APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Timothy Tyrone Sanders, was convicted in the Bedford County Circuit Court of one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell. On direct appeal, this court reversed the appellant's conviction because the trial court failed to properly charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession, and we remanded the case for retrial. State v. Timothy Tyrone Sanders, No. M2000-00603-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 38, at **13-14 (Nashville, January 18, 2001). Subsequently, the appellant was once again convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II offender to seventeen years and six months incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In the instant appeal, the appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) whether the trial court erred in determining the length of his sentence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to one count of child abuse, a Class D felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years to be served on intensive probation. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying him judicial diversion and by imposing as a condition of his probation that he not reside in the same household with children of "tender years." Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On March 6, 1997, the defendant pled guilty to a two-count indictment for passing worthless checks in an amount over $10,000, a Class C felony, and in an amount over $1,000, a Class D felony. He was granted judicial diversion and placed on probation. The trial court subsequently revoked the defendant's diversion and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of four years and six months for the Class C felony and two years for the Class D felony, all suspended except seven months service in the county jail. In this appeal, the defendant contends he should have received full probation or community corrections upon being revoked from judicial diversion. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court ordered the Petitioner to serve an effective twenty-six-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions on appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing, the court denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted of theft over $500.00, two counts of theft over $1000.00, and driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. He was given an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. The trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after considering and weighing the proper factors and principles set out under sentencing law, and the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.The defendant was convicted of theft over $500.00, two counts of theft over $1000.00, and driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. He was given an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. The trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after considering and weighing the proper factors and principles set out under sentencing law, and the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, appeals as of right from his convictions and sentences for aggravated rape, rape, aggravated robbery, robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an aggregate sentence of sixty-six years. The convictions relate to four victims and result from two trials that were consolidated for this appeal. The defendant raises numerous issues. Although we conclude that several errors occurred, only one requires reversal of any convictions. Because of improper consolidation, we reverse the judgments for the three aggravated rape convictions and one especially aggravated kidnapping conviction relating to the victim, D.C., but we affirm the remaining judgments of conviction.

Defendant, Don Woody McGowan, was convicted by a Marion County jury of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class E felony. Defendant appeals his conviction, presenting the following issues for review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether he was denied a fair trial by the trial court's denial of his motion to sever the cases when the co-defendant failed to appear on the second day of trial; (3) whether the trial judge erred by failing to recuse himself; and (4) whether his sentence was proper. After a review of the record, we find that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

The petitioner, William R. Diaz, appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends that his trial attorney was ineffective for (1) failing to file a motion to suppress his statement to the police on the grounds that it was coerced and (2) failing to file a motion to suppress evidence that the police took from his garage without a search warrant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The opinion and judgment entered June 24, 2002, are hereby VACATED and WITHDRAWN. A corrected opinion and judgment will be filed in due course.

Because I have no difficulty concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on sexual battery constitutes harmless error according to the standard enunciated in State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 191 (Tenn. 2002), I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the appellant’s convictions of rape. As acknowledged by the majority, our supreme court emphasized in Allen that, “[w]hen a lesser-included offense instruction is improperly omitted, . . . the harmless error inquiry is the same as for other constitutional errors” and entails an examination of both the evidence adduced at trial and the defendant’s theory of defense. Id. As also acknowledged by the majority, RB unequivocally testified at trial that the appellant’s sexual assault upon her included three separate acts of sexual penetration, and her testimony was uncontradicted with the exception of the appellant’s statements to the police denying any sexual activity whatsoever between himself and RB. In other words, the appellant’s defense in this case did not hinge upon the nature of the sexual activity between himself and RB but rather upon whether any sexual activity occurred. Accordingly, with respect to the evidence underlying each count of rape, the appellant was either guilty of the charged offense or entirely innocent. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on sexual battery should not afford the appellant relief.

The defendant, Patsy Webster, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court's ordering her to serve one year of her effective two-year sentence in continuous confinement. She claims that the trial court erred in requiring her to serve a full year in jail because she was eligible as a Range I offender with only a two-year sentence for release after serving thirty percent of her sentence. The state agrees. We hold that the defendant was improperly sentenced and remand the case for resentencing.

The appellant, Herman Holston, was convicted after a trial by jury of sale of cocaine, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range II offender to eight years and six months confinement in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Holston raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, and (2) whether his sentence was proper. After a review of the record, we find that Holston's issues are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court is affirmed.

The defendant was indicted for first degree murder and convicted by the jury of second degree murder. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and was permitted to make a delayed motion for a new trial, which ultimately was denied by the trial court. The defendant appeals the denial, arguing that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder. After a review of the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of second degree murder and that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and a new trial.

An Obion County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Ernest Lee Littles, of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a child rapist to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with 100% of the sentence to be served. In his appeal as of right, the defendant claims only that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment

The defendant was convicted of premeditated first degree murder by a Davidson County jury and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In this appeal, he contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) he was denied the opportunity to retain his counsel of choice; (3) the state committed prosecutorial misconduct when it failed to sua sponte redact a portion of an audio tape, and the trial court improperly denied the defendant's request for a mistrial; and (4) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on facilitation of first degree murder and voluntary manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of first degree murder. After reviewing the record, we affirm.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to pay $18,000 in restitution. We reverse the judgment of the trial court regarding restitution and remand this matter for further proceedings.