APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In August 1998, the McMinn County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Stephen L. Denton, M.D., for one count of rape, two counts of sexual battery, and two counts of unlawful distribution of a Schedule IV controlled substance. In November 1998, the McMinn County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for three counts of rape, one count of attempted rape, and eight counts of sexual battery. In March 1999, the McMinn County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count of rape and four counts of sexual battery. In sum, the Defendant was charged in three different indictments for twenty-two criminal offenses involving eleven different female patients. Despite repeated objections by the Defendant, the three indictments were consolidated for trial. Four of the counts were nollied before trial, two more counts were dismissed at the conclusion of the State's proof, and the final sixteen counts were considered by the jury. The jury convicted the Defendant for six counts of sexual battery, one count of sexual battery by an authority figure, and three counts of assault and acquitted the Defendant on the remaining six counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that the trial court erred by denying his Motion for Severance; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to Suppress his statement given to law enforcement officers after his arrest; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to improperly cross-examine the Defendant and his former wife; (4) that the Defendant did not exercise "supervisory power" over his patient, and, therefore, was improperly convicted for sexual battery by an authority figure; (5) that the State presented improper closing arguments that were "so inflammatory and prejudicial as to require reversal;" (6) that the Defendant's conviction for assault against an undercover law enforcement officer should be dismissed because the undercover officer consented to the actions of the Defendant; (7) that the State failed to elect the incident upon which it was relying to support one of the Defendant's sexual battery convictions; and (8) that the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant. Finding reversible error in case number 98-538, we reverse and remand the Defendant's conviction for assault in that case. We affirm all of the other judgments of the trial court.

Roger Dale Lewis, the petitioner, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Sumner County Criminal Court. Through his petition, the petitioner sought to collaterally attack his aggravated arson conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations in the nature of suppression of exculpatory evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. After consideration of the entire record, we affirm the post-conviction courts disposition.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dolwin Deon Cormia, of first degree murder and abuse of a corpse, and the trial court imposed a life sentence with the possibility of parole plus a concurrent two year sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the trial court dismissed the petition, and this appeal ensued. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Glenn C. Summers, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant presents two issues for review: (1) that he established the affirmative defense of insanity and (2) that the trial court erred by providing an irrelevant definition of "intentional" in its jury instructions. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis claiming a due process violation in that the State failed to disclose a plea agreement with a material witness. We conclude the issues raised by the petitioner have been previously determined and are time barred. We further conclude the facts of this case do not justify tolling of the statute of limitations. We affirm the trial court's dismissal.

The Appellant, Zellburge Gleaves, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court following his guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Gleaves agreed to an eight-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender. The plea agreement further provided that the manner of service of the sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered total confinement. Gleaves appeals, contending that the trial court erred in failing to grant a sentence of split confinement. After review of the record, we affirm.

A Sullivan County Jury convicted the appellant, Henry Mitchell Dixon, Jr., also known as "Mackie" Dixon, of one count of attempted first degree murder (Count One), one count of attempted second degree murder (Count Two), one count of attempted aggravated assault (Count Four), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts Three and Five), one count of unauthorized use of a vehicle (Count Six), and one count of aggravated burglary (Count Seven). The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective twenty-two (22) year sentence as a Range I offender for Counts One through Six and four (4) years probation on Count Seven, to run consecutively to the twenty-two (22) year sentence. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, his sentence, and the trial court's refusal to set aside the appellant's conviction for attempted first degree murder based on the jury foreman's statement after the trial that there was a mistake as to how the verdict was returned. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that none of these claims merit relief. However, we must reverse and remand the conviction for attempted second degree murder due to an erroneous jury charge on the definition of "knowingly." In all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder. He now contends that the evidence of premeditation was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

On May 19, 2001, a jury in Memphis convicted the defendant, William Wilson, of aggravated robbery and first degree felony murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I Standard Offender to life in prison for the first degree felony murder conviction and to eight (8) years for the aggravated robbery to be served consecutively. The defendant appeals these convictions. He argues four issues on appeal: (1) He was not criminally responsible for his co-defendant's actions, and therefore, not guilty of first degree murder; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated robbery and first degree murder; (3) the trial court erred by failing to charge the affirmative defense of duress; and (4) the trial court erred by sentencing him to eight (8) years consecutive to his life sentence with the possibility of parole. We affirm the trial court's actions with regard to these issues.

The defendant appealed his convictions on two counts of facilitation of second degree murder and one count of aggravated arson, as well as the effective 65-year sentence. The defendant's appeal raised the following issues: insufficiency of evidence to support the convictions; error in allowing hearsay testimony under the conspiracy exception; error in allowing cross-examination of the defendant during limited purpose jury-out hearing; error in allowing a medical expert to testify outside his area of expertise; failure to instruct the jury on inadequate crime scene investigation; and error in application of "particularly vulnerable" enhancement factor during the sentencing phase. We conclude that the defendant's issues are without merit and affirm the convictions and sentence as imposed by the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of attempted reckless homicide, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated assault conviction, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years for aggravated assault and six years for aggravated burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated assault conviction. Also, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight. We conclude, following plain error review, that attempted reckless homicide is not a recognized crime in Tennessee. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction for attempted reckless homicide. Further, we conclude that the jury instruction regarding flight was not error, and the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. We affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, facilitating aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. He now appeals these convictions contending that the (1) evidence was not sufficient to support the convictions, (2) trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of aggravated kidnapping or in refusing to merge the charge of aggravated kidnapping with his aggravated robbery charge, (3) trial court erred by denying him his right to effective cross-examination by stating that questions regarding the prior inconsistent statements of the victim would allow the admission of more damaging testimony against the defendant, and (4) trial court erred in sentencing. We hold that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factor four; however, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The pro se petitioner, Mitchell Tarver, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing the habeas petition under the peculiar circumstances presented in the instant case. We therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.