APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a negligent construction case involving a statute of repose. The defendant developer bought the residential lot in question in 1992. The developer hired the defendant subcontractor to remove trees and perform the grading work necessary to make the lot suitable for the construction of a house. In 1993, the developer sold the lot to the defendant construction company, which constructed a house on the lot. In 1994, the construction company sold the lot and the house to purchasers not party to this litigation. In 1997, the purchasers sold the house to the plaintiffs in this case. A few weeks after the plaintiffs moved into the house, they noticed cracks in the walls and abnormal settling of the house. In April 2000, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the construction company and the subcontractor for negligent construction of the house and negligent grading of the lot. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the four-year statute of repose set out in T.C.A. § 28-3-202. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on that statute. The plaintiffs now appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment only as to the defendant subcontractor. We affirm.
 

In this action involving child support, the issues are whether the trial court erred in finding that the father provided adequate discovery information regarding his income and assets; whether the trial court erred in ordering the mother to pay half the cost of the father's airfare to attend his deposition in Tennessee; whether the court should have awarded the mother more attorney's fees than it did; and whether the trial court erred in failing to hold the father responsible for a hospital bill for medical treatment of the parties' child. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand.

This is an appeal as of right from the denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant, Jeffrey Lynn Myers, was convicted of one count of attempted rape upon entry of a best-interest guilty plea. He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment as a Range I, standard offender. The Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief and received an evidentiary hearing. The trial court subsequently denied the Defendant's petition, and he now appeals to this Court. He argues multiple issues, all of which we find to have been waived because the claims are either (1) not proper issues for a post-conviction proceeding, (2) not properly preserved for appeal, or (3) not reviewable due to an incomplete record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Augustine John Lopez, III, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree felony murder and theft of property over $1000 and subsequently received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and five years for the respective convictions. On appeal, Lopez raises four issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions: (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony by a police officer concerning fingerprint evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding the hearsay statements of a witness which indicated her possible involvement in the murder; and (4) whether the trial court's sequential jury instruction was error. After review of the record, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The Appellant, Kenneth Hayes, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Davidson County Criminal Court. In 1997, Hayes pled guilty to felony possession of cocaine and was sentenced to a term of eight years with service of one year in confinement followed by supervised probation. In 2004, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Hayes violated probation by possessing cocaine. At the revocation hearing, Hayes sought suppression of the cocaine upon grounds that it was illegally seized. The trial court found that the police search was valid and revoked Hayes' suspended sentence. After review, we conclude that the cocaine was illegally seized. Notwithstanding, we further conclude that in the absence of police harassment or that the evidence was obtained in a particularly offensive manner, the exclusionary rule is not applicable to probation revocation proceedings. Accordingly, the order of revocation is affirmed.

The Defendant, Jason Ray Taylor, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, burglary, two counts of vandalism and three counts of forgery. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief; this appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3, the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility ("the Board") appeals from an order of the Chancery Court for Knox County imposing the sanction of public censure upon James L. Milligan, Jr., Esq. ("Milligan"). The Board contends that the Chancery Court erred in concluding that: (1) Milligan did not misappropriate funds; (2) Milligan's use of a client's funds for personal purposes was not a serious violation; and (3) public censure is the appropriate sanction. Because we conclude that Milligan did misappropriate funds and did otherwise conduct himself in a manner inconsistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, as will be hereinafter detailed, we have determined that suspension for a period of two years is appropriate.

This is a collection action. The defendant corporation owned an automotive repair shop. In order to obtain a line of credit to purchase automobile parts from the plaintiff auto parts supply company, the sole shareholder of the defendant corporation signed a personal guaranty. After the corporation had incurred about $20,000 on its line of credit, the plaintiff supply  company filed this lawsuit against the corporation and the individual shareholder to recover that debt. The shareholder argued that, before the debt was incurred, he sold the business to a third party and canceled his personal guaranty on the debt of the corporation. The trial court rejected that argument and entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against both the corporation and the shareholder. The shareholder now appeals. We affirm, concluding that holding the shareholder liable for the debt of the corporation is appropriate under these circumstances, regardless of  whether his personal guaranty remained intact.

The petitioner, Archie L. Miller, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his three 2002 convictions of selling cocaine. The post-conviction court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition, and the court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the court found that the petitioner failed to establish the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and denied post-conviction relief. We affirm the action of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Kennath Henderson, appeals as of right from the May 21, 2003 judgment of the Fayette County Circuit Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner entered guilty pleas to first degree premeditated murder, two (2) counts of especially aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and felonious escape. The petitioner waived his right to jury sentencing. After a capital sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the death sentence for the murder count and an effective sentence of twenty-three (23) years in prison for the noncapital offenses. The petitioner’s convictions and sentences, including the sentence of death, were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d 307 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 934 (2000). A pro se petition for post-conviction relief was filed on February 12, 2001, which was followed by an amended petition on November 30, 2001. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 28-29, 2003, and, on May 21, 2003, the trial court denied relief and dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals, presenting for our review the following claims: (1) the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself at both the trial and the post-conviction hearings; (2) the post-conviction court’s findings were clearly erroneous; (3) trial counsel was ineffective; (4) appellate counsel was ineffective; (5) the post-conviction court erred in prohibiting a witness from testifying; and (6) the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional. After a careful and laborious review of the record, this Court concludes that there is no error requiring reversal. Accordingly, the order of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The defendant, David Wayne Fountain, appeals from the Rhea County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. Because the record supports the revocation of probation, we affirm the revocation; however, to avoid a length of confinement that exceeds the defendant’s release eligibility as a Range I offender, we modify the post-revocation terms of the manner of service of the defendant’s two-year sentence.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, challenging: (1) the jury instruction given on the mens rea term "knowingly," and (2) the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser included offenses of aggravated assault and assault. Upon review, we conclude that the issues are waived for failure to provide a completed record on appeal. Furthermore, notwithstanding waiver, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Wilson County jury convicted the defendant, Lorenzo Malone, for first degree felony murder under the theory of criminal responsibility. The trial court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to strike a potential juror for cause; (2) admitting photographs of the victim and a videotape into evidence; and (3) failing to grant a mistrial based upon impropriety in the State's closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Darrell Toomes, of robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him as the perpetrator, (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence relating to a photograph array and a subsequent in-court identification of him, and (3) that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Norris Ray, was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a handgun; one count of first degree felony murder; and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole on the felony murder conviction. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to forty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and as a Range II, multiple offender, to four years for the felony possession of a handgun conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of life plus forty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to identify him as the perpetrator of the offenses; (2) that the trial court erred by not allowing the impeachment of the testimony of the victim of especially aggravated kidnapping with evidence of the victim’s misdemeanor drug convictions; and (3) that the trial court erred in determining the length of Defendant’s sentences and in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available when: (1) the trial court imposed concurrent sentences for two offenses committed by the petitioner while on parole; and (2) the trial court failed to order these new sentences to be served consecutively to the remaining sentence for the paroled offense. We conclude that the sentences are not illegal under either claim and that the petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Petitioner, Robert Howell, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the
State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Appellant, Jason Allen Ruiz, appeals the sentencing decision of the Marshall County Circuit Court denying his motion for suspension of his sentence. Following a guilty plea to Class B felony sale of cocaine, Ruiz received an eight-year sentence with service of one year in confinement. At the sentencing hearing, Ruiz refused to name his drug sources. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court informed Ruiz that after serving 120 days in jail, the remainder of his incarceration period would be suspended if he revealed the names of those who supplied him drugs. Ruiz petitioned for suspension of his sentence after serving 120 days in confinement. He persisted, however, in his refusal to identify his drug sources because he feared retaliation. Ruiz's motion for suspension of his sentence was denied. After de novo review, we conclude that the trial court improperly considered Ruiz's refusal to reveal his drug sources. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the balance of the Appellant's sentence of incarceration is suspended.

This is a claim against an estate for personal services rendered to the decedent. The decedent's stepson and his wife provided personal services to the decedent for several years prior to her death. The decedent died intestate, leaving no issue. The decedent's nephew was appointed as administrator of the decedent's estate. The stepson and his wife filed claims against the estate on the theory of implied or quasi contract, seeking reimbursement for the expenses incurred in providing the personal services for the decedent. The decedent's estate filed an exception to those claims. After a hearing, the trial court granted a portion of the stepson's and his wife's claims for personal services, finding that an implied contract existed with the decedent as to those items. The estate now appeals. We reverse, finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of an implied contract between the decedent and the claimants that the claimants would be paid for their services at the time the services were rendered.

The appellant, Thomas Wray, appeals from the denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus wherein he alleges that his guilty pleas and sentences in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to two (2) offenses committed while he was a juvenile are void. For the reasons stated below we find that the habeas court properly denied habeas corpus relief and we therefore affirm the decision of the lower court.

This case comes before us on appeal from a denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner sought relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery, raising several claims including that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury trial because of an improper communication by a court officer to the jury during deliberations. During the hearing on the post-conviction petition, the court heard testimony from a juror regarding the content of the communication and also the subjective effect of the officer’s statement upon the juror. At the close of the hearing, the trial court found that the improper communication had not influenced the verdict and therefore denied the petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. In this Court, the petitioner challenges admission of the juror’s testimony relating to the effect of the court officer’s statement on the juror. After thorough consideration, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals.

We hold that Tennessee Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits introduction of juror testimony concerning the effect on the juror of an improper communication by a court officer during jury deliberations.

This case involves codicils to a will. The decedent died testate. His will included one typed codicil and two handwritten codicils. The typed codicil, pursuant to a marital dissolution agreement, granted the decedent’s former spouse a life estate in his real property with the remainder to their children, and devised all of the personal property to the children as well. The decedent later handwrote two codicils addressing the disposition of certain personal property and debts. After his death, the devisee under the handwritten codicils intervened in the probate proceedings to enforce the codicils. The trial court ruled that the handwritten codicil addressing the personal property violated the marital dissolution agreement and was therefore invalid. It held that the codicil addressing the debt did not violate the marital dissolution agreement and that the estate should pay for the debt, as set forth in the codicil.  Other matters remained outstanding, and the trial court, under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02, made the order final. Because the outstanding matters could render this Court’s ruling moot, we find that the order was improvidently made final and dismiss the appeal.

This case arises out of the sale of a used car which Plaintiffs, the buyers of the car, maintain was damaged prior to sale despite Defendant’s denial of damage. A jury found for Plaintiffs, the buyers, on their claims for both common law intentional misrepresentation and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-101 et seq. (1995). Plaintiffs elected to receive the punitive damages awarded by the jury under the common law claim in lieu of treble damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. When Plaintiffs then requested attorney’s fees under the Act, the trial court held that they could not receive both punitive damages and attorney’s fees. The trial court also held that the election of remedies made by Plaintiffs had become final before the entry of judgment and before Plaintiffs were informed of the amount they might have received in attorney’s fees under the Act and that Plaintiffs could not amend their election of remedies. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court. We reverse, holding that Plaintiffs can receive both punitive damages under the common law misrepresentation claim and attorney’s fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We remand to the trial court for award of appropriate attorney’s fees and costs.

On March 25, 2002, the defendant, Michael Ricardo Martin, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury on two (2) counts of rape for an incident that occurred on November 27, 2001. A jury trial was held and the defendant was convicted of one (1) count of rape and one (1) count of sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences of ten (10) years for the rape conviction and two (2) years for the sexual battery conviction. On appeal the defendant argues that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal, by granting the State's motion in limine regarding evidence concerning a prior hymenal injury sustained by the victim and by sentencing the defendant to a ten (10) year effective sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.