APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In Lester Johnson v. State, No. E2001-00019-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, July 11, 2002), and State v. Jimmy D. Goode, No. E2000-02829-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 19, 2001), I authored opinions indicating that the finding of an emergency is the only time a trial court might suspend the sentence of an individual convicted of a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-616. Johnson was a post-conviction case in which the petitioner alleged bias on the part of the trial judge. The holding in Goode was that an actual emergency is not only a defense to prosecution under the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, but also a factor which could be considered at sentencing in the event of a conviction. In State v. Ricky Fife, No. 03C01-9401-CR-0036 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, June 15, 1995), however, a panel of this court had held that the 1989 Act superseded the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-616(c), thereby providing sentencing alternatives absent an emergency. Our research indicates that other panels of this court, relying upon the holding in Fife, have established a conflicting line of authority. After further review, I am persuaded by the majority that the terms of the 1989 Act, so comprehensive in nature, should apply, thereby affording the trial court with more flexibility in the sentencing of habitual motor vehicle offenders. The facts here demonstrate why it is so important for trial judges to have wide discretionary authority in matters of sentencing.

The Defendant, Roger L. Hickman, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that, in 1986, he entered a guilty plea to a misdemeanor without the assistance of counsel and without waiving his right to counsel. We affirm the dismissal of the Defendant's post-conviction petition because it was time-barred. Furthermore, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Anton McDonald, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from a guilty plea to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the petition was time-barred. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Appellant, Ashad R. A. Muhammad Ali, appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition requesting DNA analysis under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. On appeal, the Appellant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court properly dismissed the petition and (2) whether the trial judge erred by not sua sponte recusing himself based upon the fact that the trial judge was "part of the prosecutorial team that prosecuted the original conviction against the Appellant." Due to the sparseness of the record with regard to the question of recusal, we remand the case for a determination of this issue.

The defendant, Larry K. Bombailey, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to violating a motor vehicle habitual offender order, a Class E felony; theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor; and public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor. The defendant agreed to a sentence as a Range I offender of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft; thirty days for the public intoxication, to be served concurrently to the theft; and eighteen months for violating a motor vehicle habitual offender order, to be served consecutively to the theft. The parties stipulated that the trial court would determine the manner of service for the defendant's conviction for violating a motor vehicle habitual offender order. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for an alternative sentence for the motor vehicle habitual offender violation. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence. We affirm the trial court's denial of an alternative sentence but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment for the theft conviction.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that the post-conviction court erred for failing to find that the one-year statute of limitations was tolled due to his mental incompetence, or, in the alternative, for failing to find that his petition was timely because it was filed within one year from the date mandate issued. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Donald Walton, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of one count of burglary. He contends on appeal that 1) there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, 2) no proper foundation was laid for opinion testimony by certain witnesses, 3) the warrantless search of the vehicle was improper, and 4) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Letivias D. Prince, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed Petitioner's petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and contends (1) that his counsel failed to develop a reasonable trial strategy or defenses for Petitioner; (2) that his counsel failed to fully investigate or adequately prepare the witnesses for trial; (3) that his counsel failed to allow Petitioner to testify at trial; and (4) that his counsel failed to ask for a continuance to investigate certain exculpatory evidence presented by the State at the time of trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Thomas G. Lampley, Jr., was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. After determining the Defendant to be a Range III, persistent offender, the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Department of Correction, consecutive to an prior sentence. The Defendant now appeals, alleging that his sentence for the instant crime should be ten years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Craig Quevedo, pled guilty to thirty counts of rape and twenty-four counts of incest and pled nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, four counts of rape of a child, nine counts of rape and one count of aggravated rape in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of ninety-two years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence was excessive and contrary to public policy. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The petitioner, Jerry Lynn Wright, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and that he received effective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Corey Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Darrell Watkins, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Walter R. Smith, Jr., was convicted by a jury of five counts of child rape. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentences. We affirm the Defendant's five convictions for child rape. The trial judge erred by failing to state on the record the facts that support the imposition of consecutive sentences. However, the record clearly shows that consecutive sentencing was proper. Therefore, we affirm the Defendant's sentences.

A Bedford County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Dywand Carlos Pettway, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to twenty years in the Department of Correction for the aggravated robbery conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of a Schedule II controlled substance conviction, to be served consecutively. In this appeal, the defendant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated robbery conviction and (2) that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Emery Wells, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to an effective eight-year sentence, with the sentence being suspended after service of ninety days in jail. A probation violation warrant was subsequently issued alleging violation of the following conditions: (1) failure to report to his probation officer; (2) failure to obey the laws of this state; and (3) failure to report a new arrest. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Wells' suspended sentence and ordered his eight-year sentence to be served with community corrections, after service of an additional ninety-day period of jail confinement. Wells concedes that the violations occurred, but he argues that the revocation did not "aid the interest of both the public and the [Appellant]," as it will likely result in the loss of his employment.

Following a bench trial appellant, Jason White, was found guilty of D.U.I. Second Offense in violation of T.C.A. 55-11-401. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days with incarceration for forty-five days followed by probation for the balance of the sentence. The appellant appeals, contending that the evidence was not sufficient for a D.U.I. Second Offense conviction. After a review of the record we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, David I. Tucker, appeals the dismissal of his petition requesting DNA analysis pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the Cannon County Circuit Court.

The petitioner, Anthony Darrell Hines, convicted of first degree felony murder and sentenced to death for a 1985 homicide, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that counsel were ineffective at his 1986 trial and 1989 resentencing hearing, that women were excluded from both juries, and that imposition of the death penalty violates his rights under the federal and state constitutions. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the denial.

Upon his plea of guilty, the Defendant was convicted of DUI. In this appeal, he attempts to present two certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). Because we conclude that this appeal does not properly present certified questions of law, we dismiss the appeal.

The Appellant, Christopher Robert Smith, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of possession with intent to deliver over 300 grams of cocaine, a class A felony. Following this conviction, he was sentenced to twenty-one years imprisonment. Smith appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and (2) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of prior criminal conduct. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Shamain Johnson, appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Finding that denial of the petition was appropriate, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Crawley, Sr., pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law stems from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of a police officer stopping the Defendant's automobile. Because we find that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant, we reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. This case is remanded for entry of an order of dismissal.

Defendant, Martin Stuart Hammock, was originally convicted of first degree murder following a jury trial. On appeal, this Court found that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation to support a conviction for first degree murder. Accordingly, we modified the judgment to reflect a conviction of second degree murder and remanded the case to the trial court for re-sentencing. State v. Martin Stuart Hammock, No. M2000-00334-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 824, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 12, 2001), no perm. to app. filed. Following a new sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty-five years. Defendant appeals. After a review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.