APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mario Ricky Orlando Printis appeals from his convictions of driving under the influence and evading arrest. He questions the sufficiency of the evidence that he committed Class D felony evading arrest, as opposed to the Class E form of that crime, and he complains that the trial court sentenced him too harshly. Because we are unpersuaded, we affirm the convictions and sentences imposed. Due to an omission from the DUI judgment form, however, we modify that judgment to correspond with the lower court's pronouncements at the sentencing hearing.

In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, he illegally pled guilty to second degree murder, and his guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily. The trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm.

The petitioner was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. In his petition for post-conviction relief, he asserted that trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, following a hearing.  We affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

Defendant was convicted of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant submits that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and the trial court erred in not charging the jury on facilitation. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to uphold the conviction, and defendant was not entitled to an instruction on facilitation. We affirm.

The Defendant was indicted for two counts of promoting prostitution and for two counts of patronizing prostitution. Following a bench trial, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempting to patronize prostitution, a Class C misdemeanor; sentenced to thirty days suspended; and fined $50.00 for each count. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) that the conduct by law enforcement in this case was so outrageous as to constitute a defense; (3) that a fatal variance exists between the indicted charges and the evidence presented at trial; (4) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the audio and video tape evidence that was introduced at trial; and (5) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to seal the audio and video tape evidence in this case. Concluding that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the Defendant.

Defendant, Jeret Phillips, appeals from the order of the Sullivan County Criminal Court which revoked Defendant's probation and required him to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Billy Harold Arnold, appeals his misdemeanor theft conviction for which the Sullivan County Criminal Court sentenced him to eleven months twenty-nine days, all suspended except for thirty days confinement, "day for day." He contests the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission into evidence of prior similar conduct, and his sentence. We affirm the trial court, although we also note that a "day for day" term of confinement does not bar application of relevant good conduct credit statutes.

The appellant, Timothy S. Oglesby, pled guilty to the offense of felonious possession of a weapon.  He received a two (2)-year sentence. Contemporaneously with the entry of the guilty plea the appellant and the State entered an agreed order purporting to reserve a certified question of law for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law alleged to be dispositive of the case is stated in the agreed order as “the denial of his suppression motion.” We hold that the absence in the judgment of the certified question of law or of a statement incorporating the agreed order into the judgment compels a dismissal of this appeal. In addition, the failure of the agreed order to set forth the certified question with sufficient specificity compels the dismissal of this appeal even if the agreed order had been incorporated by reference into the judgment.

The appellant, Gonzalo Moran Garcia, appeals his conviction by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of one count of possession of one thousand grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, a class A felony. He raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting at trial the testimony of Daniel A. Rosales, an officer employed by the Houston Police Department in Texas; (3) whether the evidence underlying the appellant’s conviction is sufficient; and (4) whether the trial court erred in rejecting his proposed jury instructions. Following a thorough review f the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case
to the trial court for a new trial.

After careful review of the record, I write separately because I reach a different conclusion than that expressed in the majority opinion with respect to the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his vehicle. I agree with the majority on all other matters raised in this appeal.

The defendant, Otis Campbell, was convicted of two misdemeanor counts of a three-count indictment and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively to each other as well as to two other sentences for which he had earlier been placed into the community corrections program. He timely appealed, presenting as his sole argument the claim that the trial court erred in ordering that all of the sentences be served consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After pleading guilty to aggravated assault and receiving a sentence of split confinement of three years with nine months to be served day-for-day, defendant appeals her sentence. She requests full probation or allowance of good conduct credits while serving the incarceration portion of her sentence. We affirm the denial of full probation and reverse that portion of the sentence that provides day-for-day service. We hold that a defendant sentenced to the county jail for less than one year is entitled to earn good conduct credits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-111(b).

The defendant, Paul Payne, Jr., was convicted in a bench trial of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days and suspended all but 48 hours. The defendant was fined $350.00. In this appeal of right, the defendant complains that the stop of his vehicle was unlawful, that the evidence at trial was insufficient, and that there was no reasonable basis for the administration of the blood alcohol test. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Eric Wallace, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issues presented for review are (1) whether the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel; (2) whether the petitioner was denied the right to a speedy trial; and (3) whether the state used improper impeachment evidence. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, the order denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The Defendant pled guilty to three counts of retaliation for past action, a Class E felony, and the trial court sentenced him to four years on community corrections. Three separate violation warrants were subsequently issued against the Defendant. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s placement on community corrections and ordered that the Defendant serve his original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Kenneth R. Griffin, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-206, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing. In its order, the trial court made a finding of fact that the petition contained no verification of any facts under oath. Since the petition was devoid of verified facts upon which the trial court could grant relief, it concluded that a dismissal was required. On appeal, the State agrees with Petitioner that the trial court's judgment should be reversed. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.

The petitioner appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's denying her post-conviction relief from her especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnaping convictions and resulting concurrent fifteen-year sentences that she received in 2000 based upon her pleas of guilty. She contends that her guilty pleas resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel in that counsel misadvised her about the percentage of her sentence that she would have to serve in confinement. We affirm the trial court's denial of relief.

The defendant, Annetta Bell, was convicted after a bench trial of theft of property having a value less than $500.00. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days. All but six months was suspended. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction.

The defendant, Thaddeus Morris, was convicted of three counts of assault, three counts of reckless aggravated assault, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of carjacking following a jury trial. The trial court merged the three assault convictions with the three reckless aggravated assault convictions and the aggravated robbery conviction with the carjacking conviction. The defendant was sentenced to seven years, six months for each of the reckless aggravated assault convictions, with two of the sentences to be served concurrently and the third to be served consecutively. For the carjacking conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twelve years to be served consecutively to the third reckless aggravated assault sentence, for an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for carjacking and aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erred by not including "moral certainty" in its jury instruction on reasonable doubt; (3) cumulative error occurred during the trial; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.