APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Philander T. Fleming, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced the appellant to nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Luther E. Fowler, appeals from the Johnson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. We affirm.

The appellant, Frazier Fashun Perry, was indicted for: (1) possession of cocaine over .5 grams with the intent to sell or deliver; (2) possession of marijuana over one-half ounce with the intent to sell or deliver; and (3) being a drug felon in possession of a handgun. The appellant filed a motion to suppress the items seized as a result of the execution of a “no knock” search warrant. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the appellant entered a guilty plea to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to resell, a Class B felony. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant reserved a certified question of law to determine whether exigent circumstances existed to justify execution of the “no knock” search warrant in violation of Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(e). The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We determine that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress as the State proved that exigent circumstances existed which justified the issuance of a “no knock” search warrant. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a state appeal from the Cumberland County Criminal Court's suppression of a handgun seized pursuant to a warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle. Because a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule has not been adopted as a facet of the state constitution, we affirm.

Petitioner, Clarence Washington, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his sentence for his conviction of the offense of escape from a penitentiary. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The defendant, Doreen Jones, was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of twenty-one years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; (3) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence certain photographs of the victim; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding expert testimony provided by a defense witness; (5) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a videotape recording; (6) that the trial court erred by permitting the medical examiner to testify that the victim's death resulted from abuse and neglect and by refusing to redact this statement from the autopsy report; (7) that the trial court erred by permitting the state to read certain Social Security regulations; and (8) that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a change of venue. The defendant has also asked this court to review the propriety of the sentence in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Terrance Dupree Woods, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The majority concludes that modification of the defendant’s sentence is required in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). I must respectfully dissent.

The defendant, Gustavo Chavez, pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court classified him as a Range I offender and imposed a ten year sentence at 100% service in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the length of the sentence imposed by the trial court. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s conviction. However, in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ----, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the defendant’s sentence to an effective sentence of eight years at 100% service. We, therefore, remand the case for entry of a judgment that is consistent with this opinion.

The defendant appeals the sentence he received after a violation and revocation of his community corrections sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the sentence issued was illegal. Following our review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The defendant, Ronald Allen, was convicted of rape of a child. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, he asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial court erred by permitting the state to ask leading questions of the minor victim; (3) that the sentence is excessive under the terms of the 1989 Sentencing Act; and (4) that the sentence must be modified under the terms of Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2351 (2004). The sentence is modified to twenty-three years. Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.

A Hardeman County jury found the defendant, Stephen Lynn Hugueley, guilty of first degree premeditated murder. Following a separate penalty phase, the jury found the presence of four statutory aggravating circumstances and that these aggravators outweighed any mitigating factors.  The jury subsequently imposed a sentence of death. On appeal, the defendant seeks review by this Court of both his conviction for first degree murder and his sentence of death. He presents the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant an individual and sequestered voir dire; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s objection to the State’s use of peremptory challenges based upon race and gender; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to excuse a potential juror for cause; (4) whether the indictment failed to charge a capital offense; and (5) whether the trial court failed to apply meaningful standards to ensure constitutionally adequate proportionality review.  Finding no error, we affirm the defendant’s conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death.

The Defendant, Thomas D. Stanton, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery, one count of carjacking, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of theft, one count of Class D felony evading arrest, and one count of misdemeanor evading arrest. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the robbery offense; twenty-five years for the carjacking, to run consecutively; twelve years for the burglary offense, to run consecutively; five years for the theft, to run concurrently; ten years for the felony evading arrest, to run concurrently; and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor evading arrest, to run concurrently; for an effective sentence of life plus thirty-seven years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence does not support his aggravated robbery conviction; that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge the jury on certain lesser-included offenses; that the trial court erred in permitting the State to impeach him on the basis of a prior conviction; and that his sentences are excessive. The State also filed a direct appeal, arguing that the Defendant's sentence of life imprisonment for the aggravated robbery conviction is illegal and should be modified to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We reverse and remand for a new trial the Defendant's conviction of Class D felony evading arrest. We modify the Defendant's sentence for his aggravated robbery conviction to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We remand for a correction of the judgment reflecting the Defendant's carjacking conviction. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Anthony Lee Hill, was convicted by a Scott County jury of nine counts of sexual battery and received an effective two-year split confinement sentence with service of six months in the county jail. On appeal, Hill raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the nine convictions and (2) whether the statutory language of the phrase "can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification" improperly lessens the State's burden of proof and is, thus, unconstitutional. After review, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contended that his sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because he was classified as both a Range II, persistent offender and a Class X offender. We conclude that the petitioner was properly sentenced based upon both the classification of the offense (Class X) and the offender classification (Range II, persistent). As such, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the habeas petition.

The defendant was convicted of theft under $500 and evading arrest, and was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days at 75% release eligibility. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the failure to admit the testimony of a defense witness, and the length and consecutive nature of his sentences. Upon thorough review, we affirm the judgments and the sentences.

Petitioner, Willie E. Kyles, Jr., filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, as amended after the appointment of counsel, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Specifically, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel (1) failed to adequately investigate the facts surrounding Petitioner’s case or interview potential witnesses; (2) failed to file a motion to suppress; and (3) failed to challenge the chain of custody of the State’s evidence introduced at trial.  After review of the record in this matter, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief.

The appellants, Christopher L. Williams, Corey A. Adams, and Ortega Wiltz, appeal as of right from their convictions in the Davidson County Criminal Court. Following a jury trial, Appellant Williams was convicted of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Appellant Adams was convicted of three counts of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, and Appellant Wiltz was convicted of two counts of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Appellant Williams to a total effective sentence of seventy-five years incarceration. Appellant Adams was sentenced to a total effective sentence of thirty-six years incarceration, and Appellant Wiltz was sentenced to a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration. On appeal, the appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions and the sentences imposed by the trial court. Appellant Adams also challenges the trial court's ruling that certain prior convictions were admissible for the purpose of impeaching a defense witness. Based upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Richard A. Emmitt, was convicted in 1984 of assault with intent to commit second degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery, and first degree burglary and received an effective sentence of 125 years. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on January 21, 2004, which the post-conviction court dismissed as untimely. The petitioner appeals, claiming the statute of limitations was tolled. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner was convicted for assault in Shelby County. During the proceedings on these convictions, the trial court found the petitioner in contempt of court on two occasions. On appeal, we reversed the petitioner’s convictions for assault. Upon remand, the State moved to nolle prosequi the petitioner’s assault charges, and the trial court entered nolle prosequi on September 7, 1999, without cost, which dismissed the assault charges against the petitioner without prejudice. These charges were later expunged. On March 18, 2003, the petitioner filed two petitions to expunge the contempt judgments. The trial court denied the petitioner’s petition to expunge the contempt convictions in January of 2004. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal to this Court on February 20, 2004. The petitioner presents five issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred under Tennessee’s Expungement Statute by refusing to expunge the petitioner’s contempt records and the related records in general sessions court; (2) whether the trial court clerk and the chief administrative official of the State violated petitioner’s due process rights and the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-102 by not expunging petitioner’s contempt records within sixty days of filing an expungement petition; (3) whether the trial court and district attorney general violated the petitioner’s constitutional rights of due process and equal protection by causing petitioner to be held
in contempt; (4) whether the trial court improperly allowed petitioner to waive counsel on December 5, 1997, in case number 97-06150; and (5) whether the trial court had jurisdiction in case numbers 96-09407,-08 and 97-06150. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Keith Kennedy, entered a plea of nolo contendere to numerous counts of burglary, theft, and vandalism arising out of events that occurred in Chester and Henderson Counties.  As a result, he was sentenced to fifteen (15) years for the Chester County convictions and twelve (12) years for the Henderson County convictions, to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of fifteen (15) years. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner reserved the following certified question of law for appeal: “Did the defendant give an unequivocal, specific, intelligent, and voluntary consent to the warrantless search of his premises and vehicles, uncontaminated by duress or coercion?” This Court determined that the certified question was not dispositive as to three of the petitioner’s convictions, but determined the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search as to the remaining convictions. See State v. Michael Kennedy, No. W2001-03107-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 402798 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 21, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 27, 2003). Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging: (1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (2) that the trial court erred by imposing restitution; (3) that the trial court erred by admitting his prior felony convictions; and (4) that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel. After a hearing on a motion to dismiss filed by the State, the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for an evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Terrence A. Sawyers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Alfio Orlando Lewis, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post- conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. He seeks relief from his convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder and consecutive twelve-year sentences. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial and that his sentences are invalid under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Upon entering a "best interest"guilty plea, the Defendant, Jeremy Miller, was convicted of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in ordering an excessive sentence by: (1) improperly weighing enhancement and mitigating factors; and (2) denying alternative sentencing. We modify the sentence of the trial court to comply with the dictates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We remand for the trial court to consider the Defendant's suitability for probation.

The defendant, Rebecca G. Ratliff, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revocation of her probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering her to serve her original two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Because the record supports the trial court in its discretionary determination to order incarceration, we affirm.