State of Tennessee v. Eric Cruthird
Upon his pleas of guilty, the Defendant, Eric Cruthird, was convicted of three counts of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, each conviction being a Class B felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant received an eight-year sentence for each conviction, with one of said sentences to be served consecutively to the other two, for an effective sentence of sixteen years. In accordance with the plea agreement, the manner of service of the sentence was left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing and ordered that the sentences be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Glenn Collins, Jr. v. Tommy Mills, Warden (State of Tennessee)
The petitioner, James Glenn Collins, Jr., appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals because the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Upon our review of the petition and the applicable authorities, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jessie Hodges v. Ricky J. Bell, Warden
Petitioner, Jessie Hodges, was convicted of robbery and sentenced as a persistent offender to twelve years in incarceration. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Jessie Nelson Hodges, No. W2001-00871-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 927603, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 3, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 4, 2002). Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. Jessie Hodges v. State, No. W2005-01852-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 211829, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 25, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 30, 2006). Subsequently, Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in the Davidson County Chancery Court. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals. We determine that the habeas corpus court properly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daryl Dewitt Godwin
The defendant, Daryl Dewitt Godwin, pled guilty to theft of property over $60,000, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of : The Estate of Allen Crawford Roberts, Deceased
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the probate court erred when it granted Appellee’s motion for a directed verdict. The probate court found that Appellants, in their proof in chief, did not satisfactorily make out a prima facie case of the Antenuptial Agreement’s validity under the statutes and appellate opinions of Tennessee as Appellants failed to establish that there was a satisfactory disclosure of Mr. Roberts’ assets. On appeal, Appellants contend that the motion for a directed verdict was improperly granted as reasonable minds could conclude that the Antenuptial Agreement was presented to, read, and understood by Appellee at execution and that the Antenuptial Agreement constituted a full and fair disclosure as required by Tennessee law. Although Appellants have urged an incorrect standard of review, we find, after a de novo review of the evidence, that Appellants made out a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. We reverse and remand to the probate court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
McKee Foods Corporation et al. v. James M. Bumpus
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, James Bumpus, appeals the trial court’s ruling that his sternal non-union following open-heart surgery was a noncompensable injury because it was caused by over fifty years of heavy smoking and a chronic cough rather than work-related activities. Mr. Bumpus also appeals the trial court’s ruling that work-related activities did not cause an actual advancement or progression of his pre-existing condition. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s ruling, and affirm the judgment. |
Sumner | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Kenneth Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Kenneth Williams, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to second degree murder and received a sentence of thirty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. The sole issue for review on appeal is whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Emily N. Williams v. Charles Cliburn
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her personal injury action as barred by the savings statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The trial court measured the period for refiling the action from the date of entry of an Order of Non-Suit which had been sent to the court by facsimile rather than from the date of entry of the hard copy of the order. We find that the trial court correctly held that the operative date for purposes of the Tennessee savings statute was the date of entry of the first order received and signed by the court, but that Plaintiff was not given notice of entry of the order, as his counsel had requested. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this action and remand for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Jones And Billy Jones v. Lisa June Cox
This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant/Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Appellees/Plaintiffs’ complaint for legal malpractice. Appellant, a licensed attorney, represented the Appellees in a lawsuit following an automobile accident. Appellant failed to effect service of process on the party-defendant to that suit. Appellees retained other counsel and filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against Appellant. Appellees’ new counsel made a strategic decision to withhold service of process on Appellant pending the outcome of the underlying case. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3) for intentional delay of service of process. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed. We reverse and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Ice Stores, Inc. v. Gregory Reier Holmes
This appeal involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment. In 1997, the defendant pled nolo contendere to a criminal charge in a Texas court. As a part of his sentence, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution. The judgment of conviction listed the party to whom restitution should be paid. In 2005, the plaintiff corporation filed a lawsuit in Tennessee, seeking to enforce the Texas judgment. In his response, the defendant noted that the plaintiff corporation was not the party named in the Texas judgment to receive restitution from the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the entity listed in the Texas judgment to receive restitution was the plaintiff’s “doing business as” name, and that the plaintiff was in fact the proper party to enforce the Texas judgment. A hearing on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was held before expiration of the required thirty-day period after service of a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation. The defendant now appeals. He argues that the trial court erred by holding the hearing on the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion before expiration of the T.R.C.P. 56.04 thirty-day period. He also argues that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff corporation to domesticate and enforce the foreign judgment. We affirm, finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by being deprived of the T.R.C.P. 56.04 thirty-day period between service of the motion for summary judgment and the hearing, and that summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation was otherwise proper. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Robert H. Waldschmidt v. Reassure America Life Insurance Co., et al.
This appeal involves a question of law concerning the interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2303 (2008) certified by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The bankruptcy court has asked this Court to determine whether the issuer of a deceased debtor’s life insurance policy was exempted under Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2303(d) from the statutory notice requirements for lapsed life insurance policies because the premium payments on the policy were being paid monthly. We hold that the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2303(d) exempts from the notice requirements in Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2303(a) “any policies upon which premiums are payable monthly or at more frequent intervals.” Based on the undisputed facts, the premiums for the debtor’s life insurance policy were “payable monthly.” Therefore, the issuer of the policy was not required to give either the debtor or the trustee the notice required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2303(a), and the policy lapsed in accordance with its terms before the debtor’s death. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Cedric Renee Mims & Angela Brown
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. The children were taken into protective custody soon after the birth of the youngest child, and were ultimately found to be dependent and neglected. The father was not appointed an attorney at this stage of the proceedings. Both the mother and father underwent psychological evaluations; both were found to be in the mild range of mental retardation and lacking the mental capacity to care for their children. DCS sought termination of their parental rights, alleging several grounds, including abandonment and mental incapacity. After a hearing, the lower court terminated the parental rights of both parents. The father appeals, arguing that DCS did not prove abandonment and mental incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. He also argues that the failure to appoint an attorney for him during the dependency and neglect proceedings was a denial of his right to due process. We affirm the trial court’s finding on the ground of mental incompetence. We also find that any violation of Father’s due process rights in relation to the dependency and neglect proceedings was remedied by procedural protections in place in the termination proceedings. Therefore, we affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Phillip Geanes - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this matter. As I will explain, I believe that the cases relied upon by the majority are distinguishable upon the facts from those presented by the present appeal. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Phillip Geanes
A Hardeman County jury convicted the defendant, Anthony Phillip Geanes, of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a multiple offender to three years imprisonment, consecutive to another sentence.1 In this appeal, the defendant raises the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. Upon review of the evidence, we are constrained to hold that the evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the conviction and dismiss the charge. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Phillip Geanes - Concurring
I write separately to set out unique factors used in my analysis concluding insufficient evidence exists upon this record to support the defendant’s conviction of reckless endangerment. A notion widely held is that whenever people are arguing, participating in fisticuffs, or engaged in fights involving knives, bats, or chairs, the discharging of a firearm into the air has the immediate effect of alerting all participants that a higher and more powerful authority has been introduced into the situation and, therefore, the holder of the firearm is deserving of respect and attention. I feel this notion is misguided and outdated, and although I have found for this defendant, I do not wish to suggest that firing a weapon into the air is not reckless or is safe. Common sense tells us that what goes up must come down. I simply do not know where or with what force the bullet returns. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nino Jones
The Defendant, Nino Jones, was convicted by 1 a jury of one count of sale of cocaine, a Class C felony. In this direct appeal, he argues that the State failed to rebut his defense of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that this argument lacks merit, and accordingly affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Earnest Edwin Gilchrist v. Juan T. Aristorenas, M.D
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim. The defendant physician performed an operation on the plaintiff patient. Complications occurred during the surgery; as a result, the patient required several more procedures and spent approximately three weeks in the hospital. The patient hired an attorney, who obtained an opinion letter from a physician expert, in which the expert opined that the defendant physician breached the standard of care during the patient’s initial operation. After securing the expert opinion, the patient filed this lawsuit against the defendant physician for medical malpractice. After the case had been pending for several years, the attorney for the defendant physician took the deposition of the patient’s expert. At the deposition, the patient’s expert changed his opinion, and testified that he believed that the defendant physician’s care of the patient was not below the standard of care. The next day, the defendant physician filed a motion for summary judgment. Several months later, the patient filed a motion under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 requesting a continuance of the summary judgment motion because he had been unable to engage another expert. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a continuance and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician. The patient appeals. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to continue the motion for summary judgment. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the request for a continuance, and thus in the grant of summary judgment in the defendant’s favor. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex Rel., Margaret V. Hickman v. Ronald L. Dodd
This is a Title IV-D child support case. Appellee father executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and a consent paternity order. After discovering that he was not the child’s biological father, Appellee sought relief from both his retroactive and future child support obligations. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion on the ground that he was not the biological father. The State of Tennessee seeks review of the trial court’s decision. We conclude that the trial court did not have authority to forgive Appellee’s child support arrears. Moreover, Appellee has neither alleged sufficiently specific facts to challenge the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity as required under Tenn. Code. Ann. § 24-7-113, nor has he satisfied the necessary requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P.60.02 to gain relief from either the consent paternity order, or the order on child support entered in the chancery court. We reverse and remand. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Debra J. Eaton v. Stephen G. Portera, M.D.
This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee doctor on grounds of insufficient service of process, and failure of Appellant patient to come forward with the required expert proof to refute the motion for summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quamine Jones
The defendant, Quamine Jones, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He argues that the evidence of premeditation was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree murder, the indictment should have been dismissed because he was denied a preliminary hearing, the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a photograph of the victim and testimony of a witness regarding his reluctance to testify, and the State withheld exculpatory evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Knollwood Manor v. Mildred Cox
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case employer appeals the trial court’s findings that the employee’s injury arose out of employment, that the employee did not make a meaningful return to work, and that the employee met at least three of the four criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(b) by clear and convincing evidence and thus was not subject to the six times cap. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury arose out of her employment. However, we reverse the finding of the trial court with regards to the employee’s meaningful return to work. Our conclusion that employee made a meaningful return to work therefore precludes consideration of the issue of whether the six times cap applies. |
Macon | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Annette Turner Morrow
The Defendant, Annette Turner Morrow, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Maury County Circuit Court. The Defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at over $10,000 but less than $60,000 and identity theft. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective five-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender and ordered the Defendant to serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for probation or other alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ellis S. Baucom, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ellis S. Baucom, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, receiving sentences, respectively, of fifteen years and thirty years, to be served concurrently at forty-five percent. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel had been ineffective in representing him. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. We affirm that dismissal. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie R. Dyer
Willie R. Dyer was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and driving with a blood alcohol level of over .08 percent. During the jury trial, the trial court dismissed the indictment with prejudice on the basis that the chain of custody for the blood sample was inadequate. Subsequently, the State appealed. We determine that the trial court abused its discretion where the evidence was sufficient to establish chain of custody of the blood sample and, therefore, reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court for reinstatement of the indictment. Further, we determine that principles of double jeopardy do not bar retrial. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald E. Crook v. Landon Despeaux
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in a personal injury case. The plaintiff, a diabetic, consumed a substantial amount of alcohol and then proceeded to drive south towards an intersection. At about the same time, the defendant was traveling east toward the same intersection. The plaintiff’s vehicle skidded, hit the curb, and then collided with a telephone pole. After the onecar accident, the plaintiff followed the defendant and his family to a nearby parking lot and accused the defendant of running the stop sign at the intersection and causing the plaintiff’s accident. After that, the police arrived and gave the plaintiff a breathalyzer test, which he failed. The plaintiff was later convicted of reckless driving and driving under the influence of an intoxicant in connection with the accident. At his criminal trial, the plaintiff admitted drinking alcohol and that his tires were in poor condition. The plaintiff nevertheless filed a negligence claim against the defendant. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that, based on the plaintiff diabetic’s intoxication and faulty tires, he was, as a matter of law, at least fifty percent at fault for his own injuries. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |