APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

General Oils Company ("plaintiff") filed suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County against the Assessor of Property for Hamilton County ("Hamilton County Assessor") and the Tennessee State Board of Equalization ("Board of Equalization") seeking judicial review of the decision by the Assessment Appeals Commission ("AAC") of the Board of Equalization that for tax assessment purposes plaintiff's petroleum storage tanks located in Hamilton County were real property. The chancellor reversed the AAC, holding that the tanks were personal property. On appeal Hamilton County Assessor and Board of Equalization present one issue 1On appeal the Board of Equalization only challenges the lower court's action to the effect that tanks are automatically considered tangible personal property under T.C.A. § 67-5-903(f) for property tax purposes. Because the broader issue raised by Hamilton County Assessor in essence encompasses this secondary issue, we approach this case from the standpoint of Hamilton County Assessor. 2 for our consideration: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the storage tanks should be classified as personal property for tax assessment purposes.1 For the reasons hereinafter stated, we find no error and affirm.

This appeal involves a venue dispute. Plaintiff, Sue McGee, appeals from the order of the Circuit Court for the Twenty-Second Judicial District in Maury County, Tennessee, that dismissed her suit against defendants, First National Bank and Neal Lovlace, for improper venue. The record in the case consists of what was formerly called the technical record and a "transcript of proceedings" which has no testimony and contains only argument and statements of counsel and the court.

On June 28, 1994, Plaintiff Jack Keller sued the defendants in the Davidson County Circuit Court claiming a breach of fiduciary duty by fraudulently failing to disclose the contents of a contract amendment signed in 1960. Jordan Keller, to whom a part of the contract rights had been assigned, joined his father as plaintiff.

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Shade T. Underwood, Jr., from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment and violations of civil rights. The sole issue presented by petitioner is "[w]hether the trial court properly dismissed the petition for want of prosecution."

In this action, plaintiff was awarded judgment for work performed under a contract, and defendant has appealed, insisting that plaintiff did not perform in accordance with the agreement between the parties.

Appellant, Gordon Burks, (Burks) brought this negligence action against Appellee, Pride Construction Company, Inc., (Pride) and various other defendants, in the Circuit Court of Shelby County. Pride's motion for summary judgment was granted and, from that judgment, Burks appeals.

I respectfully dissent from part I of the majority opinion holding that the appellants have standing to maintain this action under the Declaratory Judgment Act. In my opinion this case does not involve present rights that have accrued under presently existing facts. See Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. App. 1992).

Appellant D. Dean Graves ("Graves") appeals the chancellor's decision requiring 2 Graves to specifically perform a contract by purchasing an $85,000 parcel of real estate offered for sale by the Appellees, Donald L. Mott ("Mott") and Murl Kennamore ("Kennamore").

Indian Hills ClubHomeowners' Association ("Plaintiff"), filed suit against Clayton and Cindy Cooper ("Defendants"), seeking an injunction prohibiting Defendants from building a driveway extension/parking pad and walkway onto their property. The trial court granted Plaintiff a permanent injunction, holding that the proposed construction would violate certain restrictions of record that prohibited any construction or improvements without approval from the Board of Directors of the Indian Hills  Homeowners' Association. Defendants have raised three issues for our consideration: (1) whether the Plaintiff's denial of Defendants' application and approval rested upon a lawful and legitimate basis; (2) whether the  Board's decision to deny the application was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of control; and (3) whether it would be unfair and inequitable to enforce the restrictive covenant. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the decision of the trial court and order that the injunction be dissolved.

This case comes before us as an interlocutory appeal pursuant to T.R.A.P. 9. The 1This suit was originally filed by a total of fifteen limited partnerships. The claims of the five Keystone Partnerships; to wit: Keystone 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Keystone 1983-2 Oil an Gas Drilling Partnership; Keystone 1984-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Keystone 1984-2 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; and Midco 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership, are not at issue in this appeal. 2 Appellant, Citizens Bank of Tennessee (hereinafter "Citizens"), appeals the chancellor's denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiffs below, a group of ten
limited partnerships; to wit: Exchequer Associates Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership 1982-1; Exchequer 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Exchequer 1983-2 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnerships; Exchequer Synergy 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; First Energy 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; First Energy 1984-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Overlord 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Overlord II 1984-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Overlord III 1984 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; and Overlord IV 1984 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership (hereinafter "Partnerships").1

Kenneth O. Burnett and Vickie S. Burnett ("plaintiffs") filed suit in the Davidson County Circuit Court against Frank E. Krisle, individually and d/b/a Elite Electric ("defendant") seeking damages resulting from a fire caused by defendant's negligence that destroyed plaintiffs' home. The jury awarded plaintiffs compensatory damages in the amount of $90,733.56, reduced by a finding that plaintiffs were ten percent (10%) at fault. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied. On appeal defendant has presented three issues for our consideration: (1) whether there was any material evidence in the record to support the jury verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant defendant a new trial or a remittitur; and (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to present a witness for testifying after defendant had rested his case. We find no error and affirm.