APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Darrell M. Anderson, was convicted of aggravated assault and simple assault. The trial court imposed a Range III, ten-year sentence for the aggravated assault and a concurrent 11-month, 29-day sentence for the assault. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction. The judgments are affirmed.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Donald Clark, guilty of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to serve twenty-seven years as a violent offender. The defendant now appeals his conviction, (1) challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and (2) the trial court's failure to charge the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, but that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the offense of reckless aggravated assault. However, we find that error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentence is excessive. Because this Court previously determined that the petitioner's sentence was not excessive on direct appeal, we dismiss this issue. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court and affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant on charges of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. A trial jury subsequently convicted him of first degree premeditated murder and acquitted him of the remaining charges. The defendant then unsuccessfully pursued a new trial motion. In this appeal the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by not suppressing his statement and that the jury's verdict is inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we find neither of the defendant's claims meritorious. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, George Glenn King, Jr., appeals his convictions by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury for first degree murder for which he received an effective sentence of life in prison. He was also convicted of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, for which he received a concurrent sentence of eight years. He contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the state's eliciting expert testimony on the ultimate issue of his insanity and prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument constitute plain error. He also argues that the trial court should have merged his convictions for premeditated and felony murder arising from a single killing. We agree that the defendant's first degree murder convictions should be merged, but we otherwise discern no plain error and affirm the judgments of conviction as modified.

The defendant, N'Kosi Tuggle, entered a plea of guilt to aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of eight years. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that he should have been classified as an especially mitigated offender. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner contends his trial counsel failed to investigate his case and meet with him regularly. He further contends his trial counsel never held a hearing on his motion to suppress his identification, thus rendering his plea involuntary. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Ronald W. Jenkins, II, pled guilty to reckless homicide, felony reckless endangerment, and DUI, second offense. The Defendant was thereafter sentenced to two years for the homicide, one year for the reckless endangerment, to be served concurrently, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI, to be served consecutively. The Defendant's driver's license was also suspended for a period of two years. The Defendant's sentences were suspended after service of 150 days, and he was placed on three years of probation. Within a few months of beginning his probationary period, the Defendant was arrested and convicted of driving on a revoked license. A probation violation warrant was filed, a hearing conducted, and the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation. The Defendant now appeals, complaining that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Todd Drinnon appeals the dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief and attacks his convictions for a variety of reasons, mostly related to the claimed ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as raising issues that had been previously determined and for failure to allege or establish grounds for reopening his previous petition. We affirm.

The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, he argues the trial court erred in excluding testimony as to the victim's prior aggressive conduct, as well as his access and familiarity with firearms, and in not instructing as to aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense and that the cumulative effect of these errors warrants a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, William G. Barnett, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pled guilty to two drug-related offenses. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Lynn L. Davis, pled guilty to robbery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. In his appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in failing to apply mitigating factors and in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tony Alan Garretson, along with Harold Garretson and Tonya Garretson, sought return of numerous guns alleged to have been unlawfully seized by law enforcement when Tony Garretson was arrested for aggravated assault. The trial court found: (1) Harold Garretson and Tonya Garretson failed to establish they were the lawful owners of the guns; and (2) the guns could not be returned to Tony Garretson because he was convicted of aggravated assault and cannot lawfully possess a weapon. On appeal, the state concedes the guns were unlawfully seized and Harold Garretson and Tonya Garretson established proper ownership. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for another hearing.

The Defendants, Billy J. Coffelt and Lyle T. Van Ulzen, were each convicted of one count of felony escape, two counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court subsequently sentenced both Defendants to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on each of their especially aggravated kidnapping convictions. The Defendants were each sentenced to two years for their escape convictions, and to six years for each of their aggravated assault convictions. In this direct appeal, both Defendants contend that their convictions for aggravated assault and especially aggravated kidnapping violate due process, relying on State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). Both Defendants also allege error with respect to the trial court's admission of the identification of the felonies for which they were serving time when they escaped, and with respect to their sentences on the kidnapping convictions. Individually, Coffelt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of proof concerning two weapons. Coffelt also alleges that the prosecutor's closing argument constituted reversible misconduct. We affirm the Defendants' convictions. We reverse the trial court's finding that the Defendants are repeat violent offenders subject to mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and remand this matter for resentencing on the Defendants' convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping.

The Defendant, a teacher, was indicted for three counts of assault against one of her students. She offered to enter a plea of nolo contendere on Count II in exchange for judicial diversion and the dismissal of the remaining two counts. The State rejected the Defendant's plea of nolo contendere and maintained that the Defendant would have to plead guilty in order to receive judicial diversion. The Defendant refused the offer and requested pretrial diversion. The State denied the Defendant's request. The Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Knox County Criminal Court. The trial court denied the petition. The trial court then filed an order permitting interlocutory appeal to this Court. This Court granted the Defendant's application for interlocutory review. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the State abused its discretion by denying the Defendant pretrial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se appellant appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Finding that summary dismissal was appropriate under the circumstances of this case, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Petitioner, Melvin E. Beard, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation and entry of Petitioner's best interest plea to the charge of sale and delivery of cocaine, that his best interest plea was involuntary, and that the factual basis presented by the State was insufficient to support his plea. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings of fact. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Mark Anthony Bales, pled guilty to attempted second degree murder. After accepting his plea, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve eleven years as a Range I standard offender. The defendant now appeals his sentence arguing that the trial court erred (1) by finding that when the defendant committed the instant crime, he treated the victim with exceptional cruelty; (2) by giving insufficient weight to two applicable mitigating factors, the defendant's excellent social history and his lack of a criminal record; and (3) by sentencing the defendant to a term of years that made him ineligible for consideration for an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we find that none of the defendant's allegations merit relief and accordingly affirm his sentence.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Terrance W. Price, pled guilty to fifteen counts of money laundering, a Class B felony, and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, a Class C felony. He pled guilty reserving the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The certified question of law on appeal is whether Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-14-901, - 903, Money Laundering Act of 1996, violates Article XI, Section 8 or Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution by exempting from its application violation of gambling laws, found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-501 et seq. After a careful review, we conclude that the statutes do not violate the Tennessee Constitution, and therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the issuance of a capias tolls the expiration of a probationary sentence. Upon this record, we conclude it does not. We reverse the revocation of the defendant's probation, concluding his probationary sentence had expired.

The defendant, Kenneth Jordan, entered pleas of guilt to aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed Range I sentences of six years for each offense to be served concurrently. At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of one year with split confinement. The defendant was given the choice of serving one year with work release and the balance on probation, or participating in a Lifeline Therapeutic Community Program with the opportunity to apply for early release. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider the statutory guidelines and should have granted probation. The judgments of conviction are affirmed and the effective sentence is modified to require 90 days in jail with work release followed by supervised probation.

The appellant, Dennis Pylant, was found guilty in the Cheatham County Circuit Court of felony murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The appellant received a sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues for our consideration, namely the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary issues, and a complaint regarding the jury instructions. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his community corrections revocation and resentencing. The post-conviction court found post-conviction relief was unavailable to one challenging a community corrections revocation proceeding. We conclude that although the post-conviction process may not be used to collaterally attack a probation revocation, it is available to attack a community corrections revocation/resentencing. Thus, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, John Wayne Gray, appeals the Franklin County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for the sale of a Schedule II controlled substance. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner appeals after being denied post-conviction relief. She pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary and ten counts of forgery. Pursuant to her plea agreement, she received an effective sentence of twenty years as a Range III offender. Her post-conviction relief petition alleged she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that she did not enter her plea knowingly and voluntarily. We conclude the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court's findings. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.