APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the criteria for determining the
validity of antenuptial agreements announced in Randolph v. Randolph, ___
S.W.2d ___, ___ (Tenn. 1996)1 should be applied to reconciliation agreements.
I also agree with the majority’s determination that the reconciliation agreement
involved in this case is not enforceable because Mr. Smith has not demonstrated
by a preponderance of the evidence that he disclosed the value of his interest in
National Sheet Metal Company to Ms. Smith or that Ms. Smith had independent
knowledge of the nature, extent and value of this interest. Accordingly, I agree
that the trial court erred by enforcing the reconciliation agreement.

This is a suit by a judgment creditor to set aside a fraudulent transfer of assets and to subject said assets to the satisfaction of the judgment.

The wife of a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed for divorce, claiming that her husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. The husband answered and counterclaimed, and moved the court to order the wife to file a Bill of Particulars, setting forth the facts she was relying upon as grounds for the pending divorce. The court did not respond to the husband’s motion, nor did it respond to the husband’s Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum, but granted the wife an absolute divorce without affording the husband the opportunity to present any evidence. We reverse, and vacate the trial court’s order.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Dana D. Defriece (Mother) to her son, John Defriece (John)(DOB: Januar 9, 1988). Mother appeals, raising three issues that present the followig questions:

David K. Hinchy and Pearline Henchy, who are residents of Indiana, appeal judgment of the Chancery Court for Cocke County. The Chancellor, first, granted a default judgment against them in favor of Ronald D. Mackie and Brenda L. Mackie, who are residents of Florida. The Court also ordered the sale of certain real estate, the proceeds of which would be applied to the satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by the real estate and, preliminarily, a personal judgment in the amount of $18,200, plus interest at the rate of 8.65 percent per annum from October 1, 1989. Second, after sale of the property and giving credit for payments previously made, he awarded a definciency judgment in the amount of $15,719.97, which included court costs and expenses of the sale.

In this case, the Plaintiff, Richard D. Phillips, sues Interstate Hotels Corporation and Instate Hotels Corporation #L07, D/B/A Chattanooga Marriott and Kicks Lounge, seeking damages by reason of the Defendant's violating his civil rights under the provisions of  T.C.A. 4-21-301( 2) .

This is an appeal from the judgment of the chancery court for Hamilton County, whereby the court affirmed the decision of the City Council of the City of Chattanooga finding the appellant, a police officer, guilty of violating Chattanooga Police Manual Orders and imposing disciplinary sanctions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The counter-plaintiff, Connie Argo Smith, appeals from the Trial Court’s judgment awarding her a divorce on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. The Trial Court also awarded her the marital residence and contents, a 1990 Astro Mini Van, and $100,000.00 cash. The Trial Court required the counter-defendant, Jimmy E. Smith, to pay all marital debts including the mortgage on the home. The court also awarded Mr. Smith a farm, commercial property, the “Smart Station” property, a houseboat, a bass boat, a Chevrolet truck, Mercedes automobile, riding mower, tractor, personal effects and unspecified stocks.

The mother and father lived together in Michigan for approximately fifteen (15) years but were never married. They had a daughter, Cnanah, now seven (7) years of age.

The City of Knoxville appeals judgments rendered in favor of Elmer Richardson, surviving spouse of Goldie H. Richardson, for personal injuries received by him and the wrongful death of his wife in the amount of $30,000, and $130,000, respectively.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Kafait U. Malik (“husband”) appeals from the trial court’s judgment ordering him to cash out and/or borrow against his pension and retirement funds in order to satisfy the court’s prior distribution of marital property to Susan K. Malik (“wife”).

This is an appeal by plaintiff/appellant, Jeannie Farrow, from two orders of the trial court which granted the motion to dismiss filed by defendant/appellee, Charles F. Barnett, M.D. (“Dr. Barnett”), and the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant/appellee, Fort Sanders Parkwest Medical Center (“the Medical Center”). In its orders, the trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to file her action within the applicable statute of limitations. The facts out of which this controversy arose are as follows.

Plaintiff-Appellant, Lamar Fletcher (“Fletcher”), appearing pro se, appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant-Appellee, John W. Campbell (“Campbell”).

The appellant, Allen Ray Ricker, was convicted of theft under $10,000, a Class D felony, by a jury of his peers. The trial court found that the appellant was a standard offender and imposed a Range I sentence of confinement for three (3) years in the Department of Correction. The appellant contends that the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by: (a) denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the state’s case in chief because the state failed to prove the venue of the offense and failed to prove that the person named in the indictment was the owner of the wrecker in question, and (b) permitting the state to reopen its case in chief to prove the venue of the offense. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law that governs the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

This case concerns liability in connection with the default on a promissory note for the purchase of stock in a closely held corporation. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and also awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiff. Two principal issues are before the Court. The first is whether the plaintiff gave the necessary parties proper notice of default under the terms of the promissory notes executed by the parties. The second is whether the guarantor of the promissory notes is liable under the personal guaranty if proper notice was, in fact, given. We find that the trial court was correct in its holding that proper notice was given and that the personal guarantor was liable. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Pamela Ford (“wife”) filed a petition to modify child support and alimony. Although the trial court declined to increase alimony, the court increased the amount of child support that Michael Ford (“husband”) was obligated to pay based upon his increased income. Wife has appealed and argues that the trial court erred in several respects. First, she asserts that the trial court erred in holding that the husband’s receipt of principal from an irrevocable trust is not “gross income” as that term is defined within the child support guidelines. Next, she contends that the trial court improperly failed to consider the value of the trust in increasing child support. Furthermore, wife argues that the trial court should have imputed income to husband based upon his voluntary unemployment. Finally, wife argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for an increase in alimony. For the reasons stated below, the judgment below is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

The pivotal issue on this appeal is, if an attorney in fact issues a check to a bank, drawn on the checking account of her principal, for which the bank issues a time certificate of deposit for the amount of the check in the name of the principal "or" the attorney in fact, and there is no specific provision in the power of attorney for such transaction and no signature card or contract 2 relating to the certificate of deposit signed by either the principal or the attorney in fact, upon the death of the principal, which is entitled to the funds, the principal's estate or the attorney in fact? We hold the estate is entitled to the funds, and affirm.

Stephen Ray Stamps appeals the judgment of the trial court dismissing his “Petition
for Visitation Rights” for lack of jurisdiction. The parties were divorced in the court below and
Linda Diane Stamps was awarded custody of the parties minor daughter. Mr. Stamps was
incarcerated at that time.

Defendant-Appellant, Mickey Dwayne Burleson (“Father”), appeals the trial court’s judgment denying his petition to modify the child custody provisions of the parties’ final divorce decree.

The Defendant, John Namdi Anene appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court of Hamilton County granting Victoria Ngozi Anene's petition for divorce and awarding her custody of their three minor children. Mr. Anene raises five issues on appeal, two of which are jurisdictional. (See appendix.) As to the jurisdictional issues, we find that the Circuit Court of Hamilton was correct in assuming jurisdiction to hear both the divorce and custody issues. We find the remainint issues to be without merit.

In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant, Teri Michelle Parker (Wife), appeals the trial court’s decision to award custody of the parties' child, Dylan Ken Parker, to Defendant-Appellee, Richard Ken Parker (Husband), alleging that the custody determination was based on the effects of racial prejudice. We affirm the trial court’s award of custody to Husband.

In this appeal we are asked to re-visit the question of whether a man who fathers a child by a married woman may legitimate the child. The Davidson County Juvenile Court held that the legitimation statute allowing a putative father to legitimate a child “not born in lawful wedlock” applied only to children born to unmarried women. If that interpretation holds, the appellant attacks the constitutionality of the statute on due process and equal protection grounds. We affirm the lower court’s interpretation of the statute and reject the appellant’s contention that the statute is constitutionally defective.

We are called upon in this appeal to determine whether relying on the advice of an attorney in filing an unfounded will contest constitutes probable cause sufficient to avoid the enforcement of a forfeiture clause in the will. For the reasons set forth below, we find that such reliance does constitute probable cause, and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Tennessee Public Service Commission ordered the completion of a previously authorized investigation of the future earnings of BellSouth Telecommunications, despite legislative developments that stripped the Commission of its authority to use such an investigation to set telephone rates. BellSouth filed a petition with this court for review of the PSC’s order, arguing that completion of the investigation was inconsistent with the legislative purpose. We reverse the Commission’s order and remand the case for further consideration by the Tennessee Regulatory Commission.

I fully concur in Judge Cantrell's opinion. I have read with much interest Judge Koch's dissenting opinion. The matters set forth in the dissenting opinion might make good public policy, but the setting of public policy is not a matter for this court or any court in Tennessee.