APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Dennis Burnett, appeals the Monroe County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction. He argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to admit at trial a statement of an alleged witness who invoked the Fifth Amendment upon being subpoenaed to testify; advising the jury during voir dire that he, trial counsel, had been previously indicted; failing to respond to a judgment of conviction belonging to Burnett's co-defendant found in the jurors' bathroom furing trial; failing to adequately prepare Burnett to testify; failing to investigate and call Michael Gibson as a trial witness; and failing to preserve issues in a motion for new trial thereby securing review on direct appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Ronald Duckett, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of first degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to serve two concurrent life sentences. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to voluntary intoxication; 2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and 3) the trial court erred by reconvening the jury to alter its verdict after the jury had been discharged. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the collection of credit card debt. The plaintiff, a subsequent purchaser of the debt, filed this collection action against the appellant debtor. On appeal, the appellant debtor argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence various documents from a previous owner of the debt, pursuant to the hearsay exception for business records under Tenn. R. Evid. Rule 803(6). We hold that two of the exhibits were not appropriately admitted into evidence under the business records exception. Without those exhibits, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s judgment in favor of the creditor, and reverse.
 

A dispute over the extent of lawn being mowed and the manner in which it was being mowed boundary line between the neighboring lots be established and demanded compensatory and punitive damages. The Defendants filed a third-party complaint against their predecessor in title, Sandra Stallings, based upon her alleged misrepresentation in her disclosure to them. After a bench trial, the court awarded the Plaintiff a judgment establishing the boundary according to one of her two surveys, and awarded her the cost of her surveys as damages. The court also ordered the Defendants to remove all encroachments. The court found that Ms. Stallings failed to disclose known encroachments and held her liable to the Defendants for one-half of the cost of the surveys. The Defendants appeal. We reverse that part of the judgment awarding as damages the cost of the surveys. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Roy Allen Scott, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief because the trial court for the underlying convictions was without jurisdiction to enter his conviction for aggravated assault. In addition, he contends that his convictions for driving under the influence and vehicular assault violate double jeopardy principles. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Gary V. Bullard, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After trial, a jury convicted him of attempted aggravated rape, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. In this appeal, Bullard argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to (1) sufficiently cross-examine the investigating police officer,(2) cross-examine the victim,and (3) offer any proof in defense.Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Milton Lee Cooper, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief because of alleged jurisdictional defects in the indictment. He also contends that the trial court constructively amended the indictment by its jury instructions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Jeffrey Martin, was convicted by a Maury County jury of sale of cocaine in an amount of .5 grams or more, a Class B felony. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced him, as a Range III offender,to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. The court further ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to prior unserved sentences in separate cases. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range III offender; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the conviction and sentence.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee contended that he struck his head against the casing of a conveyor belt, causing permanent and total disability due to a resulting cervical strain and mental injury. His employer denied that he sustained any permanent disability as a result of the incident. The trial court awarded 95% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Wade Osborne, was convicted after a bench trial for failure to appear, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, Osborne argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State’s proof, (2) relying on evidence that was not introduced at trial, namely Osborne’s signature on a form waiving his right to a jury trial, and (3) allowing the case to proceed to trial before the completion of a mental evaluation assessing Osborne’s diminished capacity at the time of the offense. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury found the appellant, Sean Higgins, guilty of driving under the influence (DUI) and reckless driving. The appellant received a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court’s allowing the State to question the appellant regarding “the whereabouts of his witnesses and why they were not present to testify on his behalf” shifted the burden of proof to the appellant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Brandon Watson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery and his effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Juvenile Court for Bradley County (“the Juvenile Court”), upon a petition by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and following a trial, terminated the parental rights of Debbie D. (“Mother”) to the minor child Roni M.H. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) (2010). Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child.

This is a divorce case. The parties are Priscilla Lee Slagle (“Wife”) and Lawrence Fred Slagle (“Husband”). They were married for more than thirty years and, prior to the entry of the divorce judgment, they shared the custody of their adopted grandson (“the Child”). Wife sued for divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. Husband filed a counterclaim on the same grounds. At a pre-trial hearing, the court held Husband in contempt for violating the statutorily-mandated injunction prohibiting, among other things, the transferring of or the borrowing against “any marital property.” Following the trial, the court additionally found Husband in contempt (1) for failing to comply with discovery requests and (2) for dissipating marital assets. Husband left the country and did not appear at trial. The court granted Wife a divorce predicated on Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct; designated Wife as the Child’s primary residential parent; and prohibited any contact between Husband and the Child until he had purged himself of contempt. The court classified and divided the parties’ assets, awarded Wife $5,000 a month in alimony in futuro, and set Husband’s child support obligation. Husband appeals. He challenges the contempt findings and some financial aspects of the court’s decree. We reverse that part of the judgment barring contact between Husband and the child and downwardly adjust the award of alimony to $3,200 per month. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

This appeal involves a limitation of liability in an insurance policy. The plaintiff was working in a volunteer capacity for the city. While doing so, the plaintiff sustained injuries in an accident caused by the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff’s medical expenses were paid through the city’s on-the-job-injury program. The plaintiff had uninsured motorist coverage under his insurance policy with the appellee insurance company. The appellee insurance company denied the plaintiff’s claim based on language in the policy reducing the insurance company’s liability by sums paid under laws similar to workers’ compensation laws. The insurance company asserted that the city’s on-the-job-injury program was similar to workers’ compensation. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit, and the plaintiff and the insurance company filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, finding that the plaintiff’s benefits under the city’s on-the-job-injury program were similar to workers’ compensation. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the grant of summary judgment, for the reason stated by the trial court.

The plaintiff in this case is Donna Bellomy. The defendant is a prior employer of hers, AutoZone, Inc. In Bellomy v. AutoZone, Inc., No. E2009-00351-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4059158 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Nov. 24, 2009) (“Bellomy I”), we vacated, in part, a summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff’s entire complaint. We held that the Plaintiff had created genuine issues of material fact with respect to her Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) claims. On remand, the case progressed through discovery and opening statements, following which the trial court granted a mistrial, holding that the Plaintiff had violated certain rulings made by the court on AutoZone’s motions in limine. The court later granted the defendant partial summary judgment and dismissed the constructive discharge aspect of the Plaintiff’s THRA claims. In the same order, the trial court held the Plaintiff in civil contempt and ruled that the dismissal of the constructive discharge claim was also appropriate as a sanction for violating the court’s rulings entered on AutoZone’s motions. The Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the judgment of dismissal and all other orders of the trial court inconsistent with this opinion and remand for further proceedings.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Nathaniel P.Carson, of two counts of first degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life for the murder convictions and fifteen years for the especially aggravated robbery convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court allowed improper evidence under Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence, and (3) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress telephone records. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves remittitur of a jury verdict. The defendant driver caused a vehicular accident that resulted in substantial personal injuries to the plaintiff. At trial, several witnesses testified to the amount of the plaintiff’s economic damages as well as the noneconomic impact of her injuries. After a trial, the jury returned a special verdict with awards for various categories of economic and non-economic damages. The trial court denied the defendant insurance company’s motion for a new trial but suggested an overall remittitur as to the total verdict. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest and filed this appeal. We affirm the denial of a new trial, reverse the suggestion of remittitur, and reinstate the original jury verdict.

The petitioner, Milton Leon Simpson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal on the grounds that the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief.

The petitioner, Ricky Terrell Cox, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal arises out of a four-day trial over a boundary line dispute. Numerous surveyors and other witnesses testified at trial, and many maps, aerial photographs, survey plats, deeds, and other documents were entered into evidence. The chancellor personally viewed the property in question as well. Thereafter, the court established the boundary line as set forth in the survey plat prepared by the defendants’ surveyor.  The plaintiff contends that this was error. We affirm.

The defendant, Robert Earl Grady, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of confinement.

The defendant, Doris Miller, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of assault by provocative contact, a Class B misdemeanor, and sentenced to three months in the county workhouse. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Don Allen Rodgers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this extraordinary appeal, the State of Tennessee appeals the trial court’s decision to order a new trial for the defendant, Cordell Remont Vaughn, after a jury returned a guilty verdict of first degree (premeditated) murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The trial court, after a hearing, granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the court: (1) erroneously concluded that a State’s witness committed perjury at a suppression hearing based solely on the defendant’s submission of an affidavit that conflicted with that witnesses’ testimony at that hearing, and (2) erroneously concluded that the outcome of the defendant’s trial would have been different had this alleged perjury not occurred and had the defendant’s motion to suppress been granted. The defendant responds that the trial court properly considered the affidavit and reached the proper conclusion concerning whether the State’s witness committed perjury. Furthermore, the defendant contends that because the perjury at issue related to a constitutional right, the State was required to establish that the effect of the perjury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and it failed to meet that burden. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct because it failed to make any finding that the prosecution had, in fact, engaged in any misconduct. Moreover, the defendant has failed to show any prejudice resulting from the alleged perjury. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court granting a new trial is reversed.