APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Kimberly Greene, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 1, 2005, and counsel was subsequently appointed to assist Petitioner. A hearing was held on June 1, 2005, and, after consulting with her counsel, Petitioner voluntarily withdrew her petition. Thereafter Petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner, Jonathon Christopher Hood, entered a best-interest guilty plea to felony reckless endangerment and, pursuant to a plea agreement, was sentenced to one year imprisonment with a release eligibility date of 30%. The Petitioner filed for and was denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted in an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Danny Strode, was indicted by the Bledsoe County Grand Jury for one count of premeditated murder, one count of felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The State sought the death penalty. The defendant asserted he could not be put to death because he was mentally retarded within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(a). The trial court held a hearing and determined that the defendant was indeed mentally retarded under the definition provided in the statute and therefore could not be sentenced to death. The State requested permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, we determine that the defendant is not mentally retarded under the definition of the statute and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-conviction action, the petitioner, Kevin Frank Mercer, contends that: (1) his plea was involuntary and unknowing; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective by providing little meaningful advice as to whether to enter a plea or proceed to trial. Following our review, we conclude that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered and that counsel was effective in his representation of the petitioner. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

In this post-conviction action, the petitioner, Andrew Rochester, contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to file a motion to suppress evidence taken from his vehicle after his arrest; (2) failing to object to testimony elicited from two witnesses not qualified as experts; and (3) failing to comply with the requirements of Momon v. State on the record at trial. Following our review, we conclude that counsel was not ineffective in his representation; therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Daniel Potin, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the appellant to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and imposed a fine of $20,000.  On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s designation of a witness as an expert, and the fine imposed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Walfrido L. Rodriguez, appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and aggravated assault, claiming that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider the charges sequentially, that the convicting evidence is insufficient, and that the trial court erred in rejecting a request for a special jury instruction. We discern no reversible error and affirm the convictions.

The petitioner, Earl Jerome Lee, pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping, attempted felony escape, concealing stolen property, and fraudulent use of a credit card, and he received a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the sentences imposed were illegal. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without appointing counsel or conducting an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appeals the dismissal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Capital Petitioner David Keen appeals as of right the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner Keen pled guilty to first degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of the rape of eight-year-old Ashley Nicole (Nikki) Reed. See State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1996). He was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the petitioner’s conviction was affirmed, but the supreme court reversed and remanded the sentence of death after finding reversible error due to erroneous jury instructions. Keen, 926 S.W.2d at 736. On remand, the jury, again, imposed the penalty of death. Keen, 31 S.W.3d at 202. Our supreme court affirmed the sentence of death on direct appeal. Id. A pro se petition for post-conviction relief was filed on May 3, 2001, which was followed by the appointment of counsel and an amended petition on November 16, 2001. An evidentiary hearing was conducted and, on August 2, 2004, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. On direct appeal to this Court, the petitioner presents for our review the following claims: (1) whether the petitioner was denied a fair trial due to jury misconduct; (2) whether the petitioner received constitutionally effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing; (3) whether the death sentence violates the holdings in Apprendi, Ring, or Jones; (4) whether the prosecutor’s discretion in seeking the death penalty violates Bush v. Gore; (5) whether the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional; and (6) whether imposition of the death penalty violates international
law. After a careful and laborious review of the record, this Court concludes that there is no error requiring reversal. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Cassandra Robinson, was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed Range I, concurrent sentences of four years, nine years, and four years, respectively. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is a direct appeal from convictions on a jury verdict of four counts of aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to sixteen years for each conviction to be served consecutively in part for an effective thirty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises four issues: (1) the trial court erred in consolidating the Defendant’s two indictments for a single trial; (2) the admission of hearsay statements is plain error; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault; and (4) the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences violated the Defendant’s constitutional rights pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Edward Jankowski, Sr., appeals from the sentencing decision of the Sequatchie County Circuit Court. The Defendant pled guilty to one count of incest. The victim was his eighteen-year-old daughter. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received a six-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, and the manner of service was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. After review, the sentencing decision is affirmed.

The defendant, Ernest Cunningham, Jr., appeals his convictions for facilitation of sale of cocaine under .5 grams (Class D felony) and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell (Class B felony). The defendant received concurrent sentences of twelve years for the facilitation offense and thirty years for possession with intent to sell, as a career offender with a 60% release eligibility date. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Our review reveals that the evidence was sufficient. The judgments of conviction are hereby affirmed.

The petitioner, James McClennon, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he asserted various instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. A review of the record reveals support for the findings of the post-conviction court. We affirm.

The defendant, Robert L. Mitchell, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and assault. Later, the two aggravated kidnapping convictions were merged. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated kidnapping, twelve years for the aggravated kidnapping, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault. Because the kidnapping sentences are to be served consecutively, the effective sentence is thirty-seven years. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his kidnapping convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts; and (3) his sentence is excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant of four counts of aggravated robbery against two victims, and the appellant received an effective thirty-six-year sentence. In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by requiring Detention Response Team personnel to sit next to him in the courtroom and while he testified; and (3) that his sentences are excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the four convictions should be merged into two convictions and that the case should be remanded for entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Tommy Dixon, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Ryan James Moran, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Appellant, Chad Michael Knight, appeals the sentencing decision of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. Following a jury trial, Knight was convicted of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and sentenced to an effective term of twenty years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, Knight argues that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to apply various sentencing considerations which would have served to mitigate his sentence, as authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-113(13) (2003); and (2) refusing to sentence him as an especially mitigated offender in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-109 (2003). After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Steven Ray Chance, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Clifford Sims, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is a direct appeal from a conviction on a jury verdict of first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. The Defendant was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant raises five issues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to define premeditation for prospective jurors through the uses of examples during voir dire; (2) the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the victim’s alleged involvement in a prior homicide; (3) the trial court erred in allowing as evidence at trial the prior testimony from an unavailable witness; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of three of the State’s rebuttal witnesses; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of first degree, premeditated murder.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Louis Leslie Myles, appeals the denial of judicial diversion following his guilty pleas to two counts of theft of property over $1,000. After review of the record, we reverse the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court and remand for deferment of the proceedings as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (2003).

The defendant, Susan Wallace, a special education teacher, was indicted by the Henderson County Grand Jury for fourteen counts of child abuse and fourteen counts of assault. She filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the State had not complied with the School Discipline Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-6-4101, et seq. The trial court denied the motion, finding that any procedural defects were cured by the return of the grand jury indictment, and this Rule 9 interlocutory appeal followed. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss the indictment.

The Petitioner, Jeremy Catron, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for postconviction DNA testing. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy the qualifying criteria under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.