APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Ronald Benjamin Irwin, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. As a result, the appellant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a nine-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence as excessive. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant to serve nine (9) years in incarceration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Kevin Bufford, pled guilty to one (1) count of aggravated robbery and one (1) count of carjacking while reserving a certified question of law for appeal. In that certified question of law, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of what the appellant argues was an illegal arrest. Because we determine that the certified question is not dispositive, we dismiss the appeal and remand the matter to the trial court for any further proceedings which may be necessary.

The petitioner, Anthony D. Forster, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Petitioner, David Johnson, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to interview or call a witness who could have provided an alibi for Petitioner on the night of
the offenses. After a review of the record in this matter, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of pretrial jail credits. We conclude that Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 does not provide an appeal as of right from the trial court's action. Moreover, because the sentence is neither illegal nor void, the appeal cannot be treated as a writ of certiorari. Therefore, because this matter is not properly before us, we dismiss the appeal.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Robert Gamble, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, and one count of theft of property over five hundred dollars. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal,
and Petitioner’s Rule 11 application was denied by the Supreme Court. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed Petitioner’s amended petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that the court erred when it dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the lower court properly dismissed the petition. As such, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Carlos Weeks, was indicted in Shelby County for four counts of aggravated robbery. Two of the four counts were alternative charges. The defendant was convicted of all four counts and the trial court merged the alternative counts into two convictions. The trial court imposed a concurrent, Range I sentence of ten years for each of the two offenses. In this appeal as of right, the defendant asserts that there is a material variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial and that the evidence is insufficient to support either conviction. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant appeals his conviction for reckless endangerment, contending specifically that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he placed anyone in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. Upon review, we conclude that because the defendant fired the gun in the air, away from any person or potentially occupied building, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Therefore, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charges.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Allen Jean Stephens, was convicted of one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to twenty-three years for the felony drug conviction, and eleven months, twenty nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty-three years. Defendant does not appeal the length of his sentences or the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Defendant argues however, that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the crack cocaine found at his house during the execution of a search warrant; and that the trial court erred in ruling admissible certain evidence about a prior sale of crack cocaine, an offense for which Defendant was not charged.  Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony Crowe, entered a plea of nolo contendere to facilitation of first degree murder and received an eighteen-year sentence. After imposition of the sentence, but before the judgment became final, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea alleging that the plea was not supported by a factual basis and that the plea had not been voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw. Although we conclude that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) does not mandate that a plea of nolo contendere be supported by a factual basis, we also conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw because the defendant established that his plea had not been voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered. Thus, permitting withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct manifest injustice. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, grant the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, vacate the conviction of facilitation of first degree murder, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted in case no. 03-05457 of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and one count of evading arrest, a Class D felony . Defendant was convicted in case No. 03-05459 of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, against victim Christopher Bridges. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to six years for each of his Class C and Class D felony convictions. The trial court merged Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions in counts one and two in case No. 03-05459, and
sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to ten years for the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences in case No. 03-05457 to be served concurrently. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences in case No. 03-05459 to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to Defendant’s sentence in case No. 03-05457, for an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Defendant does not challenge the length of his sentences. Following our review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.  We remand for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to make specific findings justifying the imposition of consecutive sentencing, failed to identify and support the enhancement factors used to enhance Defendant’s sentences for his Class D and Class B felony convictions; and failed to identify which specific convictions it was relying upon to classify Defendant as a multiple offender for sentencing him for his Class D and Class C felony convictions.

The Defendant, Alice Smotherman, pled guilty to possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance for resale, a Class D felony, after the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. As part of the plea agreement, she reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question reserved for review was "whether or not the affidavit in the search warrant is sufficient to establish truthfulness, reliability and veracity of information that [an] unnamed third party conveyed to affiant which established probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant; and whether or not the search warrant complied with Rule 41(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure." Because the record on appeal is incomplete, we must conclusively presume the ruling of the trial court was correct. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in awarding to the employee a 30% permanent partial disability to the whole body as a result of his employment with Clinton Home Center. We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge with regard to the extent of the disability sustained but find that the employee refused a reasonable offer of return to work and is subject to the maximum benefit set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-241(a)(1). In accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-225(e)(2), we affirm the judgment of the trial court but modify the award to the employee to provide for a 17.5% permanent, partial disability to the whole body.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the issue is which of the multiple insurance carriers is responsible for paying the workers’ compensation benefits of Ms. Gina Gunn, the injured employee. The trial court ruled that Hartford Insurance Company, the insurance carrier when Ms. Gunn underwent surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome, was responsible for payment. On the basis of recent developments in the law, the Panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and that Realm National Insurance Company, the insurance carrier when Ms. Gunn filed the notice of her injury, is liable for payments of Ms. Gunn’s benefits.

Blount County -In this boundary dispute between two lot owners in adjacent subdivisions, the trial court relied on an old fence line to establish the boundary and award plaintiff damages for trespass. Given that the deeds and surveys were inconclusive, it is appropriate to look to the most reliable monumentation to establish the line. We affirm.

Defendant, Qawi Nur, a/k/a/ Darrius James, was indicted on one count of first degree felony murder and one count of first degree premeditated murder. The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder in count one and second degree murder in count two. The trial court merged Defendant’s second degree murder conviction into his first degree felony murder conviction. The jury sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for his first degree murder conviction. The sole issue raised on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a dispute over compensation for property taken by eminent domain. The Knoxville Community Development Corporation insisted that the property was worth only $19,500 and deposited that amount into the court. The landowner claimed it was worth much more. Following a trial, the jury found the fair market value of the property to be $25,700. The landowner appeals, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that they could consider the tax assessment figures in their valuation of the property. We agree, and we reverse the trial court.

The appellant, Patricia Marie Jenson,² was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of child neglect and possession of drug paraphernalia. She received a total effective sentence of four years, to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction for child neglect and the sentence imposed by the trial court on that offense. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Daylon Roberts, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Daniel Blake, stands convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, attempt to leave the scene of an accident, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, and he is serving an effective sentence of 25 years. He has appealed his aggravated vehicular homicide conviction and claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his blood-alcohol content was above .20 percent and that he had previously been convicted of DUI. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find sufficient evidence to support the conviction and affirm
the judgment.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s upholding the conviction. I do not believe the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant of child neglect as that offense is described in State v. Mateyko, 53 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. 2001). In Mateyko, our supreme court held that “a mere risk of harm” was insufficient and that the state was required to show “that the defendant’s neglect produced an actual, deleterious effect or harm upon the child’s health and welfare.” Id. 53 S.W.3d at 671-72.

The petitioner, Clarence Carnell Gaston, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his 2001 convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and conspiracy to commit second degree murder. See State v. Clarence Carnell Gaston, No. W2001-02046-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Feb. 7, 2003) (affirming the petitioner’s convictions and sentences), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2003). After appointing counsel, the post-conviction court conducted a hearing on May 24, 2004. Following the hearing, the court denied post-conviction relief. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Daniel Blake, stands convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, attempt to leave the scene of an accident, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, and he is serving an effective sentence of 25 years. He has appealed his aggravated vehicular homicide conviction and claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his blood-alcohol content was above .20 percent and that he had previously been convicted of DUI. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find sufficient evidence to support the conviction and affirm the judgment.

The Chancery Court granted Rule 11 sanctions against James Saffles and Connie Saffles (“Plaintiffs”)1 based upon their actions and the resulting delay that occurred after the filing by Roger Watson and Tammy Watson (“Defendants”) of a motion seeking Rule 11 sanctions. We hold that the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on the grounds relied on by the Chancery Court was error, vacate the grant of Rule 11 sanctions, and remand for a reconsideration of Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions and a determination of whether the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is proper based on the grounds raised in the Rule 11 motion.

Appellant was held in criminal contempt of court for failure to pay alimony. We affirm the action of the trial court and find the appeal to be frivolous.