APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves subject matter jurisdiction with respect to billboard permits. The defendant's application for a State permit to erect a billboard in Shelby County was denied, so he filed an administrative appeal from this decision. Meanwhile, the defendant proceeded to erect the billboard in Shelby County without a State permit. The State filed this petition in Shelby County to enjoin the defendant from erecting the billboard pending resolution of the administrative appeal. The defendant argued that the State was not entitled to injunctive relief because he had unfairly been denied a State permit. The defendant also filed a counterclaim based on alleged improper conduct by State officials, seeking to enjoin the State from improperly enforcing its regulations against him in all cases in which he had been denied a State billboard permit. The trial court entered an order enjoining the State from improper enforcement of the billboard regulations. Later, after lengthy evidentiary hearings, the trial court ordered the State to grant the defendant State permits for various billboard sites and assumed continuing jurisdiction over certain administrative proceedings in which the defendant had appealed the denial of billboard permits. The State now appeals. We find that, by statute, the trial court in Davidson County has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the matters asserted by the defendant in response to the petition for injunctive relief and in his counterclaims. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, dismiss the counterclaim in its entirety, and remand.

In 2002, a jury convicted the petitioner, Daniel Livingston, of evading arrest in a vehicle with risk of injury, a Class D felony, inter alia. The trial court sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On July 28, 2009, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the indictment for evading arrest was insufficient to vest the trial court with jurisdiction. The circuit court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

Danny J. Phillips ("Plaintiff") sued William T. Mullins ("Defendant") after a truck driven by Defendant struck and injured Plaintiff who was riding a bicycle. Defendant moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order granting Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reverse the grant of summary judgment finding that there are disputed issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment.

The petitioner, Jeffrey A. Waggoner, appeals the denial of error coram nobis relief by the trial court. He was convicted of first degree murder on February 2, 1984, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis relief, alleging that a witness who had testified against him at trial had recanted his testimony. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The Warren County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Donald Ray Blevins, for two counts of delivery of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in an amount of less than 0.5 grams, and one count of delivery of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in an amount of 0.5 grams or more. These offenses were based upon three drug transactions involving a confidential informant's telephone calls to Appellant and further dealings with two other individuals. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of facilitation of delivery of cocaine in an amount less than 0.5 grams, delivery of cocaine in an amount less than 0.5 grams, and delivery of cocaine in an amount of 0.5 grams or more. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender and imposed an effective nine-year sentence to be served at thirty percent. Appellant appealed his convictions arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever offenses. We have reviewed the record on appeal. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's convictions of the delivery offenses based upon the theory of criminal responsibility. In addition, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for facilitation of delivery. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the telephone calls were part of a common scheme or plan and for that reason the denial of Appellant's motion to sever offenses was proper. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.

Plaintiff, a non-resident, brought this action against defendant real estate agent for releasing funds from a sale to defendant Hays, who had been employed by the plaintiff to sell items of personalty for plaintiff and improve plaintiff's real estate properties for sale. Further, that Hays improperly filed a lien against plaintiff's property, resulting in damages to plaintiff. The Trial Court granted the real estate agent summary judgment and, after a trial, entered a monetary judgment against Hays in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals the issue of summary judgment in favor of the real estate agent, and Hays appeals the monetary judgment entered against him in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The Defendants-Appellants, Erica Harrison and Alexis Harrison, each entered an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property valued at more than five hundred dollars ($500) but less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), a Class E felony, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Both requested judicial diversion, which the court denied. The trial court sentenced Erica Harrison as a Range I, standard offender to 180 days in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the balance of her two-year sentence to be served on supervised probation and sentenced Alexis Harrison as a Range I, standard offender to 90 days in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the balance of her sentence to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Erica and Alexis Harrison argue that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) denying judicial diversion and (2) denying full probation. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The petitioner, Richard Joe Fitten, appeals pro se from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Hamilton County. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Fitten resolved case numbers 255275, 261292, and 261403. In case number 255275, Fitten agreed to the revocation of his probation and the imposition of a six-year sentence. He also agreed to plead guilty to filing a false police report, case number 261292, and retaliation for past action, case number 261403. He received a two-year sentence on the false reporting offense, and one year on the retaliation offense, to be served consecutively. However, the effective three-year sentence was suspended to unsupervised probation, to be served consecutively to the six-year sentence. Although not entirely clear from his handwritten brief, Fitten claims: (1) his conviction for retaliation for past action should be dismissed because it resulted from an illegal arrest under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for retaliation for past action and filing a false police report. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Johnny Villalobos, of robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to four years in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a post-divorce modification of child custody and support. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court's order, which increased his child support obligation, modified his parenting time, and ordered him to pay Mother/Appellee's attorney's fees. Finding that the trial court erred in eliminating Father's one-week of uninterrupted summer visitation and not allowing him an additional night per week visitation, we reverse that portion of the order. Further, we find that the trial court erred in providing Father with a "credit" towards his child support in exchange for his payment of Mother's mortgage. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's amount of child support ordered, as well as the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Mother. We affirm the trial court's findings on both Mother's and Father's income. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; vacated in part and remanded.

Defendant-Appellant, John Barlow, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies. The trial court sentenced Barlow as a Range I, violent offender to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for the aggravated child abuse conviction and fifteen years for the aggravated child neglect conviction, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. In Barlow's appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect violate his right against double jeopardy, (3) the trial court erred in declaring Dr. Robert Sanford and Dr. Karen Lakin as expert witnesses, (4) the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Lakin to testify that the victim suffered from an "abusive head trauma incident [that was] most probably associated with [a] bed[-]wetting episode," and (5) the State committed several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support Barlow's conviction for aggravated child neglect. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for aggravated child neglect is vacated. However, the judgment of the trial court in all other respects is affirmed. Because Barlow's fifteen-year sentence for his aggravated child neglect conviction was to be served concurrently with his twenty-five-year sentence for aggravated child abuse, his effective sentence is unchanged.

In 2004, Baird Tree Company, Inc. ("Baird Tree") unsuccessfully bid on a tree trimming and removal project with the City of Oak Ridge ("Oak Ridge"). Baird Tree filed a lawsuit claiming, inter alia, that Oak Ridge's bidding process violated the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 47-25-101. We affirmed the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants because the contract at issue was a contract for services, not goods, and, therefore, the Tennessee Trade Practices Act did not apply. We also concluded that Baird Tree could not challenge the bidding process because it had failed to submit a valid bid in the first place. See Baird Tree Co., Inc. v. City of Oak Ridge, No. E2007-01933-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2510581 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2008). When the same project came up for bid in 2007, Baird Tree again submitted a fatally defective bid. When it was not awarded the contract, Baird Tree filed the present lawsuit raising various challenges to Oak Ridge's bidding process. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to all defendants. We, again, conclude that Baird Tree does not have standing to challenge the bidding process because it submitted a fatally defective "bid" in the first place. The judgment of the Trial Court is, therefore, affirmed.

The Petitioner, Delwin O'Neal, appeals as of right from the Marshall County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his guilty plea convictions for multiple drug offenses for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-three years as a Range II, multiple offender. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner requested a reduction of sentence, and the trial court ruled that it was without jurisdiction to modify the sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in ruling that it could not modify the sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs, commercial and residential consumers of natural gas, purchased natural gas from utilities, which had acquired the product wholesale from the defendants. In this class action antitrust suit, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants engaged in various anticompetitive practices, including making false statements about natural gas transactions and engaging in “wash trades” and “churning.” After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the claims were barred by both field pre-emption and the filed rate doctrine, the chancellor dismissed the claims. The plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the claims were not subject to dismissal. Because the Natural Gas Act and subsequent federal legislation pre-empt state actions in this particular field of regulation, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and all claims are dismissed.

Prospective buyers entered into a contract with construction company for purchase of a home; the contract was amended to provide that a garage would be constructed. A letter was subsequently prepared specifying a time for the buyers to tender payment for the garage. The buyers failed to secure a loan to finance construction of the garage until a year after closing. When the construction company refused to build the garage for the amount specified in the contract amendment, the buyers initiated this action. The trial court found that the letter clarified the amendment by setting a time for performance and that the buyers' failure to pay within that time was a breach of the agreement which relieved the construction company of its contractual obligations; the court consequently dismissed buyers' action. Finding that there was not an agreement between the parties, the trial court's determination that the letter clarified the amendment is reversed. Finding that a reasonable time for performance was 90 days from closing on the home, and that the buyers' failure to tender payment within such period was a material breach, we affirm the trial court's determination that the construction company was relieved of its contractual obligations.

The Defendant, Jason Allen Ruiz, pled guilty to one count of sale of cocaine and one count of delivery of cocaine, both Class B felonies. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed an effective sentence of eight years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation following an 11 month and 29 day period of confinement in the local jail on work release. Following the filing of a revocation warrant and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffery Boyd Trusty, was convicted by a Smith County jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property over $1000. The trial court merged the two first degree murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction, twenty-five years as a violent offender for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and four years as a Range I offender for the theft of property over $1000 conviction, for an effective sentence of life in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises essentially eight issues on appeal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, that the State failed to prove venue in Smith County beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the State's burden to prove venue, and that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's requests for special jury instructions, allowing hearsay testimony that the victim feared the defendant, allowing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence about the search procedures employed to locate the victim's body and the evidence uncovered during those searches, allowing a police officer to offer legal opinions and conclusions, allowing irrelevant and prejudicial evidence about the defendant's possession and movement of firearms, and not allowing each of the defendant's counsel to deliver a separate closing argument. Having reviewed the record and found no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony Douglas Dansby, pled guilty to driving under the influence ("DUI"), violation of the implied consent law, violation of the seatbelt law, violation of the open container law, and possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance. In accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the stop of his vehicle, which led to his indictment and guilty plea, was constitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the stop of the Defendant's vehicle was constitutional; therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. After a trial, the court entered a divorce decree and divided the marital property. The trial court awarded the marital real property to Husband, and Wife, a pro se litigant, appeals the trial court's division of the marital property. We affirm in part, modify in part, and remand.

This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff worker allegedly injured his knee while in the defendants’ home. The plaintiff visited a doctor the next day, and ultimately had surgery on the knee the next month. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendants, alleging premises liability. A jury trial was held. After the testimony concluded, the trial court declined to include a jury instruction requested by the plaintiff. During closing arguments, the plaintiff’s attorney started to read from a deposition that had not been entered into evidence; the trial court sustained a timely objection. Also during closing argument, the closing remarks of the defendant’s attorney alerted the plaintiff’s attorney to the fact that a particular medical record was not a part of the evidence submitted to the jury. While the jury was deliberating, the plaintiff sought to reopen proof to admit into evidence the omitted medical record; the trial court declined to reopen the proof. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this appeal should be
dismissed. The record on appeal includes the court’s minutes for April 30, 2008. The minutes reflect that on October 4, 2007, judgment nisi was taken against the defendant and that a scire facias was issued and served. According to the minutes, a final judgment was entered against the defendant and his sureties in the amount of $75, 000 “the penalty of the defendant’s appearance bond, for which execution will issue, together with the costs of this prosecution.”

This appeal arises out of an elderly woman's attempt to recover assets from her daughter and former son-in-law, who allegedly exercised undue influence over her financial decision-making for a period of years following the death of her husband. In a motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs sought to invalidate two transfers of substantial assets to the defendants. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion and certified the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court's order does not dispose of a claim between the parties, we vacate the entry of final judgment and remand.

The appellants, Aaron Bonding Company, T Bonding Company, and Around the Clock Bonding Company, LLC, appeal the order of a final forfeiture against them, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the order. Following our review of the record, we dismiss this appeal as being premature and remand the case to the trial court to issue an order of final disposition  appellants may then appeal.