APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Randall Blakeney, appeals the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. The pleading is barred by the statute of limitations and was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This case involves a dispute over the proper amount of child support to be paid for the parties' two minor children. Father requested a child support adjustment due to the emancipation of the parties' oldest child. He additionally requested a downward deviation of his child support payments due to significant additional parenting time in excess of that contemplated by the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines, as well as, significant additional monies paid for private school and other expenses for the children. The previous court order required Husband to pay $4,100 per month for their three minor children based on an income of $10,000 per month. The trial court determined that Husband's new child support amount for the remaining two minor children would be $3,700 per month. Father argued that the proper amount after the emancipation of their oldest child should reduce his child support to $3,200 per month. Father also argued that he should be entitled to a downward deviation reducing his child support to $1,000 per month for his two minor children. We agree with Father that the trial court incorrectly modified his child support following the emancipation of the parties' oldest child. Although Husband's current income is in excess of $10,000 per month, Wife did not carry her burden of proving that additional child support based on an amount over $10,000 per month is reasonably necessary. Child support should be set at 32% of $10,000, $3,200 per month. With regard to Father's request for a downward deviation of his child support obligation, we find that there has been no change of circumstances since the last court order and that this issue could have and should have been litigated at the time of the previous Order, so the matter is barred by res judicata. Child support is set at $3,200 per month for the remaining two minor children.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Keith Latrell Jackson, guilty of possession with the intent to sell twenty-six (26) grams or more of a substance containing cocaine in a Drug-Free School Zone and of possession of a firearm with the intent to employ it in the commission of or escape from an offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-six years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a surveyor pertaining to the use of GPS in determining the distance between the location of the offense and the real property that comprises Wharton School; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm with the intent to employ it in the commission of or escape from an offense, and we affirm the Defendant's conviction and sentence for possession with the intent to sell twenty-six (26) grams or more of a substance containing cocaine in a Drug-Free School Zone.

The Petitioner, Lorenzo D. Harris, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Horatio L. Rice, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish that his convictions are void or that his sentence has expired. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, the widow of decedent, appeals from probate court judgment that decedent died intestate. Decedent had executed an individual will, as well as a joint mutual will with Appellant, on the same day. Both wills executed by decedent contained revocation clauses purporting to revoke all prior wills. Neither Appellant, nor the witnesses to the execution of the wills, could recall the order in which Decedent executed the wills. Probate court held that, since each of Decedent’s two wills purported to revoke all prior wills and the order in which they were executed could not be established, Decedent died intestate. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the probate court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Jim L. Townsend, appeals the trial court’s denial of his application for writ of error coram nobis/petition for post-conviction relief. Finding that the instant petition is not proper as either a motion for writ of error coram nobis, petition for post-conviction relief, or application for writ of habeas corpus relief, we affirm the dismissal of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Stanley Harvell, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Came the appellant, Michael L. Calandros, pro se, and also came the Attorney General on behalf of the State of Tennessee, and this case was heard on the record on appeal from the Criminal Court of Sullivan County; and upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that this avenue of appeal is unavailable to the defendant because the sentence in this case is neither illegal nor void.

Pro se plaintiff appeals the order of the trial court dismissing his personal injury lawsuit for failure to comply with an order compelling discovery. Because no order compelling discovery was entered by the trial court, we reverse.

Harpeth Valley Utilities District of Davidson and Williamson Counties is a supplier of water and sewer services with charges for such services being based on gallonage of water measured by a water meter installed where the water main supply line joins the water line owned by the customer. Ridgelake Apartments is an apartment complex served by both a main residential water meter and an irrigation meter. Water supplied through the irrigation meter is not subject to sewer charges, but water supplied through the main residential meter is subject to such charges. Over a period of years, leaks developed in the water lines owned by Ridgelake on the Ridgelake side of the main residential water meter. Ridgelake sought reimbursement of sewer charges for water lost in these leaks on the basis that such water did not enter the sanitary sewer system. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Utility District, and we affirm the action of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce involving issues of alimony in futuro and an award of attorney fees. Husband appeals. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

The appellant, Julia Mosely, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to facilitation of attempted rape of a child and felony failure to appear. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she was sentenced to six years for the facilitation conviction and one year for the felony failure to appear. The trial court ordered that the two sentences be served consecutively, with both sentences suspended and to be served on probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered her to serve the balance of her sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the revocation of her probation. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Joshua William Algood, entered a nolo contendere plea to aggravated burglary and theft over one thousand dollars ($1,000). The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 150 days in the county jail with the remainder of a three-year effective sentence to be served on community corrections. As special conditions of the defendant's probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to have no contact with the victims, pay restitution of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), obtain a GED, submit a DNA sample, maintain full-time employment once out of jail and establish paternity of his minor child and begin paying child support to the child's mother. The defendant appeals arguing that the trial court erred in imposing the special conditions requiring he establish paternity of his minor child and pay child support. We agree with the defendant and reverse and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings pursuant to this opinion.

The appellant, Jesse James Johnson, was indicted for driving on a revoked license, violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act and third offense driving on a revoked license. At trial, the appellant's counsel argued that the order declaring the appellant to be an habitual traffic offender had expired as it was more than three (3) years old. The trial court prohibited the jury from considering the argument. The jury found the appellant guilty of driving on a revoked license and violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act. In a separate phase of the trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty of third offense driving on a revoked license. The appellant received a sentence of three (3) years and six (6) months for the violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for the third offense driving on a revoked license. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal ensued. Despite the absence of a transcript of the hearing on the motion for new trial, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the appellant's counsel from arguing that the order declaring the appellant to be an habitual motor vehicle offender had expired.

This appeal involves the division of marital property. Following almost fifteen years of marriage, both the husband and the wife sought a divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County. The trial court, disregarding the marital dissolution agreement and quitclaim deed that the husband induced the wife to sign following their separation, awarded 58.5% of the marital estate to the husband and the remainder to the wife. The husband asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by declining to follow the marital dissolution agreement and by overvaluing the marital property. We find that the trial court properly ignored the marital dissolution agreement and the quitclaim deed and that its valuation of the marital property is supported by the evidence. We have also determined that the manner in which the trial court divided the marital property was equitable.

This case involves a dispute regarding whether Tennessee courts have personal jurisdiction over a Georgia bank regarding a contract for business services provided by a Tennessee business. The trial court found no personal jurisdiction over the Georgia bank and dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We find that the Tennessee Long Arm Statute does give Tennessee courts personal jurisdiction over the Georgia bank; therefore, we reverse this case and remand it for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Edwin Matthew Bryant, appeals pro se from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for two counts of vehicular assault, a Class D felony, and resulting sentences of four years each to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. He contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his writ of habeas corpus without appointing counsel and that his sentences are illegal because the trial court sentenced him to incarceration and imposed restitution and because the trial court enhanced each of his sentences from two years to four years without finding any applicable enhancement factors. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

A Williamson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Loretta A. Wright, for one count of misdemeanor child abuse. The Defendant pled guilty, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court's sentence is excessive. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant's sentence.

The defendant, Rodney Southers, originally charged with aggravated robbery, was convicted of robbery. The trial court imposed a Range I, six-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his pretrial statement and (2) that the trial court erred by denying his request for a special jury instruction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, an at-will employee, was terminated from her position with St. Thomas Hospital because an investigation led Hospital employees to the conclusion that Appellant was involved in the harassing and stalking of another employee. Appellant sued Hospital and two employees for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress stemming from her termination. Appellees moved for summary judgment, which was granted. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment action. Crossroads Market, LLC, a grocery, was owned by two brothers whose differences escalated to a point that necessitated an action to dissolve the LLC. The trial court granted the petition to dissolve the LLC and ordered the LLC be sold at auction to the highest bidder. Appellant, one of the brothers, was the successful bidder; however, a dispute arose immediately following the auction concerning the liabilities of the LLC. The Appellant insisted that a certain $300,000 promissory note was not a liability of the LLC while his brother, the Appellee, the holder of the note, insisted it was. The court, finding that the LLC had identified the promissory note as a liability on its financial reports and tax returns from the inception of the LLC, ruled that the note was a liability of the LLC when it was purchased at auction by the Appellant. Appellant appealed. We affirm.

This appeal involves the construction of a holographic will. Following the decedent’s death, two documents in her own handwriting were found among her papers which the probate court admitted as her holographic will. The will contained devises of real and personal property to named
individuals and charities. At her death, however, the decedent owned property in excess of the devises made in her will. The executor filed three separate petitions to construe the decedent’s will.  The children of the decedent’s sister argued that the decedent died intestate as to the excess personal property and her personal residence, which the decedent did not specifically devise in her will. The probate court held that the decedent’s will contained a residuary clause, therefore, all of the decedent’s remaining assets passed through the residuary clause to the individuals and charities named in her will on a pro rata basis. In addition, the probate court held that the decedent died intestate as to her residence, which passed to her sister’s children by intestate succession. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case to the probate court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Terry Wayne Buckner, was convicted of two counts of sexual battery. Defendant was sentenced to serve one year in confinement for each offense, with the sentences to run concurrently with each other. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court's failure to order alternative sentencing and the trial court's consideration of enhancement factors which were not submitted to a jury. After a thorough review, we modify Defendant's sentence for each conviction to a sentence of one year of split confinement with three months to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on probation, with the sentences to run concurrently with each other.

A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant, Kenneth Wayne Ball, of one count of driving under the influence, and the trial court sentenced him to 11 months and 29 days, of which 10 percent was to be served before eligibility for rehabilitative release programs. In this appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of a breathalyzer test despite the officer's lack of reasonable grounds to believe that he was intoxicated and despite the officer's failure to follow the 20-minute observation protocol. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.