APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

OnNovember 2, 2004, the appellant, Wiley Hawthorne, was indicted on one count of attempted first degree murder and one count of felony reckless endangerment. On July 27, 2005, a jury found the appellant guilty on both counts. On August 26, 2005, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-two years for attempting to commit first degree murder and eighteen months for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, the sentences to run concurrently. On September 9, 2005, the trial court denied the appellant’s motion for a new trial. The appellant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions on both counts of the indictment. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the accused guilty of both counts of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s convictions.

Defendant, William Granville Howell, was indicted for aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of simple assault and sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days, with the sentence suspended. On appeal, Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed because (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of simple assault beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in admitting testimony pertaining to a prior assault claim against Defendant; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of the prior conviction and for opening the door for introduction of this evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Percy Lee Palmer, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant concedes on appeal that the trial court's judgment is correct. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joseph Jackson, Jr., of two counts of attempted first degree murder, and the trial judge imposed two twenty-year sentences to be served concurrently. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief, which was dismissed by the habeas court without a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends he could not have been convicted for these two criminal attempts under statutory law and the underlying judgment is therefore illegal and void. Finding no reversible error exists, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The appellant, John Patrick Nash, was indicted by a Sumner County grand jury of six counts of sexual contact with a victim under the age of thirteen. On August 23, 2005, he pled no contest to an amended indictment charging two counts of aggravated assault and retiring the other four counts of the original indictment. He received sentences of six and four years respectively, to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of ten years as a standard offender and placed on community corrections. In October 2005, the appellant failed a drug test after testing positive for cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol, and a violation of community corrections warrant was filed. Following a hearing on January 9, 2006, the community corrections sentence was revoked and the appellant was ordered to serve his underlying sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his community corrections sentence. After careful review, we find no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Mario L. Smith, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and vandalism over $1000, a Class D felony  and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of nine years and two years, respectively, in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his attempted second degree murder conviction. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Sherry Floyd McAlister, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join with the majority in concluding that the State’s special instruction submitted to the jury constituted reversible error. I write separately only to note the following additional reasons for finding the instruction was error. The special instruction, in its entirety, is as follows:

The court instructs you that in a sexual abuse case you may convict the defendant on the basis of the victim’s testimony alone. Corroboration of the victim’s testimony is not necessary.

The appellant, David Michael Chubb, was convicted by a jury in the Sumner County Criminal Court of four counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of fourteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to inquire into the conflict of interest when it was revealed at trial that the appellant’s trial counsel had previously represented the mother of the minor victim; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to admit a videotape into evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for a bill of particulars; (4) whether the trial court erred in charging a special jury instruction requested by the State; (5) whether, according to the dictates of Blakely v. Washington, the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant; and (6) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the convictions for aggravated sexual battery and attempted aggravated sexual battery based upon an improper instruction, affirm the drug related convictions, and remand for a new trial on the aggravated sexual battery and attempted aggravated sexual battery charges.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Jeremy S. Crosby, was convicted of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced to serve eighteen years in the Department of Correction for the cocaine conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the paraphernalia conviction, for an effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Following a jury trial Defendant, Latisha Jones, was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, both Class A felonies. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for her felony murder conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty-three years for her especially aggravated robbery conviction and ordered her robbery sentence to be served consecutively to her sentence for felony murder. Defendant does not challenge the length or manner of service of her sentence. In her appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred in not suppressing her statement to the investigating officers; (3) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury on facilitation; (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted especially aggravated robbery; and (5) Tennessee pattern instruction, criminal 43.04 is unconstitutional. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Teresa Sue Skipper, was convicted of assault, resisting arrest, and obstruction of the execution of an arrest warrant. The Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial, asserting that the trial judge infringed upon her constitutional rights by not properly instructing the jury. The motion for a new trial was denied. On appeal, the Defendant continues to assert that the jury instructions were erroneous. Furthermore, the Defendant now argues that her constitutional rights were violated because the law enforcement officers entered her home unlawfully and, but for the illegal entry of the officers, she would not have used force against them to protect and defend herself. We conclude that the trial judge properly instructed the jury and that the Defendant waived any claims regarding an unlawful search. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his driving under the influence (DUI), fifth offense, conviction, the petitioner, Gregory L. Anderson, sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the Criminal Court for Davidson County after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner pursues his claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Robert Smith, was convicted by a Madison County jury of the misdemeanor offenses of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. As a result of these convictions, Smith received two sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement. The trial court further ordered that the two sentences be served concurrently but consecutively to two previously imposed suspended misdemeanor sentences, which Smith was currently serving on probation. On appeal, Smith raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm.

James Patterson, the defendant, appeals from his jury convictions of especially aggravated robbery (Class A felony), criminal attempt of second degree murder (Class B felony), and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping (Class A felonies). The defendant presents two issues by contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the convictions and the sentence imposed.

Aggrieved of his kidnapping and sexual battery convictions, the petitioner, Lawrence Warren Pierce, sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the Davidson County Criminal Court after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner presents several issues of the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, John Whatley, appeals the judgment of the Maury County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. Whatley is currently serving an eleven-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a result of his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Whatley argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) “failing to adequately consult with and prepare [Whatley] for trial”; (2) failing to present a potential defense witness at trial; (3) opening the door for the introduction of prejudicial testimony; and (4) failing to properly preserve a conflict of interest issue for appeal. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Octavia Cartwright, was convicted of evading arrest in a motor vehicle with risk of death or injury, attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of ninety-one years in prison as a Range I offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions for attempted murder and especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant; (3) the trial court erred when it determined the Defendant was competent; and (4) her constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. After throughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The Defendant, Jermeil Ralph Tarter, was indicted by a Sullivan County grand jury for evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the indicted offense. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court erred in requiring the Defendant to serve this sentence consecutively to his prior sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donald Wayne Joiner, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of one count of escape, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to six years in the Department of Correction. He filed a timely motion for a new trial, which was denied. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for escape beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Reginald E. Bost, appeals the decision of the Knox County Criminal Court revoking his alternative sentence. In July 2004, the Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and received an eight-year sentence. This sentence was suspended, and he was placed in the Community Alternative to Prison Program. On April 13, 2005, a warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of the program. The warrant was later amended to include additional violations. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant violated the conditions of his sentence and ordered that his original eight-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence does not support full revocation of his alternative sentence. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Anthony Dewayne Cotton, pled guilty to possession of a schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver .5 grams or more, unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Vivian Earl McDaniel, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court denied relief, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction over him because he was improperly shuttled between state and federal custody in violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

A Wayne County Jury convicted the defendant of four hunting related offenses. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of seventy days, to serve forty-two days in incarceration with the remainder suspended. The defendant argues on appeal that he should have been granted probation with regard to his entire sentence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ronald E. Walker, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court denied relief, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received an illegal sentence that was used to enhance the sentence that he is presently serving. He also asserts that the sentence that he is presently serving is void on its face. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.