APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

One day before his scheduled jury trial for first degree murder, the appellant sought and was granted the right to represent himself. He now appeals from his conviction by a Shelby County jury for the offense of first degree murder, asserting that the convicting evidence was insufficient and that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (D.U.I.) second offense, sentenced to fifty days in jail, and ordered to pay a $2,500.00 fine. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of D.U.I., (2) that the trial court erred in admitting the breath alcohol results, and (3) that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and sentenced to twelve years in confinement. His conviction was affirmed by this court on direct appeal. He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner appealed. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Barry N. Waddell, proceeding pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court found Waddell's petition was time-barred. On appeal, Waddell argues that: (1) his petition was timely filed, and (2) alternatively, if the petition was untimely filed, the statute of limitations was tolled under the holding of Dexter Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001). After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary and that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. In a timely appeal to this court, the petitioner raises the issue of whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. After a careful review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Daniel Ray Styles, was convicted of felony escape, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, theft over $1,000, and aggravated criminal trespassing. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to dismiss his case on the ground that his right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictments; (3) whether the indictment charging felony escape was facially void because it was unsigned; and (4) whether the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election between aggravated assault and aggravated robbery. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court regarding Defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated robbery, felony escape, and aggravated criminal trespassing. However, we reverse and dismiss Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and theft as violative of constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.

The Defendant, Michael J. McCann, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated criminal trespass on a habitation; two counts of assault; two counts of aggravated assault; one count of aggravated sexual battery; and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. After a hearing he was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender on the aggravated assaults, and as a Range I offender on the remaining convictions, to an effective sentence of thirty years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that his kidnapping convictions must be reversed and dismissed as violative of his due process rights under State v. Anthony; that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to elect between the proof presented in support of two sexual offenses charged; that the Defendant’s two assault convictions should have  been merged into one of the aggravated assault convictions; that
the prosecutor made improper and prejudicial remarks during closing  argument; that his sentence is excessive; and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We reverse and dismiss one of the Defendant’s assault convictions. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for premeditated first degree murder. The defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced to 24 years as a violent offender. In this appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erroneously neglected to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; and (3) the defendant's sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the failure to charge the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide was, at most, harmless error. The defendant's remaining allegations of error are without merit; thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Edward Alan Scarbrough, failed to appear for a scheduled court date on September 21, 1999. Conditional forfeiture was taken on bail bonds in the total amount of $125,000.00. The surety for these bail bonds was International Fidelity Insurance Company, which was obligated through its agent, Gary's Bail Bonds, Inc. Defendant was not returned to custody until after the time period for final forfeiture had expired. International Fidelity Insurance Company filed a timely petition to be granted full exoneration. The trial court, after a hearing, granted partial exoneration and ordered International Fidelity Insurance Company to pay $55,000.00. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Randall Ray Mills, was convicted in the Marshall County Circuit Court of one count of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of casual exchange. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged all of the defendant's convictions of aggravated sexual battery into the conviction of rape of a child and sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Additionally, the State challenges the trial court's merger of the aggravated sexual battery convictions into the rape of a child conviction and further contends that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court and remand for resentencing.

A Williamson County grand jury indicted the defendant on one count of possession of not less than ten pounds, one gram of marijuana nor more than seventy pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver. Through counsel the defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence or statements resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional search of the defendant's vehicle. When the motion to suppress was denied, the defendant waived his right to a trial by jury and pled guilty as charged. For this offense the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years, which would be suspended after the service of one hundred days, day for day; placed him on supervised probation for a period of four years; and fined him five thousand dollars. According to the Negotiated Plea Agreement form, there was also an agreement with the State that the defendant would later submit a certified question of law to this Court. Through this appeal the defendant asks us to consider two search related issues. However, the State asserts that the defendant did not properly reserve the certified questions, and, thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. Finding the State's position has merit, we, therefore, dismiss this appeal.

Although I agree with Judge Welles that it is problematic to use voluntary
manslaughter as the intermediate offense for the purposes of applying the Williams harmless error rule, I concur with Judge Riley in affirming the conviction, based on the facts of the present case and the defendant’s use of those facts in formulating a theory of defense. Given the facts, the defendant’s theory of defense, and the jury’s verdict of second-degree murder, I conclude that the failure to charge the included offenses lesser than voluntary manslaughter was harmless error.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that the trial court’s erroneous failure to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide as lesser-included offenses of first degree murder is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The petitioner, Jeffrey E. Dunlap, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.