APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, David D. Harris, pled guilty to seven counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in the Davidson County Criminal Court on June 16, 1999. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three eight-year sentences, to be served consecutively. The trial court suspended the sentences and ordered the Defendant to serve three consecutive eight-year terms on supervised probation. The State appealed, and this Court reversed the portion of the sentence that ordered the Defendant to serve twenty-four years of probation on the three consecutive eight-year sentences, holding that a probationary sentence for aggravated robbery is contrary to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a). Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for re-sentencing. Upon re-sentencing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three eight-year prison terms and ordered that the sentences run consecutive to each other and consecutive to a sentence that the Defendant is currently serving in Williamson County. The Defendant appealed the trial court's re-sentencing order and raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erroneously denied his request for a new sentencing hearing and; (2) whether the trial court erroneously denied the Defendant's request, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, for a reduced sentence. After a through examination of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing; however, because we conclude that the trial court erroneously believed that it was without the authority to impose concurrent sentences, we reverse and remand for it to determine whether the three sentences should run consecutively or concurrently.

The defendant, Robert L. Leach, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated rape, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The felony murder convictions were merged into the premeditated murder convictions. The jury sentenced the defendant to death based upon the finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. As to victim Sarah McBride, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more violent felonies; the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; and the murder was knowingly committed by the defendant while committing or attempting to commit robbery or aggravated rape. As to victim Jean Poteet, the jury found the same three aggravating circumstances and the additional aggravating circumstance that the victim was seventy years of age or older or was particularly vulnerable due to a significant handicap or significant disability, physical or mental. The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery and aggravated rape convictions. In this appeal, the defendant raises numerous issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the constitutionality of the death penalty, and the application of certain capital case procedures. We conclude that no harmful error exists, and we affirm the convictions and sentences. The case should be remanded, though, for correction of clerical errors by which the judgments for Counts 5 and 6 have respectively been switched to Counts 6 and 5.

The Appellant, Ronald B. Finch, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated rape. As a result of these convictions, Finch was sentenced to concurrent thirty-year sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Finch raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and (2) whether the sentences imposed were excessive. After review of the record, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

The appellant, Marcus Thompson, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of one count of conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and one count of selling and delivering cocaine. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and fines totaling $150,000. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues for our review, including speedy trial, sufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but reduce the amount of the appellant's fines to a total amount of $50,000.

This is an appeal by permission, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Defendant, Jeffery McCraney, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for various narcotics charges arising out of the search of his motor vehicle. The trial court suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of that search, ruling that the search of the Defendant’s vehicle was unconstitutional. The State filed a motion for interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the trial court. We granted the State permission to appeal, and the State asserts that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant’ s Motion to Suppress. We hold that the trial court did not err by granting the motion because the search of the Defendant’s vehicle violated constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of the offense of reckless aggravated assault. He received a sentence of seven years incarceration as a Range II multiple offender convicted of a Class D felony. On appeal the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court erred in denying him any form of alternative sentencing. Appellate review is available for these two issues despite the fact that the appellant failed to file a timely motion for new trial under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(b). However, review of these issues is dependent on either a timely filed notice of appeal, or in the interest of justice, a waiver of the timely filing of a notice appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). Because the appellant filed a late motion for a new trial, his notice of appeal is likewise tardy. Neither has the appellant sought a waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Under these circumstances the appeal is DISMISSED.

The defendant, Calvin Jerome Oliver, pled guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged his attempted aggravated robbery convictions into his aggravated robbery conviction and sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years in the Department of Correction (DOC). The trial court sentenced him to seven years for the aggravated burglary conviction and eight years for each aggravated assault conviction, all to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the eighteen-year sentence for an effective sentence of twenty-six years in the DOC. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred by refusing to apply and give proper weight to mitigating factors. We affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand the case for correction of a clerical error regarding the aggravated burglary judgment.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Brandon Ray Roland, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder and theft of property over $10,000. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into the premeditated first degree murder conviction and sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to three years for the theft conviction and ordered the sentence to run concurrently with the life sentence. In his appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree murder; (2) the trial court erred in not granting a new trial because of improper juror conduct; (3) the trial court erred in not suppressing a letter written by Defendant while in juvenile detention; and (4) the Rhea County Juvenile Court erred in transferring Defendant to stand trial as an adult. Defendant does not appeal his conviction for theft. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Shun D. Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of rape and was sentenced to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald W. Rice, filed in the Morgan County Criminal Court ("the habeas court") for habeas corpus relief, alleging that he received an illegal sentence for his conviction for an aggravated rape which occurred in 1983. The habeas court granted the petitioner relief. On appeal, the State contends that the habeas court erred in finding that the petitioner was entitled to relief. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the Morgan County Criminal Court, reinstate the petitioner's aggravated rape conviction, and remand to the Williamson County Criminal Court ("the convicting court") for correction of the judgment of conviction.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to the following: "11 months, 29 days suspended after 6 months day for day (11 months, 29 days suspended probation after the 6 months)." The trial court also revoked the Defendant's driver's license for two years, ordered the Defendant to pay a $610 fine, and ordered the Defendant to avoid alcohol throughout the probation period. In addition, the trial court imposed twenty days of community service to be completed within one year. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: 1) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress the results of a breathalyser test, 2) that the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of the Defendant's accident re-construction expert's testimony about the Tennessee Department of Transportation's statistics regarding traffic accidents that occurred at the intersection in question, and 3) that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing the Defendant to a sentence in excess of the maximum sentence available by statute for a DUI second offense. Finding no reversible error as concerns the conviction, we affirm the conviction. We vacate the sentence and remand for entry of an amended judgment.

In a series of steps designed to challenge his 1981 convictions for armed robbery and aggravated rape, Petitioner, Barry Winfred Ritchie, filed various pro se motions including (1) a motion for post-conviction relief and/or writ of error coram nobis, (2) a motion for relief of judgment pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, (3) a petition for common law writ of certiorari, and (4) a motion to quash the indictments and correct an illegal sentence. All pleadings are predicated on the same allegation that the Hamilton County Criminal Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to try and convict Petitioner of the charged offenses. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief after his second degree murder conviction and argues his trial counsel (1) deprived him of his right to testify, and (2) failed to effectively represent him at trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Kevin Scott Olmstead, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed two consecutive five-year sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to felony failure to appear. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a one-year sentence with ninety days of incarceration followed by probation. The defendant appeals the denial of full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment.

The defendant, Bobby Holt, Jr., pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, four counts of burglary, three counts of theft over $1000, and one count of theft under $500. The trial court imposed sentences of five years for aggravated burglary, three years on each count of burglary, three years on each count of theft over $1000, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft under $500. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for an effective, Range I sentence of five years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that (1) the trial court erred in the application of enhancement and mitigating factors and (2) that the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Michael Salvatore Morani, was convicted of one count of attempted first degree murder and one count of theft over $10,000. The trial court imposed consecutive Range I, standard sentences of twenty-three years and five years respectively. The defendant was fined a total of $60,000. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the twenty-three-year sentence for attempted murder is excessive and that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum fines on each count. The judgments are affirmed.

The petitioner, Matthew Bruce Henderson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner originally entered best interest guilty pleas to two counts each of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and statutory rape, and received an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the petitioner contends (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering his pleas; (2) the trial court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing prior to accepting his pleas; and (3) his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Steven Paul Deskins, of seven counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective seventy-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions; (2) the admissibility of evidence indicating the defendant married his wife when she was seventeen years old; (3) the admissibility of evidence regarding statements the defendant made to his wife during sexual intercourse which were similar to statements allegedly made to the victim; and (4) the imposition of consecutive sentences for three of the convictions. We reverse one of the aggravated sexual battery convictions as being in violation of due process and double jeopardy. Otherwise, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Thomas Mitchell, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for burglary of a building other than a habitation, a Class D felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced as a persistent offender to ten years and six months confinement. In this appeal as of right, Defendant presents a single issue, whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Carlos Caudill, was indicted by the Claiborne County Grand Jury for second degree murder. On December 18, 2001, Defendant entered a guilty plea as a Range II multiple offender to voluntary manslaughter, with the length and manner of service of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to nine years imprisonment. Defendant appeals the length and manner of service of his sentence. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Melissa Lee Sholtz, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to one count of telephone harassment, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse, with the sentence to be suspended and served on unsupervised probation. As a condition of probation, the appellant was ordered to have no contact with the victim. The trial court subsequently revoked the appellant's probation after finding that the appellant had violated the terms of probation by having contact with the victim. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' brief, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

On January 10, 2000, defendant, Darlene Renee Blackhurst, pled guilty to a second offense of driving under the influence of an intoxicant ("DUI"), leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, and three counts of reckless aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years, eleven months and twenty-nine days and ordered the sentence to be served on intensive supervised probation following a mandatory forty-five days in confinement for the DUI second offense. The State appealed the trial court's grant of full probation. After a de novo review, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment regarding the manner of service of defendant's sentence and remanded the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of determining whether defendant should be incarcerated for the full term of her sentence, or, in the alternative, whether she should serve the balance of her sentence in split confinement. We directed the trial court to base its sentencing determination as to the manner of service of defendant's sentence on the current record without a further evidentiary hearing. State v. Blackhurst, 70 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). On remand, the trial court found that defendant was not entitled to alternative sentencing and ordered defendant to serve her sentence in confinement. Defendant now appeals her sentence arguing that (1) the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for alternative sentencing; (2) the trial court erred in not considering additional evidence concerning defendant's post-sentencing behavior; (3) that the trial court erred in not allowing defendant credit for the time served on probation prior to resentencing; and (4) that the trial court improperly weighed the applicable mitigating and enhancement factors in determining the manner of service of defendant's sentence. After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jimmy Wayne Perkey, pled guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to serve twenty-five years as a Range I standard offender and ordered the defendant to pay a $50,000 fine. The defendant brings the instant appeal challenging his sentence and the imposition of his fine. After reviewing the record, we find that none of the defendant's claims merit relief.