APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant challenges the revocation of his probation by the Sumner County Criminal Court. We affirm.

In a four-count indictment, Defendant, Wallace Jones, was charged with statutory rape, sexual battery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and exhibition of material harmful to a minor. He applied for pre-trial diversion, which the district attorney general declined to grant. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Defendant's request to be placed on pre-trial diversion. Defendant filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which was granted by the trial court and this court. On appeal, the State concedes that the district attorney abused his discretion and that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and this case remanded to the district attorney general to properly consider all facts pursuant to State v. Bell, 69 S.W.3d 171 (Tenn. 2002). We agree. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded to the district attorney general to consider and weigh all relevant factors to the pre-trial diversion determination. Furthermore, we conclude that the trial judge should be recused from further proceedings in this matter.

The petitioner, Isaac Milholen, was convicted in 1997 of rape of a child and incest and sentenced to twenty-three years and eight years, respectively. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed his petition because he had brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his direct appeal, and he now appeals that dismissal. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The appellant, Rachel N. Bennett, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to eighteen felony offenses. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contests the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Boyd L. Jones, III, pled guilty to possession of marijuana. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal three related certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified questions of law stem from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress. The central issue in this appeal is whether law enforcement officers violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they entered his residence without a search warrant and detained him until they obtained written consent to search from the lessee of the residence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The post-conviction court granted each of the petitioners post-conviction relief on the grounds that the state had violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose an exculpatory FBI laboratory report and an exculpatory witness statement. In this appeal of right, the state contends (1) that Harper's petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) that the trial court erred by permitting the petitioners to amend their petitions and allege new grounds after a remand from this court; (3) that the trial court erred by determining that the state suppressed the FBI laboratory reports and a witness statement; and (4) that Hutchison received the effective assistance of counsel at trial, an alternative ground for relief asserted by Hutchison. In response to the state's appeal, the petitioners assert that the trial court erred by excluding from evidence the affidavit of a juror which would demonstrate that the FBI lab reports would have created reasonable doubt. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Christopher A. Davis, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The jury sentenced the Appellant to death for each of the first degree murder convictions. The Appellant presents the following issues in this appeal as of right: (1) The trial court erred by not granting the Appellant's motion to disqualify the Davidson County District Attorney General's office from prosecuting the case; (2) the trial court erred by not granting the Appellant's motion to prohibit the State from relying upon the Appellant's prior murder conviction as an aggravating circumstance, because the conviction was for a crime committed while the Appellant was a juvenile; (3) the trial court erred by not suppressing the statement the Appellant made to police; (4) the trial court erred by denying defense counsel's motion to be allowed to withdraw from representing the Appellant; (5) the trial court erred by granting the State's motion to require the Appellant to supply the State information concerning mental health expert testimony to be presented during the sentencing phase of the trial; (6) the trial court erred by allowing a physician who did not perform the autopsy to testify concerning the autopsy and evidence obtained in connection therewith; (7) the trial court erred in allowing victim impact evidence to be introduced; (8) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (9) that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; (10) that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding that the aggravating factors were established beyond a reasonable doubt; (11) that Tennessee's death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional in several instances; (12) that the trial court erred in allowing certain cross-examination of defense witnesses; and (13) that the cumulative effect of errors made at trial denied the Appellant a fair trial in violation of his due process rights. Based on our review of the record on appeal, we affirm both the Appellant's convictions and the sentences imposed.

The appellant, Robert Johnson, was found guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court of forgery and was sentenced to six years incarceration. On appeal, the appellant contests evidentiary rulings of the trial court and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Concluding that the appellant's arguments have no merit, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Robert Dallis Payne, appeals the order of the Hickman County Circuit Court summarily dismissing his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record before this Court, we conclude that the Appellant has failed to perfect his application for permission to appeal in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.

The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant with a blood alcohol content of .10% or more, third offense. On appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant; (2) the trial court erred in barring testimony of the arresting officer that he opined the defendant's blood alcohol content was rising at the time of the blood withdrawal; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because the state presented no evidence extrapolating his .12% test result back to the time he was driving. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gabriel Bryan Baggett, pled guilty to second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, receiving sentences of fifty years and twenty-five years, respectively, at 100%. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas of guilty were involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The defendants, Leon J. Robins and Tabatha R. White, both were convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In their appeals, they argue that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions for first degree murder; the trial court should have instructed as to the lesser offenses of voluntary manslaughter and facilitation to commit voluntary manslaughter; evidence of a photographic lineup was improperly admitted; and the trial court improperly admitted Robins' mugshots as exhibits and improperly limited the cross-examination of a prosecution witness as to prior bad acts. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jerry Lee Miller, Sr. appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's imposition of incarcerative sentencing for his effective five-year sentence for two counts of statutory rape. Miller pleaded guilty to the offenses as a Range II offender, and the manner of service of the sentence was reserved for the lower court's determination. Miller posits on appeal that he should have been afforded a sentence involving either split confinement or straight probation. We disagree, however, and affirm.

The appellant, Richard D. Batey, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of possession of more than .5 grams of a substance containing cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eight years split confinement, with one year to be served in confinement and the remaining seven years to be served in the community corrections program. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant reserved the right to appeal as a certified question of law the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Delbert Lee Harris, was convicted in the Dickson County Circuit Court of aggravated assault, rape, rape of a child, and attempted sexual battery. The petitioner was ultimately sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, complaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that several errors occurred during trial. The postconviction court partially granted the petition and dismissed the remainder of the petitioner’s issues.  The petitioner and the State timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in all respects except for the dismissal of the rape conviction.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury by failing to limit the definition of "property" in its instruction to the jury; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence at the sentencing hearing a transcript of a prior trial; and (3) that his sentence is excessive. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The appellant, Darrell W. Smith, pled guilty in the Franklin County Circuit Court to evading arrest and operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, both Class E felonies. The parties agreed that the appellant would be sentenced on each conviction to one year and one day with the sentences to be served consecutively. The manner of service of the sentences was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve 120 days in the county jail, with the balance of the sentences to be served in the community corrections program. On appeal, the appellant challenges the period of confinement. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's upholding of the district attorney general's denial of her application for pretrial diversion. She argues that the district attorney general erred in not considering all required factors in the diversion denial and the trial court erred in taking testimony, upon which it relied in upholding the denial of diversion. Based upon our review, we reverse the order of the trial court denying pretrial diversion and remand for a reconsideration by the district attorney general of the defendant's diversion application.

The defendant's probation was revoked after his house was searched and a twelve-gauge shotgun was found inside. The defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to revoke his probation. The defendant contends the rules of probation and a police report were improperly admitted into evidence. Because the trial court is only required to find a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence, we affirm the trial court's revocation of probation.

An Obion County grand jury indicted the defendant, Justin Genel Hill, of two counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. In a separate indictment, Clarence Carnell Gaston, Miqwon Deon Leach, and Mario Deangelo Thomas were also charged with crimes arising out of the same criminal episode. The defendant and these three men were tried in a single jury trial. The jury found Gaston, Leach, and Thomas guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, second degree murder, and first degree felony murder and found the defendant guilty of facilitation to commit second degree murder. See State v. Clarence Carnell Gaston, No. W2001-02046-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 261941, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Feb. 7, 2003). For the defendant's conviction, the trial court sentenced him to serve a ten-year sentence in the Department of Corrections. The defendant now brings this appeal of his conviction, alleging that the evidence introduced at trial is insufficient to support his conviction. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we find that the defendant's allegation lacks merit and accordingly affirm the defendant's conviction.

In this appeal the appellant was convicted of theft of property over $500 and sentenced to two (2) years on community corrections. Approximately three (3) months later he was convicted of vandalism of property valued under $500. At the time of his arrest on the vandalism charge the appellant was intoxicated. As a result of his conduct while on community corrections his sentence to this program was revoked. He was re-sentenced to one (1) year of continuous incarceration followed by one (1) year of community corrections.

The defendant, Jeffrey Smith, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of theft under $500. The trial court imposed sentences as follows: six years for two of the aggravated burglaries and three years for the remaining aggravated burglary, twelve years for aggravated robbery, two years for attempted robbery, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft under $500. The trial court ordered that the twelve-year sentence for aggravated robbery be served consecutively to the sentence for aggravated burglary in Count 1 of case number 238391. The effective sentence is, therefore, eighteen years. In this appeal, the defendant complains that the sentence is excessive. Because consecutive sentences were not warranted, the judgments must be modified to reflect that all the sentences are to be served concurrently.

The petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for twenty-five years as a Range I offender. Following an evidentiary hearing and the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner argues on appeal that prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance at his trial merit a new trial. We affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant originally pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to various theft and forgery offenses as a Range II multiple offender for an effective six-year sentence, most of which would be served on community corrections. At the time of the plea, he agreed his sentence would be increased to ten years if he violated the community corrections program. He was subsequently revoked and ordered to serve an effective ten-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends the trial court failed to make sentencing findings and imposed illegal sentences above the authorized Range II punishment. We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The defendant, Vickie Swift, was convicted of one count of theft over $1000. The trial court imposed a sentence of three years to be served on probation. Later, probation was revoked. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by revoking her probation and ordering her incarcerated for the balance of her sentence.