APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff’s residential property in Hamilton County was sold for delinquent property taxes after default judgment was entered against Plaintiff, the property owner. Plaintiff brought suit against the subsequent tax sale purchaser, and others, to set aside the default judgment and sale, asserting process had not been served properly on him in the delinquent tax suit. The Trial Court found that certified mail return receipts signed by Plaintiff’s wife were sufficient proof of service under T.R.C.P. 4.04(10) and T.C.A. § 67-5-2415(e)(1), and granted summary judgment to the tax sale purchaser of the property and the other Defendants. Plaintiff argues on appeal that he was not served properly with process, first arguing that he was not served at all and then arguing that the statutory service procedure relied upon by the Trial Court violates due process. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. 

Following entry of judgment on a jury verdict, the Trial Court granted Defendants a new trial based upon allegations in the affidavit of one of the jurors. Plaintiff was granted interlocutory appeal limited to whether or not the Trial Court erred in granting Defendants’ Motion For New Trial based
on the information contained in the juror’s affidavit submitted by Defendants in support of their Motion For New Trial. Because the affidavit does not fall under any of the three exceptions to exclusion of juror testimony found in T.R.E. 606(b), the Trial Court erred in accepting the affidavit
into evidence on the issue of a new trial. No other evidence supported Defendants’ motion for new trial. Because no admissible evidence was properly before the Court, the Order for new trial is reversed and this lawsuit remanded for enforcement of the judgment previously entered on the verdict of the jury. 

The plaintiff, a mid-level executive of the Town of Oliver Springs, “borrowed” various sums of money from a citizen of the Town over a three-year period which she repaid with sexual favors. When this activity came to light she was fired by the Mayor and City Administrator. Her suit, claiming breach of contract and discriminatory employment practices, was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. This appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
 

Judge Franks.
The majority affirms the Trial Judge’s summary dismissal of plaintiff’s action, and
I concur in the affirmance of the dismissal on the basis that plaintiff was either estopped or has
waived her right to maintain this action.

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court properly awarded as discretionary costs fees of the defendant’s expert witnesses who did not testify because the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit on the day of trial before any proof was taken. The fees in question were charged by the defendant’s medical experts for reserving time in their schedules to testify, thereby precluding any other income-producing professional activities. The award of discretionary costs is affirmed.

Plaintiff, a licensed affiliate real estate broker, sued to collect a commission for locating a particular property for a prospective buyer. When the sellers refused to sell the property, the prospective buyer abandoned efforts to obtain the property. About six weeks later, the prospective buyer contacted one of the sellers and was able to negotiate with all of the sellers for purchase of the property and ultimately consummated the purchase for a higher sale price than originally contemplated. Plaintiff alleges that she had an oral agreement for $150,000.00 commission, or, alternatively, that she was acting as a facilitator and entitled to a commission for her services as such. From the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant, plaintiff has appealed. Tenn.R.App.P. 3, Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court affirmed
 

This appeal arises from a dispute over whether Defendant Robert Shropshire personally guaranteed the debts of Defendant Inn-Way, Inc., to Plaintiff Custom Interiors & Supply Company, Inc. Custom Interiors sued Inn-Way to recover the sum of $54,537.30 for orders placed by Inn-Way after October 1996. Custom Interiors also sued Inn-Way’s president and owner, Robert Shropshire, contending that Shropshire had personally guaranteed Inn-Way’s debts to Custom Interiors. After Inn-Way filed for bankruptcy protection, Custom Interiors proceeded to trial against Shropshire. The trial court entered a judgment finding that Custom Interiors had failed to carry its burden of proof and that Shropshire was not a personal guarantor of Inn-Way’s debts to Custom Interiors. We affirm the trial court’s judgment based upon our conclusion that the evidence does not preponderate against these findings. 

This appeal arises from a dispute over whether a commercial lease was renewed. After lessors notified lessee that the lease had not been renewed, lessee filed for declaratory judgment on the issue of whether renewal notice was given timely, asserting an alternative ground of equitable relief from performance under the “special circumstances” doctrine. Lessors asserted the equitable maxim of unclean hands, averring that lessee created false evidence to attempt to establish timely compliance with the lease renewal requirement. Both sides moved for summary judgment, and the Chancellor entered judgment for lessee based upon the finding of “special circumstances” to excuse untimely performance by lessee, noting that issues of material fact exist as to timely notice. On this appeal, lessors allege error by the Chancellor’s award of equitable relief without resolving the unclean hands issue, along with error in the finding of “special circumstances,” and error in denying lessors’ counterclaim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Because resolution of the issue of whether or not renewal notice was given timely is both necessary and dispostive of all other issues raised in this lawsuit, the order of the Chancellor awarding summary judgment to lessee is reversed, and this lawsuit remanded for trial.

This appeal involves a dispute over the proceeds of the sale of a family farm by a life tenant with an unlimited power of disposition. Following the life tenant’s death, the remaindermen named in the life tenant’s husband’s will filed suit in the Chancery Court for Marshall County against the executrix of the life tenant’s estate, the estate itself, and the beneficiaries named in the life tenant’s will asserting that the life tenant lacked capacity to sell the farm, that the executrix had unduly influenced the life tenant to sell the farm, and that the executrix had tortiously interfered with their inheritance from the life tenant’s husband. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found no lack of capacity or undue influence but determined that the remaindermen have an interest in the proceeds of the sale of the farm. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the lawyer the remaindermen had discharged earlier in the proceeding. The life tenant’s estate and her executrix now appeal the conclusion that the remaindermen named in her husband’s will have an interest in the proceeds of the sale; while the remaindermen appeal from the dismissal of their lack of capacity, undue influence, and intentional interference with inheritance claims and the award of fees to their former lawyer. We have determined that the trial court correctly concluded that the life tenant was capable of selling the farm, that her executrix did not unduly influence her decision, and that the remaindermen’s former attorney was entitled to payment. We have also determined that the life tenant’s sale of the farm terminated the remaindermen’s interest as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment awarding the remaindermen $269,420.89 and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
 

This is a negligent supervision lawsuit. The plaintiff rented a unit from the defendants' selfstorage facility. An employee of the self-storage facility stole the plaintiff's property and disappeared. The plaintiff sued the storage facility and its owners, alleging negligent supervision of the dishonest employee. A jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded compensatory damages. The defendants appeal. We reverse, finding that the plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence to support a finding of negligent supervision.
 

This is an interlocutory appeal from the Trial Judge’s refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement
entered by the parties. Defendant has appealed. We reverse and remand with instructions to enforce the arbitration agreement. Tenn. R. App. P.3 Interlocutory Appeal by Permission from the Trial Court; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed.
 

Plaintiff, an inmate in Brushy Mountain State Penitentiary, appeals the Trial Court’s dismissal of his civil suit for damages allegedly incurred as a result of the “capricious, arbitrary and unjust” operation of the Inmate Grievance Procedure, for “malfeasance”, and for “civil rights intimidation.” The Trial Court found that (1) the doctrine of res judicata prevents Plaintiff’s suit on one of his alleged claims because judgment has been entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee on that claim; (2) all of Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory except for that one claim already resolved, and, therefore, do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (3) with respect to Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in the Tennessee Department of Correction grievance policy, and, therefore, that allegation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s Statement of Issues in this appeal alleges abuse of discretion by the Trial Court “by dismissing his civil rights claims” and cites Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-701, 4-21-702 and 4-21-801. Construing Plaintiff’s pro se appeal liberally, we deem it as challenging all three bases upon which the Trial Court dismissed his Complaint. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.