APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff, People's Bank of Elk Valley ("People's Bank"), appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendant, American Banker's Financial Services, Inc. ("American") and dismissing People's Bank's complaint.

This divorce action involves dissolution of the 25 year marriage between Appellant, Cheryl Ann Cupples ("Wife"), and Appellee, Luther Wayne Cupples ("Husband"). Wife filed for divorce in September 1992, citing irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Husband counterclaimed for divorce alleging inappropriate marital conduct. Both parties sought custody of their minor son, Jonathan, age 10 at the time of trial.1 On appeal, Wife cites as error the trial court's award of an absolute divorce and custody of the child to Husband, its failure to award her alimony and its division of the marital estate. For reasons hereinafter expressed, we affirm.

This appeal involves the custody of a four-year-old girl. After slightly more than two years of marriage, the mother filed a divorce petition in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County requesting custody of the parties’ only child. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced and awarded custody to the mother. The husband asserts on this appeal that he is comparatively more fit than the mother to have custody. We agree and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s award of custody to the mother.

The Defendant appeals a judgment entered by the Blount County Circuit Court awarding the Plaintiffs discretionary costs including attorney fees. This appeal arises from an earlier action (second lawsuit) seeking specific performance of a settlement agreement resolving the original lawsuit filed by the Defendant.

Appellant, Dr. Alexander C. Wells, was a professor at Tennessee State University ("TSU"). He was relieved of his teaching duties in 1992 and was asked to remove his property from the office and laboratory space he occupied at TSU. He moved some of his belongings in 1995. His remaining belongings were boxed and moved to the campus warehouse in 1996 because the space had been reassigned. When he retrieved his belongings in 1997, he found several items missing. Appellant then brought a claim in the Tennessee Claims Commission asking the State of Tennessee to return his property or, in the alternative, give him monetary compensation for the lost items. The Commission held that TSU had not been negligent in the care, custody and control of appellant's property. Therefore, the State was not liable for the missing property. We affirm the decision of the Commission.

This is an action by the appellant, Cultra Landscaping Supply Company (Cultra), seeking to recover the balance allegedly due on an open account. Cultra’s complaint, as amended, was filed against the Director of Highways, Department of Transportation, W. L. Sharpe Contracting Company, Inc. (Sharpe) and Charles Hill, individually and d/b/a C. H. Hill Landscape and 2The Director of Highways was named as a defendant pursuant to T.C.A. § 54-5-124 (civil actions against contractors by claimants). Cultra’s complaint states that it “seeks no remedies” against Sharpe, but acts to put the latter “on notice” of said claim having been filed with the Department of Transportation. Prior to trial, a summary judgment was entered in favor of Sharpe. The order granting summary judgment provided that the State of Tennessee and the Department of Transportation were to retain certain funds to satisfy Cultra’s claim in the event it proved meritorious at trial, in accordance with T.C.A. § 54-5-123. After trial, an agreed order was entered with this Court dismissing the Department of Transportation, Director of Highways as a party. 2 Excavating (Hill). For purposes of this appeal, however, the only other party before us is Hill, the appellee.2 A bench trial resulted in a judgment for Hill. Cultra appeals on the sole basis that the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court’s findings. For reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm.

This is an unemployment compensation case. Petitioner, Loretta Trull, appeals from the order of the chancery court dismissing her petition for certiorari and affirming the decision of the Board of Review that disallowed her claim for unemployment compensation benefits.

This is a suit for damages against an insurance company for the alleged breach of a lawyer’s professional liability insurance policy. Plaintiff, Glenn McColpin, appeals from the judgment of the chancery court for the defendant, North Atlantic Casualty & Surety Insurance 2 Company, Inc. (hereinafter, “North Atlantic”).

This is a Rule 9 appeal from a judgment denying the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The issue is whether an insurance agent has the apparent authority to waive the conditions for issuance of a policy and the limitations on his authority as contained in the application for the policy. We hold that the agent has no such authority and therefore grant the motions for summary judgment.

In this suit wherein the Plaintiff, Thomas a. Smythe, seeks damages against the Defendant, Donald Cowan, for willfully interfering with contractual relations between Mr. Smythe and Phil Jones, the Trial Court granted summary judgment because in his opinion the Statute of Limitations barred the claim asserted. We affirm.

Pursuant to the wife's motion under Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., the trial court amended the division of the husband's Navy pension contained in an agreed order of divorce. We reverse the trial court's judgment.

In this wrongful death action, Plaintiff-Appellant Mary Kindred (Plaintiff), on her own behalf and as next of kin of Marcus Briggs, appeals the trial court’s judgment entered in favor of Defendants-Appellees Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, Willie Anderson, and Raybon Hawkins (Defendants).

The Appellant, Michael Anthony Pike, appeals as of right his sentences for simple possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He argues on appeal that the trial judge erred by not placing him in community corrections or, in the alternative, by not giving him the minimum statutory sentences. After a careful review of the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The plaintiff’s employer had a generous profit-sharing plan to which the plaintiff was not required to contribute. The trial judge declined to treat this fund as marital property because the “plaintiff didn’t earn it, and the defendant didn’t contribute to it.”

The defendant, Elton Donald Bowers, also known as Rashid Qawwi, was convicted of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ in the commission of the robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-307. The trial court ordered the weapons conviction merged with the aggravated robbery, classified the defendant as a career offender, and imposed a thirty-year sentence.

This appeal from the Washington County Chancery Court concerns whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow the testimony of an expert witness in accordance with a local rule. The Appellant, Jami Allyson Ross Carter, appeals the decision of the Chancery Court. We vacate the decision of the Trial Court.

This appeal came on to be heard upon the record from the Circuit Court of Knox County and briefs filed on behalf of the respective parties. Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there is reversible error in the trial court's judgment.

In this action, Plaintiff Eddie Heath (“Heath”) filed a pro se complaint for declaratory judgment to determine whether he provides a taxable service under the Business Tax Act. Heath brought suit against A.C. Gilless (“Gilless”), the Shelby County Sheriff, Jayne S. Creson (“Creson”), the Shelby County Clerk, as well as two employees of the Shelby County Clerk’s Office, Waylon Wininger (“Wininger”) and Pat Hutchinson (“Hutchinson”). The trial court dismissed Heath’s complaint, finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.

Eldred L. Reid (Plaintiff) sued Jason Petty (Defendant) for “pain and suffering with mental stress” alleged to have resulted from the defendant’s failure to timely respond to Plaintiff’s request for pain medication. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Defendant on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and that the defendant was immune pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8- 307(h).