APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves an inmate’s challenge to the denial of his application for parole by the Tennessee Board of Paroles. After serving approximately ten years ofa 35-year sentence for aggravated rape, the inmate filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Tennessee Board of Paroles was illegally and arbitrarily declining to honor his plea bargain agreement. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and because it was not timely filed. The inmate has appealed pro se. We concur that the petition was not timely filed and affirm its dismissal in accordance with Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b).1

After a 1996 divorce by the Circuit Court of Davidson County the husband filed an independent damages action in the chancery court, alleging that the wife fraudulently induced him to enter into the divorce settlement. The wife filed a Rule 60.02 motion in the divorce court seeking a declaration that she was not guilty of fraud. The divorce court ruled that the chancery court was bound by the circuit court’s judgment and that the husband must pay $2500 in attorney’s fees to the wife for services in the Rule 60.02 motion. We reverse.

Plaintiff, Robert E. Mayers, acting pro se in this medical malpractice action, appeals the decision of the Circuit Court of Davidson County denying his application for relief under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 60.02 from a final summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants.

This appeal involves an interstate contract dispute over ten pairs of emu chicks. Two Tennessee residents declined to honor their contract to purchase the chicks after the Arkansas breeders attempted to substitute chicks different from those advertised for sale. The breeders filed a breach of contract suit in Arkansas against the purchasers seeking to recover the unpaid purchase price, and the purchasers filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County seeking to recover their down payment as well as treble damages and attorney’s fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After the breeders obtained a judgment in Arkansas against the purchasers, they moved to dismiss the purchasers’ Tennessee lawsuit on the ground that the Arkansas judgment was res judicata to the purchasers’ Tennessee claims. The trial court agreed and dismissed the purchasers’ claims. On this appeal, the purchasers assert that the Arkansas judgment should not have precluded them from pursuing their Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims in Tennessee. We agree because the Arkansas court did not have the power to award the full measure of relief the purchasers are seeking in the Tennessee proceedings.
 

This case involves an exclusion in an automobile liability policy for a person operating the automobile without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so. The Circuit Court of Davidson County dismissed the insurance company’s action for a declaratory judgment. We reverse, and declare that the exclusion precluded coverage by the company.

This dispute concerns an award of alimony and attorney’s fees. Appellant, Dennis T. Crouse (Husband), appeals from the trial court’s order granting alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees to Appellee, Charlane Allen Crouse (Wife).

Plaintiff Chase Cavett Services, Inc. (Chase) appeals an order of the chancery court granting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Defendant Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. (Brandon). Because we find that the chancery court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Brandon, we reverse the ruling of the chancellor.

This appeal involves a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Appellant, Lorenzo Carlos Pfeifer, appeals from the order of the Circuit Court in Obion County which found him a delinquent child because he was guilty of the offense of aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000.00. Appellant was committed to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services for an indeterminate term. The only issue presented for review is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pfeifer committed the offense of aggravated burglary and theft of property over $1,000.00.

Gehl Corporation filed suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County to contest an assessment by the Commissioner of Revenue of the "Amusement Tax" imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-212(a)(2).

This is a domestic relations case. The appellant complains of the award of the residence to the appellee, and the award of the attorney’s fees. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is de novo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d); Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996). Where there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material fact, the question on appeal is one of law, and the scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness accompanying a chancellor's conclusions of law. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1993).

Steve Makris appeals the trial court’s denial of his claim for accrued and unpaid salaries in this partnership accounting and dissolution case. For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
 

Megan Harmon (“Megan” or “Appellant”), minor child born during the marriage of Plaintiff/Appellee, Todd Harmon (“Mr. Harmon” or “Appellee”) and Defendant Janet Harmon (“Mrs. Harmon”), by and through her Guardian Ad Litem (G.A.L.), appeals the decision of the trial court which found that Appellee was not the biological father of Appellant, and incorporated into the decree of divorce the marital dissolution agreement in which the parties agreed Appellee would have no further obligation to the child.

The parental relationship between Tamra Viar and her daughter, Katelyn, was terminated by the Juvenile Court, the propriety of which she presents for review. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is de novo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.

This is a divorce case. In the original divorce, years ago, the wife was awarded shares of stock from the husband’s p ension fund. Subs equently, the pension fund was distributed to the husband, with no monies going to the wife. In this action, the trial court awarded the wife a judgment for the value o f the stock at the time of the trial co urt’s order. The husband appeals. We affirm.

This controversy may, perhaps, be described as a boundary dispute. The development of Riverview Estates Subdivision began in 1971 with the recordation of a plat which provided for a cul-de-sac fifty feet in width centered on the West boundary of Lot 23.

This is a domestic relations dispute involving money only. The trial court held that a certificate of deposit and one investment account were the separate property of Husband and declined to award Wife alimony or the total amount of her attorney fees. She appeals and presents these issues for review.

This appeal involves the validity of certain transactions entered into by the holder of a power of attorney. The trial court set aside the transactions finding that the attorney in fact had failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence which arose in light of these self-benefitting transactions. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This action is based on a series of contracts executed in the sale of an industrial dust control and laundry business. The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed the claims of the sellers, held that one of the sellers had breached one of the agreements but that the buyer had failed to prove its damages, and awarded the buyer attorneys’ fees. We reverse the dismissal of the sellers’ action and modify the award of attorneys’ fees.

Benton County appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to H & W Environmental Services, Inc. (H&W) and Waste Management, Inc. of Tennessee (Waste Management) and denying summary judgment to Benton County. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Plaintiff, Jeri St. John (“St. John” or “Appellant”) appeals the trial court’s judgment 2 in favor of Defendant, Beer Permit Board (“Beer Board” or “Appellee”) denying St. John a beer permit for her business “Jeri’s” n/k/a “The Foxy Lady.”