APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant entered pleas of guilty to two counts of manufacturing a Schedule II controlled substance and was sentenced to concurrent three-year sentences. The trial court further ordered that the defendant have split confinement, with supervised probation after serving one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals this sentence, arguing that he should be eligible for parole after service of 30% of the sentence, that his sentence should be served at the county workhouse, and that he should receive sentence credits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Keith U. Tate, was tried with his co-defendant/brother for aggravated rape. The petitioner was convicted of having committed aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced him to serve seventeen years as a Range II offender. The petitioner filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The petitioner appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to this Court, and we affirmed the trial court's ruling. See State v. Keith U. Tate, No. 02C01-9406-CR-00132, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 18, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Jan. 19, 1997). Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate levels. After conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now brings this appeal challenging that dismissal. After reviewing the record, we find that the petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Appellant, Rodney K. Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of sale of cocaine less than .5 grams, a class C felony. Moore was sentenced as a Range II offender, to ten years in the Department of Correction. He now appeals his conviction and sentence, raising the following issues for our review: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the conviction; (2) whether there was cumulative error sufficient to justify a new trial; and (3) whether the trial court erred by sentencing Moore to serve the maximum sentence within his range. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

An Overton County jury convicted the defendant of possession of cocaine for resale, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In this appeal, he contends the search warrant was improperly issued, and the trial court erred by not ordering the state to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Christopher D. Neighbours, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of a felony, namely kidnapping, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. The appellant received a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions of both offenses. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Darryl Lee Elkins, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of child rape, a Class A felony, and attempted child rape, a Class B felony. Defendant received consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for the Class A felony, and twelve years for the Class B felony. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the convictions, arguing that his convictions should be reversed because the “jury improperly accredited the victim’s testimony who committed perjury at trial.” After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments.

The defendants, Timothy Scott Barnes, David Grooms, and Richard Grooms, were convicted of attempted burglary, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed Range I sentences as follows: Timothy Scott Barnes, one year, three months; David Grooms, one year, six months; and Richard Grooms, one year, six months. In this appeal of right, the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgments are affirmed.

I concur in the majority opinion regarding the child rape conviction. I respectfully disagree regarding the attempted rape conviction. I believe the evidence is insufficient to convict the defendant of any offense above a Class B misdemeanor assault.

Kendrick Jermaine Merritt appeals from his Davidson County conviction of second degree murder for the killing of Julia Lynn Baskette. He claims on appeal that the evidence at trial supports a guilty verdict of no offense greater than voluntary manslaughter and that the trial court excessively sentenced him to a maximum, 25-year term of incarceration. Because we disagree in both respects, we affirm.

The defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced as a multiple Range II offender. He appeals his sentence of nine years and requests an alternative sentence of probation or community corrections. Based upon our review, we conclude that the trial court misapplied enhancement factor (11) and failed to consider two relevant mitigating factors. Furthermore, the trial court did not make findings as to how the enhancement factors were weighed to determine the appropriate sentence. We conclude, however, that the trial court's sentence of nine (9) years is appropriate based upon the defendant's lengthy history of criminal behavior. Furthermore, the defendant is not entitled to an alternative sentence because the length of his sentence exceeds eight years.

The appellant was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of aggravated assault.  The trial court imposed a sentence of thirteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Archie Junior Weatherford, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court's revocation of his probationary sentence. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

As acknowledged by the majority in its carefully considered opinion, trial judges are vested with broad discretionary powers in the conduct of a trial. Courts must monitor all attorney conduct and may direct a remedy if the performance impedes the orderly administration of justice. United States v. Dinitz, 538 F. 2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1976). That authority necessarily includes the supervision of appointed counsel for indigent defendants. Moncier v. Ferrell, 990 S.W.2d 710
(Tenn. 1998). An extraordinary appeal to this court on any issue relative to the supervision of the trial which requires immediate appellate review may be granted only in limited circumstances: (1) when the trial court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require intervention; or (2) if necessary for a complete determination of the case. Tenn. R. App. P. 10.

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, brings this extraordinary appeal in which he challenges the order of the Knox County Criminal Court removing his lead counsel of record for his retrial on four counts of first degree murder. The defendant asserts that the trial court’s action is an infringement on his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We conclude that the trial court’s order violated the defendant’s right to counsel and exceeded its discretion. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.

The defendant, Anthony L. Rogers, was indicted for attempted second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. He pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. As his sole issue on appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in ordering his sentence to be served consecutively to a federal sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted in January 2001 of aggravated assault and sentenced to four years in community corrections. Subsequently, while confined in the Grundy County Jail, he was charged with assaulting another inmate, which generated a probation revocation warrant. Following a hearing, the court revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered that he serve the sentence imposed for his aggravated assault conviction. He appealed the revocation, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to justify it and that his due process rights were violated because the trial court did not provide in its revocation order a written statement as to the evidence relied upon. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to concurrent punishment of life imprisonment and twenty-three years, respectively. In his appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in not remanding the matter for another preliminary hearing after it was discovered that the first hearing had not been recorded; in limiting his cross-examination of two prosecution witnesses as to pending matters; and in admitting an autopsy photograph of the victim's head, with the scalp pulled back, to show the gravity of his wound. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and theft over $1000, receiving a life sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive two-year sentence for the theft conviction. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, he filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to his murder conviction, he argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to misstate law during voir dire; in not allowing defense counsel to question potential jurors about their personal experiences with crime; in allowing hearsay evidence to be presented at trial; in allowing the State to introduce evidence of uncharged crimes; and in allowing the prosecutor to make improper statements during closing argument. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.