APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following his conviction by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of one count of aggravated assault for which he received a sentence of eight years’ incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender, the petitioner, Atavis Cortez Cunningham, filed a timely petition for postconviction relief based upon allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and an unconstitutional jury composition. The Dyer County Circuit Court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

The defendant, William Randall Crawford, pled guilty to three counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of simple assault. He received an aggregate sentence of forty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sentencing determinations made by the trial court, specifically arguing that he should have received the minimum sentence for each individual offense and that the sentences should not have been ordered to run consecutively. After careful review, we conclude that the trial court imposed a lawful sentence and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rita White, was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and pled guilty to failure to obey a required traffic control device, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010), 55-8-109 (2010). She was sentenced to eleven months and twentynine days for the DUI conviction, with ten days to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. She was sentenced to thirty days’ probation for the traffic device conviction, to be served concurrently with the DUI sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following an indictment by the Cheatham County Grand Jury, Petitioner, Michael Charles King, entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of felony murder in Dickson County. He was subsequently sentenced to life in prison. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his plea of nolo contendere was not sufficient to waive venue because the district attorney did not authorize the waiver in writing. We have concluded that venue was properly waived, and Petitioner’s judgment is valid. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the habeas corpus court.

This is a termination of parental rights case with an unusual procedural history. Following an incident with one of her children, Appellant Mother was charged with one count of aggravated child neglect or endangerment and one count of aggravated child abuse of a child under eight years of age. She pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to six years’ incarceration. In a separate proceeding, the children were adjudicated to be dependent and neglected and victims of severe child abuse. At the termination of parental rights hearing, which is the subject of this appeal, the trial court determined that the previous finding of severe child abuse was res judicata and did not permit the parties to relitigate the issue. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding the issue of severe child abuse to be res judicata because the order finding the children to be dependent and neglected and victims of severe child abuse is not a final judgment. Consequently, Appellant should have been permitted to present evidence and argument at the termination proceeding as to whether she committed severe child abuse. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and remanded.

A Rutherford County jury convicted Appellant, Wanda F. Russell, of three counts of theft over $1,000. Prior to trial, the State filed a notice that it was intending to introduce Appellant’s prior convictions to impeach her testimony. At the conclusion of a jury-out hearing during trial, the trial court concluded that the State could use Appellant’s prior convictions for passing worthless checks pursuant to Rule 609(a)(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence to impeach Appellant. Appellant elected not to testify. She now appeals to this Court arguing that the trial court erred in determining that her prior convictions were admissible for impeachment. We have reviewed the record on appeal. We have concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling that the prior convictions were appropriate for impeachment of Appellant. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerome Lionel Price, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, without appointment of counsel, finding that the petitioner had failed to present a claim upon which a petition for post-conviction relief may be founded. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the decision was in error because he asserts that he did, in fact, state a colorable claim for relief. We agree. As such, we reverse the order summarily dismissing the petition and remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

This appeal arises out of dependency and neglect proceedings in which custody of the minor child was awarded to the father. The mother appealed, but she failed to provide this Court with a transcript or statement of the evidence. Due to our inability to review the evidence, we affirm the decision of the lower court.

The Defendant, Allen Doane, was indicted on four charges of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504. On April 25, 2007, the Defendant was convicted by a jury of four counts of sexual battery, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-505. The trial court imposed a two-year sentence for each count and ordered all four counts to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years. The Defendant appealed to this court, and the case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing to determine the length of the sentences and whether they should be served concurrently or consecutively. See State v. Allen Doane, No. E2008-00125-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 21032 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2009). After a second sentencing hearing, the trial court again imposed two-year sentences for each count and ordered  all four counts to be served consecutively, for an effective eight-year sentence. The Defendant then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the judgments in this case were void. Both matters were consolidated into this appeal. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the judgments in this case are void because the statute of limitations expired prior to the commencement of the prosecution and (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The employee sustained a compensable injury to her arm in 2001. In 2003, she entered into a settlement with her employer that preserved her right to receive reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the injury. In April 2008, the employee’s authorized treating physician recommended a diagnostic test. The employer submitted the recommendation to its utilization review provider, which declined to approve the recommended test. The employee and her physician were notified of the denial in May 2008. In June 2009, the employee filed a petition for contempt seeking to have the trial court order the recommended test. The trial court treated the petition as a motion for medical treatment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(b)(2) (2008). The trial court found the recommended test to be reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injury, ordered the employer to authorize it, and awarded the employee attorney’s fees. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kenneth Webster, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of burglary, a Class D felony, which resulted in his career-offender, Department of Correction sentence of 12 years. The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm the criminal court’s judgment.

A highway patrolman was terminated for allegedly deploying a tire deflation device without prior authorization in violation of General Order 412 and for untruthfulness regarding such. On appeal, the trooper argues that his partial extension of the device did not constitute a “deployment.” Thus, he contends he did not violate General Order 412, nor was he untruthful when he denied deployment. We affirm the ALJ’s finding that the trooper “deployed” the device in violation of General Order 412 and that he was untruthful about doing so. Accordingly, we find there existed substantial and material evidence to support his termination. Additionally, we find that the trial court did not err in denying the trooper’s request to admit additional evidence and to supplement his brief.

Inmate appeals the grant of summary judgment to the Tennessee Department of Corrections in declaratory judgment action wherein inmate sought to be given credit on his sentence for work performed while housed in county jail. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court.

The Defendant, Richard Alexander Herrera, was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony. Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the issuance of a search warrant in another case, the Defendant pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Defendant sought to reserve a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Following our review, we conclude that the certified question of law the Defendant sought to reserve on appeal is not dispositive of the case. The appeal is dismissed.

The order from which the appellant Nader Rahbe seeks to appeal was entered on Wednesday, January 5, 2011. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Tuesday, February 8, 2011, the 34th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, the motion of the appellee to dismiss is granted. This appeal is dismissed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Alvertis Boyd, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The Defendant was sentenced as a repeat violent offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting two prior convictions as impeachment evidence; and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a repeat violent offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The order from which the appellant Ramie Stabler-Marston seeks to appeal was entered on February 24, 2010. Notices of appeal were filed by the appellant on October 18, 2010, and October 20, 2010. Because neither of the notices of appeal was timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Terry Wayne Gunter, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court. The defendant pled guilty to Class E felony forgery and Class D felony identity theft. Pursuant to the agreement, he was to be sentenced to concurrent terms of one year and two years, respectively, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the court ordered that the sentences be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence, specifically probation. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentences as imposed.

The order of the trial court entered November 29, 2010, from which the appellant John L. Houston seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.

The order of the trial court entered February 16, 2011, from which the appellant Angelia Lynette Maupin seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.

The order of the trial court entered February 9, 2011, from which the appellant Kenneth E. Ramsey seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.

The plaintiff, an assignee to a foreign judgment, filed a petition to domesticate the judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-101 et seq. The defendant objected to the enrollment of the foreign judgment because it was assigned. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to domesticate the foreign judgment and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. Our review of the record reveals that the plaintiff properly followed the statutory requirements to enroll a foreign judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred. We reverse.

The majority opinion has provided an excellent analysis of the facts and the law in this case, and I agree with the conclusion regarding the lack of evidence of public intoxication. I also believe that the present statute regarding revocation requires a preponderance of the evidence to show that a probation violation has occurred and that a subsequent decision regarding revocation is within the trial court’s discretion. See, e.g., State v. Vincent Jordan, No. M2009-02488-CCA-R3-CD, Montgomery County, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2010); State v. Richard Thomas Jones, No. E2009-01241-CCA-R3-CD, Hamilton County, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2010). I respectfully disagree, however, with the result reached regarding “excessive consumption of alcohol.” My problem in this case is with the concept of “excessive consumption” and what proves it has occurred.

The Petitioner, Keith Ezell, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective 198-year sentence. He contends that his trial attorney failed to provide effective assistance because counsel did not advise him that accepting a guilty plea offer was in his best interest and did not accurately advise him of the likelihood he would receive a greater sentence after a trial than if he accepted the plea offer. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bryant Adair, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his untimely filed petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated robbery and from his effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that principles of due process require the tolling of the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.