APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a suit by Scott McCluen, County Attorney for Roane County, against The Roane County Times, Inc., D/B/A The Standard, and its owner and publisher Gerald Largen, seeking damages for libel incident to two separate publications in The Standard.

I agree that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. I join in Judge Tipton's concurring opinion because I believe that this record is adequate for our full appellate review. I am of the opinion that the procedures outlined in State v. Winsett, 882 S.W.2d 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) have been followed.

This current litigation is what we shall call economic fallout from an earlier domestic relations case. Linda Ann Carlton (“plaintiff”) filed suit for divorce in 1990 from James Thomas Carlton (“defendant”) in the Chancery Court of Haywood County. In October 1991, the chancellor granted plaintiff a divorce from defendant on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment, awarded joint custody of the parties’ 28 year-old handicapped daughter, Donna, with the principal place of residence with plaintiff, divided the parties’ marital property, and awarded rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees to plaintiff. Defendant appealed to this court. The primary issues presented on appeal related to the custody of the parties’ daughter, the division of marital property, and the award of rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees to plaintiff. The record reflects that the marital property was valued in excess of two million dollars ($2,000,000), with defendant and plaintiff receiving slightly over one million dollars ($1,000,000) each as a result of the chancellor’s decree.

James E. Simons and Margaret B. Simons (“plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Madison County against Herbert H. Replogle, Jr. (“defendant”) for the purpose of establishing a common boundary line between the parties. Following a bench trial the chancellor established the parties’ common boundary line based on the calls in defendant’s deed. On appeal plaintiffs have presented one issue for our review: whether the evidence preponderates against the chancellor’s finding. In our opinion, the chancellor did err and we accordingly reverse.

The determinative issue on appeal is whether the appeal should be dismissed because the appellant did not file notice of the appeal with the clerk of the appellate court designated in the notice of appeal.

Daniel P. Taylor (“claimant”) filed this suit against the State of Tennessee (?defendant” or “State”) in the Tennessee Claims Commission for damages he allegedly sustained due to the malpractice of his court- appointed attorney. The Claims Commission granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the commissioner erred in so doing. We find no error and affirm.

While I concede tha the majority opinion is technically correct and the reasoning employed comports with previous case law, I observe that this Court, or at least this member of this Court, has routinely overruled such motions when the only defect as to the serviceof thenotice of appeal is failure to file a copy with the Clerk of this Court.

The issues in this appeal are (1) whether the chancellor erred in granting a judgment against a corporation for back wages, (2) whether the chancellor should have pierced the corporate veil and granted a judgment against the corporation’s principal shareholder and (3) whether the court erred in dismissing the fraud claims against the principal shareholder. We affirm the chancellor’s decision in part and reverse on the fraud claims made directly against the principal shareholder.

The plaintiff, Evelyn June Thomason, has appealed from a summary judgment
dismissing her suit against the defendant, Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, Tennessee, for personal injuries sustained in a fall on the premises of the
Lentz Health Center, a facility owned and managed by the defendant.

The determinative issue on appeal is whether the appeals should be dismissed because the appellant did not file notice of the appeal with the clerk of the appellant court designated in the notice of appeal.