APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

As a result of a jury trial in Shelby County, the Defendant, Andrea Spencer, stands convicted of one count of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of sexual battery. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eighty-four years as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in refusing to sever the offenses; (2) dual aggravated kidnapping convictions violate double jeopardy principles; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we vacate one of the Defendant’s two aggravated kidnapping convictions due to a double jeopardy violation. In addition, because certain enhancement factors were wrongfully applied, we reduce the Defendant’s sentence for sexual battery by one year and one of his sentences for aggravated burglary by three years, thereby reducing the Defendant’s effective sentence to eighty years. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Curtis E. Wells, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to robbery, a Class C felony. The plea agreement provided that the appellant would receive a sentence of six years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve one year at one hundred percent (100%) in the Williamson County Jail, with the remainder of the sentence to be suspended and served on intensive probation. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred by not granting total probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Dickson County jury convicted the defendant, Robert Kern Holloway, of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and he was sentenced to forty years to be served at 100% as a violent offender. On appeal, he argues: the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the mens rea element of second degree murder; and the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on his pro se motion for a new trial which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant's conviction but vacate its ruling as to the pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Prior to this appeal, the petitioner, Joseph Shepherd, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in one proceeding, and, in a separate proceeding, he was convicted of felony murder and aggravated assault. He is currently serving a life sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, raising several issues, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief in both cases and the petitioner appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for aggravated gambling promotion. The trial judge denied the defendant's preliminary motion to suppress certain evidence, and a Davidson County jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The court sentenced him to two years of probation, a $1,000 fine, and five hours of unpaid community service per month for twenty-four months. He now appeals claiming: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress physical evidence gathered during and incriminating statements made as a result of a warrantless search; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated gambling promotion. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Barbara Sue Moore, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to theft of property valued $60,000 or more, a Class B felony, and theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received concurrent sentences of eight and two years, respectively, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for alternative sentences and ordered that she serve her sentences in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that she serve her sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. He argues: (1) due process required the post-conviction court to hear his petition because of his attorney’s inaction even though it was filed outside the statute of limitations; and, regardless, (2) his convictions should be set aside because they are based on void indictments. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Oscar C. Wells, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The appellant received a total effective sentence of life plus ten years. On appeal, the appellant challenges his arrest without a warrant and the trial court’s failure to suppress the appellant’s statement which was taken after his arrest. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury found the defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide. The trial court sentenced her as a mitigated offender to .9 years of unsupervised probation. The defendant appeals her conviction and alleges that the trial court erroneously allowed the improper admission of evidence regarding child restraint laws and insufficient evidence to support a conviction. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Elbert M. Marable, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Rutherford County Circuit Court. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Marable pled guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction as a Range I offender. On appeal, Marable presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether his plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered and (2) whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After consideration of the entire record, we conclude that Marable's plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered. Accordingly, his conviction for aggravated assault is vacated and this case is remanded to the trial court.

The Defendant, Guadalupe Steven Mendez, was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to terms of twenty-four years for the aggravated rape and ten years for the sexual exploitation. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to a prior sentence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the aggravated rape conviction, and further complains that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the Defendant, Reginald Derell Baldon, of three counts of burglary, three counts of vandalism over $1,000, one count of theft over $1,000, one count of vandalism over $500, and four counts of misdemeanor theft stemming from three separate break-ins. He was sentenced to an effective term of twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the State failed to provide proper discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16; (3) the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial due to the prosecutor’s reference to the Defendant’s failure to testify; and (4) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on aggravated criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense of burglary. We also address whether lost evidence deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. We modify the judgment on one of the vandalism convictions to properly reflect the jury’s verdict, although this modification does not change the effective sentence of twenty years. Otherwise, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted in general sessions court of Driving While Under the Influence and “Refusal to Submit.” He appealed his convictions and sentences to the Criminal Court for Shelby County. The Defendant failed to appear for his initial court hearing in criminal court, and a capias was issued for his arrest. The Defendant was arrested on the capias, posted bond, and subsequently appeared one hour late for a hearing in criminal court. The criminal court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to general sessions court for the execution of the original judgments. This appeal ensued, in which the Defendant argues (and the State concedes) that the criminal court erred by dismissing the appeal and remanding the case to general sessions court. We agree and reverse the judgment of the criminal court.

The petitioner, Donald Mitchell Green, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated robbery, failure to appear, and theft. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition and the petitioner appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Barry L. Armistead appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's revocation of his probationary sentences. He claims that the lower court erred in revoking probation because the state failed to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Because we disagree, we affirm the lower court's judgment.

The defendant, Charles Wade Smith, III, was convicted by a Perry County jury of second degree murder for the shooting death of his father. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to seventeen years of incarceration. The defendant now appeals contending that: (1) he was deprived of the opportunity to present exculpatory evidence; (2) the trial court erred in not giving a jury instruction regarding the relevance of the Defendant's intoxication to negate his culpable mental state; and (3) the evidence presented is insufficient to support his conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Jerome Butler, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Davidson County Criminal Court, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner contests this ruling on appeal. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Doris M. Dennison, pled guilty in the Union County Criminal Court to five counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received an eight-year sentence for each conviction with the issue of concurrent or consecutive sentencing to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve counts one through four consecutively to each other but concurrently with count five for an effective sentence of thirty-two years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Albert D. Wilson, II, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and was sentenced to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant reserved two certified questions of law relating to the propriety of the search of his motel room. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Kenneth Nolan Humphries, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. Defendant was separately indicted for three counts of Class D theft. On September 17, 1993, Defendant entered guilty pleas to all three charges, and the trial court sentenced him to serve three consecutive sentences of four years each and ordered him to pay restitution. Defendant's sentences were suspended, and he was placed on probation for twelve years. A probation violation warrant was filed and later amended. The revocation warrant was dismissed, and the trial court ordered Defendant to complete a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program. Subsequently, a second probation violation warrant was filed and later amended to include additional allegations. On April 16, 1997, Defendant pled guilty to two more charges of theft and received two six-year sentences to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to Defendant's previous twelve-year sentence, for a total effective sentence of eighteen years. The trial court ordered that Defendant's sentence be supervised by the Community Alternatives to Prison Program (CAPP), to expire on April 16, 2015. A warrant for violation of CAPP was filed. Defendant was ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence on regular probation. A fourth probation violation warrant was filed. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Defendant had violated the conditions of probation and ordered Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court's decision. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and reverse in part.

A Sevier County jury convicted the Defendant of driving under the influence and failure to carry a driver's license. The trial court sentenced him to ninety days of incarceration, followed by supervised probation, and suspended his license for two years. He now appeals, claiming: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress all evidence gained as a result of his traffic stop; and (2) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the results of his breathalyzer test. In the event that this Court finds that either the traffic stop was unconstitutional or the breathalyzer test was inadmissable, then, the Defendant contends, the remaining evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At a joint trial, a Hawkins County jury convicted each Defendant of numerous drug-related offenses. The same jury also convicted Defendant Wolfe of tampering with evidence and convicted Defendant Barnett of two theft offenses. Wolfe received an effective sentence of five years of incarceration, and Barnett's effective sentence was twelve years of incarceration. On appeal, both Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a Sequatchie County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder for shooting his wife's boyfriend to death outside a gasoline station and convenience store. Because the State did not seek either the death penalty or life without parole, the trial court automatically sentenced him to life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant raises essentially three issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence enhanced versions of the store surveillance videotape of the shooting; and (3) whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions on intentionally and knowingly. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for premeditated murder, the trial court did not err in admitting the videotapes, and any deficiency in the jury instructions constituted harmless error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ralph Lamar Williams, of four counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; one count of rape, a Class B felony; and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to life without parole for each conviction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the prosecutor improperly suggested to the jury during closing argument that the defense bore the burden of establishing the defendant's innocence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.