APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Heather McMurray, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of three counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, three counts of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school zone, and possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone, all Class B felonies. The trial court merged the convictions based on the same incidents and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twelve years for each conviction, with a mandatory eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction due to the fact that the offenses were committed in a drug-free school zone. The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain her convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as an expert witness; and (3) whether the trial court erred by denying her motion for a mistrial after the State played a redacted version of her statement to police. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Allan Pope, of one count of using public equipment for private purposes, one count of official misconduct, and one count of theft of services over $10,000 but less than $60,000. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction for theft of services and reversed and dismissed the Defendant’s convictions for official misconduct and private use of public property. State v. Pope, No. E2011-01410-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4760724, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 5, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 5, 2013). On remand, the Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the trial court reconsider its previous denial of the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion; the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

The defendant, Tommie Phillips, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of four counts of first degree felony  murder, one count of reckless homicide, two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated rape, one  count of aggravated sexual battery, six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the four counts of felony murder and one count of reckless homicide into one felony murder conviction and merged the aggravated sexual battery conviction with the aggravated rape conviction. The trial court also merged the six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping into three convictions – one per victim – and merged the two especially aggravated burglary convictions into one conviction. He was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment  plus sixty years. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress his statement to police and the photographic and subsequent identifications of him as the perpetrator; (2) the trial court’s erroneous jury charge on especially aggravated kidnapping deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 14 to reflect the sentence length of twenty years, which was omitted, and we vacate the judgment for especially aggravated burglary in Count 16 and remand for resentencing for the modified conviction of aggravated burglary in that count. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Troy Lloyd, of one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Michael D. Green, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of multiple crimes, including first degree felony murder, and received a sentence of life plus twenty-four years. That sentence was ordered to be served concurrently to a federal sentence of life plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to request sequestration of the jury; (2) failing to utilize all available preemptory challenges or to challenge potential jurors for cause; and (3) failing to limit testimony concerning the prior federal trial. Following review of the record, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Keeanna Luellan, guilty of forgery over $500 and fraudulent use of a credit card over $500. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range III, persistent offender to six years for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other bad acts or crimes and that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Frederick Parks, appeals from the trial court’s order summarily dismissing Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tavaria Merritt, pleaded guilty to nine counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2010).  He was sentenced to nine consecutive terms of twenty-five years for an effective 225-year sentence to be served at 100%.  The Defendant was seventeen years old when the offenses were committed and nineteen years old when he pleaded guilty.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that his effective sentence is the equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and is cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  Although Graham does not apply to the Defendant’s effective 225-year sentence, we conclude that the sentence is excessive, reverse the judgments of the trial court, and remand for entry of judgments reflecting an effective fifty-year sentence.

The Petitioner, Robert Lee Polk, appeals the Circuit Court for Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join the majority in all respects with the exception of sentencing.  While I agree that the effective 225-year sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive, I disagree that an effective fifty-year sentence complies with the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.    
 

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dearaysun Wright, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Kimberly Wilson Wentzel, of six counts of prescription fraud and two counts of identity theft.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a persistent offender and imposed concurrent eleven-year sentences for each of the Defendant’s eight felony convictions.  The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied her request for alternative sentencing.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Raymond Denton, was convicted of aggravated rape, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-502; aggravated burglary, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-403; and physical abuse of an impaired person, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-6-119. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender for each conviction to sixty (60) years for aggravated rape, fifteen (15) years for aggravated burglary, and fifteen (15) years for physical abuse of an impaired person. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to each other for an effective sentence of ninety (90) years. In this appeal, Defendant does not challenge any of the sentences imposed, and does not challenge the convictions for aggravated burglary and physical abuse of an impaired person. Defendant’s sole issue is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of aggravate rape, limited to the argument that there was insufficient proof establishing the element of penetration. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Everett Russ, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to consecutive terms of nine years for each conviction. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2010). On appeal, he contends that (1) the State’s failure to respond properly to his request for a bill of particulars should have resulted in a mistrial and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but because of inappropriate sentencing, we reverse the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting concurrent sentences.

The petitioner, Ira Ishmael Muhammad, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which challenged his 11-year-old Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and felony reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Reba Nell Woods, of three counts of selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class A felony, and two counts of selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a park, a Class B felony.  The trial court sentenced her as a Range III, career offender to an effective sentence of ninety years.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to sever the offenses, that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court committed numerous reversible errors regarding the admissibility of evidence.  Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to sever the offenses and that the error was not harmless as to the appellant’s convictions in counts 3, 4, and 5.  Therefore, those convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for new trials on those charges.  We also conclude that although the evidence is sufficient to show that the appellant sold twenty-six grams or more of cocaine in counts 1 and 2, the evidence is insufficient to show that she did so within 1,000 feet of a park.  Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of those judgments.  Finding no errors that warrant reversal of the appellant’s convictions for selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine in counts 1 and 2, those convictions are affirmed.  However, upon remand, the trial court is to consider whether the appellant’s mandatory thirty-year sentences should be served consecutively.
 

Petitioner, Bert Newby, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s post-conviction petition after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts his trial counsel at the trial where Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated assault rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Charles Pennington, charging him with first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm in the commission of a felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was found not guilty of employing a firearm in the commission of a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life for the murder conviction, and by agreement with the State, to a concurrent sentence of twelve years for attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Justin B. Conrad (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and theft of property of $1,000 or more.  The trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction and sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions.  See State v. Justin Brian Conrad, No. M2008-01342-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3103776, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

Petitioner, Jonathan Tears, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.  On appeal, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying the petition because the State violated his constitutional rights by withholding material exculpatory information, and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  More specifically, Petitioner contends that the State (1) failed to disclose a statement made by the victim; (2) failed to disclose the statement of Ashton Davis; (3) failed to disclose the statement of Felice O’Neal; (4) failed to disclose the statement of Tangelia Alexander; and (5) failed to disclose payment from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund.  Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) failing to “investigate, interview, subpoena, and call to the stand” Shelby Harris, Darron Little, Alexander Harris, Jarrod Robinson, Zeldra Swaggerty, and Adriana Cross; (2) failing to request Jenck’s material and cross-examine the victim concerning his statement to Detective Oliver; (3) failing to request a ballistics expert to testify at trial; and (4) failing to investigate and assert the defense of self-defense.  Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective on direct appeal for failing to raise Brady issues.  Following our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief and remand this cause for a new trial.
 

The Petitioner, Gregory Eidson, appeals as of right from the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Brandy Lea Birdwell, contends that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, citing the following bases:  (1) failure to provide a copy of discovery; (2) failure to adequately prepare and advise the Petitioner prior to her testimony; (3) failure to request a jury out hearing before the State impeached the Petitioner with a pending criminal charge; (4) failure to conduct a proper investigation with a private detective; and (5) failure to subpoena a material witness at the Petitioner’s request.  After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.  
 

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Terrance Antonio Cecil, No. M2011-01210-SC-R3-CD, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013).   See State v. Glenn Lydell McCray, No. M2011-02411-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2013), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).  Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that although the jury was not properly instructed pursuant to State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the judgments of the trial court.  Upon further review, we conclude that the omission of the White instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.  The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

I respectfully dissent. Defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment for two counts of aggravated assault against the victim. One of the convictions for aggravated assault resulted from the allegations in the indictment that Defendant

did cause [the victim] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, and [Defendant] did use or display a deadly weapon, to-wit: a rifle, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-102[.]

The other conviction for aggravated assault resulted from the allegations in the indictment that Defendant

did cause [the victim] to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury, and [Defendant] did use or display a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-102[.]

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Darryl Thomas Harmon, guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court.  Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.