APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B
from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the appellant’s petition
for recusal appeal pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, §2.06, we
affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petitioner’s motion for recusal.

The appellant filed a single-page brief on appeal that fails to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, we dismiss the appeal.

After the Rhea County grand jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Daniel G. Hampton, for one count of first degree premeditated murder, Hampton entered an Alford plea, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), to second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court accepted the parties’ agreed sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction and, after a sentencing hearing, ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to Hampton’s unserved federal sentences. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering a consecutive sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cole Woodard, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, Class C felonies, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three concurrent sentences of ten years. On appeal, Woodard argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) his convictions violate principles of double jeopardy. Upon review, we affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting merger of the jury verdicts into a single conviction for sale of cocaine.

Husband of a decedent filed a wrongful death medical malpractice action against the
decedent’s physician and sought to amend his complaint to add a count for negligence per
se based on the physician’s failure to review his physician assistant’s narcotics prescription.
The trial court denied Husband the opportunity to amend his complaint and dismissed the
action on summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court
erred in denying Husband’s motion to amend but affirmed the trial court’s other rulings. On
remand, the trial court allowed Husband to amend his complaint to add a count for
negligence per se, but the court then granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment
on the issue of causation. Between the first Court of Appeals decision and this appeal, the
Tennessee Supreme Court decided Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546
(Tenn. 2011), in which it held that negligence per se claims cannot be maintained when
medical malpractice is alleged. The Estate of French holding bars Husband’s negligence per
se claim against the physician. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the
physician summary judgment.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Robert G. Barham, of driving under the influence, first offense, and driving under a revoked license, fifth offense, both Class A misdemeanors, and imposed a five hundred dollar fine for each. The trial court sentenced Barham to a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty nine days confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support Barham’s convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted appellant Trutonio Yancey of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The jury also convicted appellant Bernard McThune of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced appellant Yancey to an effective twenty-year sentence and sentenced appellant McThune to a twelve-year sentence. In this consolidated appeal, both appellants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. In addition, appellant Yancey argues that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to elect upon which dangerous felony it relied for the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony charge, and appellant McThune argues that the trial court erred by not applying mitigating factors when sentencing him. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm appellant Yancey’s convictions for aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. Discerning error, we reverse appellant Yancey’s convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and remand the case for a new trial. We affirm appellant McThune’s conviction and sentence.

A Madison County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, Ameale Hudson, guilty of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) denying his motion to bar the State from referring to him by his nickname,“Pistol”; and (3) denying his motion to prohibit the admission of postmortem photographs of the victim. The appellant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter arose from a car accident between Traci Jones and Bernice Jones. At trial, the
jury found Bernice Jones 100% at fault and awarded Traci Jones a portion of her requested
relief. On appeal, Traci Jones argues that the trial court erred by reversing its pre-trial ruling
on a motion in limine, denying her motion for mistrial, and denying her motion for directed
verdict. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

A Gibson County grand jury indicted appellant, Christopher Alexander Jones, for first degree murder. The jury found appellant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Specifically, he contends that the evidence did not show sufficient proof of premeditation and that his intoxication negated the required culpable mental state for this offense. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Memphis police officer was terminated after he was involved in a physical altercation with his girlfriend during which she sustained facial injuries. The Civil Service Commission upheld the termination, and the chancery court affirmed. In the initial appeal to this Court, we remanded for the Commission to make  findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission issued an amended decision with additional findings. Upon reviewing the amended decision, the chancery court  reversed the termination and reinstated the officer. The City appeals, arguing that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence. The officer presents numerous arguments in support of his assertion that reversal of the Commission was proper. We affirm the order of the chancery court in part, but we vacate the reinstatement of the officer and reinstate the Commission’s decision to uphold termination.

In this parental termination case, the father was appointed counsel at the time the Court held a dependency hearing in the Juvenile Court and the Order appointing counsel in that proceeding also appointed the attorney for the subsequent termination of parental rights trial. When the Petition to terminate the father's parental rights trial was held, neither the father nor counsel appeared at trial and a Judgment was entered terminating the father's parental rights. On appeal, appellant argues that the statue and rule governing this proceeding required notification to the father's attorney. We vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that both the Court and the Department of Children's Services were charged with the knowledge that the appellee was appointed counsel and that the termination Petition's Judgment was prejudicial to the judicial process when the father's lawyer was not notified of the Petition or trial. We vacate and remand for a new trial.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The subject child is the eighth born to the appellant mother. The appellant mother failed a prenatal drug screen prior to the birth of the child at issue, so the appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took the child into protective custody three days after birth. A permanency plan was adopted and the mother made efforts to comply with her permanency plan responsibilities. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights as to this child. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights based on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. The mother now appeals only as to the grounds for termination. We reverse as to the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan but affirm as to the ground of persistent conditions. On that basis, we affirm the termination of parental rights.

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of real property. Appellee church purchased the disputed property from the seller bank in 1974, but failed to record its deed. Through a clerical error, the seller bank sold the disputed property to Appellant real estate investor in 2008. Appellant promptly recorded his deed. After the investor demolished a portion of a wall constructed by the church on the disputed property, the church sued to quiet title and for damages. The trial court ruled that the deed to the investor was void as champertous because the church’s possession of the property was open and obvious at the time of conveyance. Thus the trial court ruled that the church was the true owner of the property. Although we affirm the decision of the trial court, we rely on grounds other than those found by the trial court.

This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal we held that the parties did not have a contract for the sale of the property, and we remanded it back to the Trial Court to determine a reasonable fee in quantum meruit for the plaintiff as the facilitator of the sale. Upon remand, the Trial Court heard proof and held that plaintiff was entitled to a 6% commission on the sale price. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment as modified.

Plaintiff purchased a vent hood from defendant. The hood was paid for at the time of purchase and delivered, but was returned to defendant as being unworkable. Plaintiff brought this action for reimbursement of payment for the hood in Sessions Court. Sessions Court entered a Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Judge entered Judgment for the plaintiff for $3,500 for the amount paid for the hood to defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment. 

Plaintiff in suit seeking to have court declare boundaries of fifteen acre tract of land appeals
the declaration of boundaries and award of the tract to Defendants, adjoining landowners.
Defendants appeal finding that Plaintiff adversely possessed a portion of the fifteen acre
tract. Finding no error, we affirm.

Jeffery D. Allen (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, challenging his convictions for first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of attempted first degree murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. As his bases for relief, he alleged several grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel (1) failed to call two witnesses to testify at trial, (2) failed to adequately cross-examine a witness, and (3) failed to move to sever the Petitioner’s offenses prior to trial. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Matthew T. McGee, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2008). He was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with forty-five days’ confinement and the remainder on probation. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved two certified questions of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Roger Brent Banks, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for six counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor. Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The remaining counts were dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, Petitioner received an effective sentence of sixteen years at 100%, and was ordered to lifetime supervision after the service of the sentence. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis that his sentences were void and illegal. The petition was dismissed as untimely. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the petition was properly dismissed as untimely as Petitioner failed to show any reason that the statute of limitations should be tolled. As a result, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
 

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Appellant, Andrew Helton, has appealed the Davidson County Criminal Court order dismissing his motion for new trial in which Appellant alleged that: (1) the trial court erred by denying Appellant the right to be present at his trial; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on all lesser included offenses; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to allow the jury to examine evidence during deliberation. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the motion for new trial as duplicitous and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Fletcher Gordon, pled guilty to second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and it awarded him no jail credit. The Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court failed to award him pretrial jail credit. He asserted that he was incarcerated pending arraignment and trial from December 20, 2004, to August 24, 2006. The State filed a motion to dismiss the Petitioner’s motion based upon the Petitioner’s failure to provide documentation supporting his claim. The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Derwin Thomas, filed in the Bledsoe County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the indictment charging him with especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and first degree murder was defective for failure to allege the theory of criminal responsibility. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to allege grounds upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the habeas corpus court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Bethany Lorraine Kuykendall, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at more than $1000 but less than $10,000, for which she was granted judicial diversion with the requirements that she complete two years of probation and pay $150 per month toward restitution. On appeal, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the restitution amount. Because we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeal, we dismiss it.

In January of 2011, Ezra Williams (“Plaintiff”) sued Stephen Leon Williams and Regions Bank . Plaintiff died in May of 2011. Regions Bank filed a Suggestion of Death. No motion for substitution of proper party was made within ninety days after Plaintiff’s death was suggested upon the record. In July of 2011, the attorney who had represented Plaintiff prior to Plaintiff’s death filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. In October of 2011, Regions Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court granted the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal without prejudice. Regions Bank appeals to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court should have dismissed the case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01 for failure to timely move for substitution of proper party. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and dismiss this case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01.