APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This suit was filed by Plaintiffs Giles E. Roberson and his wife Hazel B. Roberson against Defendants Mary Margaret (Darwin) Wasson and Pug Martin, individually , and D/B/A Century 21 Pug Martin Realty. The Plaintiffs sought to have the Court declare that a strip of land approximately 18 feet in width, titled in the name of Mrs. Wasson, which lay between separate tracts owned by them (see appendix) "to have been abandoned and to be non-existent." The complaint was later amended to advance the theory of adverse possession, and still later to add as parties Defendant Stephen N. Snyder and wife Barbara L. Snyder, who had purchased the property from Mrs. Wasson.

The husband of a woman who suffered a fatal heart attack shortly after being discharged from a hospital emergency room filed a medical malpractice suit against the treating doctor and the medical group for which he worked. The trial court dismissed the claim against the defendant doctor because the plaintiff failed to obtain service on him. A summary judgment was subsequently granted to the defendant medical group on the ground of the plaintiff’s failure to produce a qualified affidavit on the proper standard of care and on causation, as is required by the Medical Malpractice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. We affirm the trial court.

he plaintiff/ex-husband has appealed from the dismissal of his post-divorce decree
petition seeking relief from child support and change of custody.

The captioned petitioner has appealed from the dismissal of his suit to enroll and modify a foreign divorce decree.

This appeal involves a marriage that failed in less than three years. The husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Sequatchie County seeking a divorce and the enforcement of the parties’ prenuptial agreement. The wife also requested a divorce and challenged the validity of the prenuptial agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129(b) (1991) and upheld the prenuptial agreement. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the parties their personal property and directed the husband to assume certain credit card indebtedness and to provide the wife medical insurance for up to thirty-six months. Both parties take issue with various portions of the final divorce decree on this appeal. We have determined that the trial court erred by failing to consider the husband’s income earned during the marriage as marital property. Accordingly, we modify the division of marital property and the award of spousal support.

This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs, Lisa and Ricky Prince, are  husband and wife. Lisa Prince ("Plaintiff") was injured during out-patient surgery, allegedly as a result of improperly administered anesthetic.  Initially, the suit was brought against Coffee Medical Center, Dr.  Ramprasand (the surgeon), and Michael Cruz (the nurse anesthetist).  Dr. Ramprasand and Cruz settled with Plaintiffs and were dismissed prior to this action. Plaintiff alleges on appeal that Coffee Medical Center ("CMC") was negligent in failing to establish adequate anesthetic policies and procedures and in failing to enforce its own anesthesia policies and procedures. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CMC and Plaintiff has appealed. For the reasons stated below, we reverse.

This is an appeal of a nonjury action in chancery form originally brought to rescind a contract for the sale of real estate and for damages to real property. The complaint was filed on January 22, 1 1991. Four separate hearings have been held in this cause. The first hearing was held without intervention of a jury. The second and third hearings were heard in the presence of a jury, and the fourth hearing in this cause was held without a jury. Following the fourth trial in the Chancery Court of GilesCounty, Tennessee, the chancellor entered a judgment against appellant for $22,279.59. The defendant, Earl Laursen, timely filed a notice of appeal from the final order entered January 9, 1995. The defendant, Delorita Laursen, did not perfect her appeal by filing a notice of appeal and is not before this Court. See, e.g., Town of Carthage, Tennessee, et al. v. Smith County, Tennessee, No. 01-A-01-9308-CH-00391 (Tenn. App., March 8, 1995). The appeal by the defendant/appellant, Earl Laursen, has been perfected and is properly before this Court. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in not having a jury hear the fourth case and in assessing damages to the real property. We reverse and remand for reasons that will hereinafter be shown.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.