APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the dissolution of a 28-year marriage by default. The wife filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Maury County and, after the husband failed to file a timely answer, filed for a default judgment. The trial court granted the default judgment even though the husband had filed an answer and counterclaim on the day before the hearing and later denied the husband's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.02 motion to set aside the default. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the default judgment but erred by refusing to later set the default judgment aside.

The Trial Court ordered the father to pay one-half of the daughter's college expenses pursuant to the parties' Marital Dissolution Agreement, and reimburse the mother for one-half of expenses already paid. On appeal, we affirm.

This appeal is the continuation of a protracted dispute between Tennessee State University and a faculty member stemming from his termination for sexually harassing a student. After the courts vacated the dismissal, the university and the Tennessee Board of Regents established a process of transitional reinstatement. The professor objected and refused to report to work. Thereafter, the professor filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Davdison County to hold the university and the board in contempt. The trial court heard the matter without a jury and declined to hold either the university or the board in contempt. The professor has appealed. We affirm because orders declining to grant contempt petitions are not appealable.

This case is an appeal from a wrongful death claim in which the Defendant was found only fifty percent at fault. The Plaintiffs appeal to this Court for review of two procedural issues. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological father whose daughter was surrendered to a licensed child-placing agency without his knowledge. Soon after notifying the biological father that it had custody of the child, the agency filed a petition in the Davidson County Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court concluded that the biological father had abandoned his daughter and that the child’s best interests required terminating her biological father’s parental rights. We have determined that the agency has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the biological father has abandoned his daughter.
 

I disagree with the standard of review employed by the court in this case for the reasons
discussed at more length in In Re Z.J.S., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 21266854, at
*18-22 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 3, 2003) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed; Estate of Acuff v.
O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527, 533-37 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2001). However, I would reach the same result
employing the standard of review recited in Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527 at 537. Therefore,
I concur with the court’s decision to reverse the order terminating R.G.L.’s parental rights.

In this appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County the Plaintiff/Appellant, Peggy Pistole, argues that the trial court erred in excluding witness testimony upon grounds that their identity was not disclosed in Ms. Pistole's response to interrogatories. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

This appeal is the second in a 24 year long dispute over a proposed raceway in Lincoln County. After hearing additional proof as this Court required in West v. Luna, No. 01A01-9707-CH-00281, 1998 WL 467106 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998), the trial court entered a new injunction prohibiting the defendant Luna from operating a race track on Old Boonshill Road in Lincoln County. In this appeal, Mr. Luna challenges the trial court's injunction as noncompliant with our decision in the first appeal, and in imposing a noise limitation effectively making the race track a nuisance per se. We affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves the lower court's award of a garnishment judgment against Accuride Corporation, as well as its subsequent denial of Accuride's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the lower court and remand for further proceedings.