incidental to attempted especially aggravated robbery; and (4) the trial court erred in determining the length and consecutive service of his sentences. Upon our review of the record we conclude the trial court properly admitted the bullet removed from the defendant; the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder; there was no due process violation; and defendant was properly sentenced. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State vs. Melissa Stearns
M1999-1826-CCA-R3-CD
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
The appellant, Melissa Ann Stearns, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to one (1) count of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and one (1) count of evading arrest, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of two (2) years for each offense, suspended after service of thirty (30) days in the Williamson County Jail. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in ordering her to serve thirty (30) days in jail. After thoroughly reviewing the record before this Court, we hold that, due to the seriousness of the offenses committed by the appellant, the trial court did not err in denying full probation. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State vs. Charles Ricky Deason
M2000-00497-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III
The appellant, Charles Ricky Deason, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to one count of driving under the influence (hereinafter "DUI"), seventh offense; one count of leaving the scene of an accident; one count of driving on a revoked license, fourth offense; one count of DUI, second offense; and two counts of misdemeanor assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Montgomery County Jail for DUI, seventh offense. The trial court also sentenced the appellant to thirty days incarceration for leaving the scene of an accident, to be served concurrently with the sentence for DUI, seventh offense. Additionally, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an eleven month and twenty-nine day suspended sentence for driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, and ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the DUI, seventh offense, and leaving the scene of an accident. The trial court further sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration, with ninety days to be served in incarceration and the remainder suspended, for the DUI, second offense, and ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the DUI, seventh offense, and leaving the scene of an accident, and consecutively to the driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. Finally, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days probation for each of the assault convictions and ordered these sentences to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the other sentences. Subsequently, the appellant violated his probation by driving on a revoked license, violating the Light Law, and improper vehicle registration. The trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered the appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. The appellant presents the following issue for our review: whether the judgment of the trial court compelling the appellant to serve the full balance of his sentences in confinement was supported by the evidence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. ThomasLawrence and Joseph Hatton
M2000-00493-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee
The appellant, Thomas Lawrence, was convicted by a jury in the Marshall County Criminal Court of one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, a class C felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Lawrence, as a Range II offender, to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the possession of crack cocaine conviction and assessed a $2000 fine. The trial court further sentenced Lawrence to eleven months incarceration in the Marshall County Jail for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. The trial court ordered Lawrence to serve these sentences concurrently. The appellant, Joseph Hatton, was convicted by a jury in the Marshall County Criminal Court of two counts of selling crack cocaine, a class C felony, one count of possession of crack cocaine with the intent to sell, a class C felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Hatton, as a Range I offender, to four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each sale of crack cocaine conviction and four years incarceration for the possession of crack cocaine with the intent to sell conviction. The court assessed a total of $4250 in fines. The trial court further ordered Hatton to serve his sentences for selling crack cocaine concurrently with each other but consecutive to the sentence for possession of crack cocaine with the intent to sell.

State of Tennessee v. Michael Brady
II-798-239-A
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter

Cunningham vs. Cunningham
W1999-02054-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
This appeal involves a divorce after seven years of marriage. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, divided the property, awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido, awarded child support for the parties' minor child, established an educational trust fund, and ordered the husband to maintain life insurance for so long as he is obligated to pay child support. On appeal, husband takes issue with all of the above and also raises the constitutionality of the child support guidelines. In addition, wife takes issue with the failure of the trial court to award her litigation expenses. We have determined that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

American Indemnity vs. Foy Trailer
W2000-00397-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
American Indemnity Company sought a declaratory judgment that its commercial general liability (CGL) policy did not cover claims made by Ms. Johnson against the Appellants in her federal court complaint and that it did not have a duty to defend Appellants in the federal action. The Chancery Court for Shelby County held that there was no coverage and no duty to defend. Appellants appealed. We affirm.

Matter of Fannie Barnhill
W2000-00289-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield
Will contestant voluntarily dismissed chancery court proceeding to contest will. Subsequently, contestant filed another notice to contest the will. The trial court, on motion, dismissed the proceeding as barred, because it had previously been dismissed, and such an action is within an exception to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 41.01 (1). Contestant has appealed.