APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The sole issue in this case is whether a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action may recover from a defendant health care provider the amount of plaintiff’s medical expenses paid by the Tennessee Medicaid program which is a part of the federal social security program.

The Court below held defendant in civil contempt for violating a permanent 2 injunction that prohibited him from obstructing the right-of-way on a state highway. Defendant has appealed and takes issue with the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and with the sufficiency of the judgment. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s finding of civil contempt and, therefore, we affirm.

The original plaintiff in this case, Billy Gwin Mitchell (“plaintiff” or “Mitchell”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County seeking to enjoin the foreclosure of a deed of trust. Named as defendants were Sam F. Cole, Jr., Substitute Trustee  f the Estate of Prudence Reynolds, and Gerald W. Pickens, Administrator CTA (“defendants” or by name). Defendants filed an answer and a counter-complaint in which they contended, among other things, that the records of Mitchell’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case reflected Mitchell’s confirmed amended plan of reorganization mandated that Mitchell pay the mortgage indebtedness to Ms. Reynolds in accordance with the terms of the promissory note. As counter-plaintiffs, Cole and Pickens sought a money judgment for the principal balance due and owing on the note, plus accrued interest and attorney’s fees and costs. At the conclusion of all the proof, the case was submitted to a jury, and after issues of fact had been resolved, the special chancellor entered a judgment in favor of the Reynolds estate in the amount of $41,101.64 on the promissory note and attorney’s 2 fees in the amount of $21,900.00.

The original plaintiff in this case, Billy Gwin Mitchell (“plaintiff” or “Mitchell”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County seeking to enjoin the foreclosure of a deed of trust. Named as defendants were Sam F. Cole, Jr., Substitute Trustee of the Estate of Prudence Reynolds, and Gerald W. Pickens, Administrator CTA (“defendants” or by name). Defendants filed an answer and a counter-complaint in which they contended, among other things, that the records of Mitchell’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case reflected Mitchell’s confirmed amended plan of reorganization mandated that Mitchell pay the mortgage indebtedness to Ms. Reynolds in accordance with the terms of the promissory note. As counter-plaintiffs, Cole and Pickens sought a money judgment for the principal balance due and owing on the note, plus accrued interest and attorney’s fees and costs. At the conclusion of all the proof, the case was submitted to a jury, and after issues of fact had been resolved, the special chancellor entered a judgment in favor of the Reynolds estate in the amount of $41,101.64 on the promissory note and attorney’s 2 fees in the amount of $21,900.00.

This appeal involves a twelve-year-old boy who became paralyzed when he lost control of an all-terrain vehicle and crashed into a utility pole. The boy sued the manufacturer of the all-terrain vehicle in the Circuit Court for Sumner County, alleging that its advertisements falsely and misleadingly depicted all-terrain vehicles as safe enough to be operated by children. The jury returned a verdict for the manufacturer following a lengthy trial, and the child and his mother appealed. We have determined that the trial court’s instructions did not fairly appraise the jury of the plaintiff’s theory of the case and that its supplemental instructions confused the jury about the significance of their verdict. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

The Plaintiff, Jennifer Frank, has appealed from summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, American Realty Company, Terry Stephens, Lee  Ann Hoffman, Shirley Adkins and Alan Saturn; and from a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendant, Ali Noureddini in the amount of  $50,000. Other captioned Defendants are not involved in this appeal.

A convicted burglar in the custody of the Department of Correction filed a petition with the Chancery Court of Davidson County for an order directing  the Department to award him additional credits against his sentence for time spent in jail before and after trial, and for sentence reduction credits he allegedly earned during the same period of incarceration. The Chancellor found that Mr. Johnson had already received all the credits to which he was entitled. We affirm-

This is a governmental tort liability case arising out of an automobile collision. Defendants, James P. Mixon; Gene Barksdale, Sheriff of Shelby County, Tennessee, and Shelby County, Tennessee, appeal from the judgment of the trial court awarding plaintiff, Lisa Griggs damages for personal injury. Under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act as it existed in 1985, governmental entities could not be tried by a jury, T.C.A. § 29-20-307. Subsequently, prior to the 1994 trial, the case was bifurcated to allow the nongovernmental defendant a jury trial. Thus, Worsham is not a party to this appeal.

The appellee, Graple Simpson, was indicted for possession of a schedule II narcotic with the intent to sell. Following a summary administrative forfeiture, the appellee moved the trial court to dismiss the criminal charge. She argued that the double jeopardy clause prohibited further criminal prosecution. The trial judge granted the appellee's motion and the state appealed. We reverse and remand.

The plaintiff, Scarlett Lay Love, appeals from the denial of her motion to dismiss, the motion being predicated upon the alleged failure of the defendants, College Level Career Services, Inc., and Nursing Careers, Inc., to perfect an appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court within the ten-day period provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108. The sole issue for our determination is as follows: whether a facsimile (fax) transmission of a notice of appeal and appeal bond, sent by the defendants to the clerk of the general sessions court on the final day on which an appeal could be taken, is sufficient to perfect the appeal. For the following reasons, we conclude that the facsimile transmission was not sufficient to perfect the appeal; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
 

In this post-divorce action for modification of alimony the appellant asserts that the appellee failed to prove that she had experienced a material change of circumstances since the original award. We agree and reverse the order modifying the award.

This suit was originated by a petition for certiorari to review the administrative order of the Metropolitan Board of Housing Code Appeals requiring the demolition of substandard improvements on six tracts belonging to Plaintiffs. The Trial Court reversed the order as to three of the tracts which are not involved in this appeal. The Trial Court affirmed the demolition order as to three of the tracts, and Plaintiffs appealed and have presented the issues for review in the following form:

Petitioner, David Randall Safer, and respondent, Micki Jo O'Fiel Safer, divorced in January 1994 after eleven years of marriage. The court granted respondent the divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The parties had entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement ("MDA") which the Final Decree of Divorce incorporated. The MDA provided that petitioner and respondent would have joint custody of their two minor children, Joseph ("Tyler") age five and Samuel age two, and that the primary placement of the children would be with respondent.

The defendant, Derek C. Denton, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. As a Range I, standard offender, he received six-year sentences and was fined $10,000 for each of the aggravated burglary and aggravated assault convictions and a two-year sentence and $2,500 fine for the criminally negligent homicide conviction. The defendant was ordered to serve each sentence consecutively, for an effective sentence of fourteen years, in the local workhouse. The defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions; (2) whether the trial court properly charged the jury on circumstantial evidence; (3) whether the trial court properly charged the jury on the prosecution's burden of proof; and (4) whether the defendant's sentence was excessive.  We conclude that the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. The trial court did not make sufficient findings, and the record does not support consecutive sentences. There is no indication from the circumstances surrounding the offenses that consecutive sentencing is necessary to protect society from the defendant or that upon release he will be unwilling to lead a productive life and resort to criminal activity. See id; Gray v. State, 538 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1976). In consideration of the foregoing, the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated burglary and criminally negligent homicide are affirmed. His conviction for aggravated assault is modified to assault, and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with a seventy-five percent release eligibility date imposed. All three sentences, though, shall be served concurrently to each other.

The appellant, Terry Bowen, was convicted of theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, by a jury of his peers. The trial court found that the appellant was a multiple offender and imposed a Range II sentence consisting of confinement for eight (8) years in the Department of Correction. This sentence is to be served consecutively with the sentences imposed in three prior cases.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. However, although I agree that the collateral fact rule essentially remains viable through Rule 403, Tenn. R. Evid., I question its use in this case relative to the appellant’s attempt to impeach Mr. Farrar’s testimony through extrinsic evidencethat Farrar’s son had previously been charged with the appellant and that his son’s charges had been retired on motion of the state.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury found Appellant John V. Woodruff guilty of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and first degree murder. Appellant received a life sentence for each murder conviction and a twenty year sentence for both the especially aggravated robbery conviction and the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. The life sentences were ordered to run consecutive to each other, and the sentences for robbery and kidnapping were ordered to run concurrent with each other and with the life sentence for first degree murder. In this appeal as of right, Appellant presents the following issues for review:(1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence of sexual assault upon one of the victims; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying a request for a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery; (3) whether the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain convictions for especially aggravated robbery and first degree murder; and (4) whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive life sentences.