APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this appeal, the ex-husband challenges the trial court's order denying his post-divorce petition to modify alimony and finding him in "technical contempt." We find that the proof is inadequate to establish willful efforts to defeat alimony obligations, that his change of employment was not voluntary and that a substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred, justifying some relief from the alimony obligation. The trial court did not err in holding the ex-husband to be in contempt. We reverse the judgment in part, affirm the judgment in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

By pre-complaint Petition under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 27, insureds seek to obtain from their insurer copies of previous unsworn oral statements given to an adjuster before they will submit to a statement under oath pursuant to their obligations under the policy. The trial court granted the Petition, and insurer appeals. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the Petition.

Plaintiff's action for libel against defendants was dismissed on grounds the action was time-barred. We affirm.

The Trial Judge refused to onerate an individual associated with defendant corporation with an obligation of the corporation which had been discharged in bankruptcy. On appeal, we affirm.

Plaintiff homeowners sued Defendant pest control operators for negligent misrepresentation and breach of warranty relative to the issuance by the Defendants of a wood destroying insect infestation inspection report pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-21-201 to 206. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Because civil liability is limited by section 62-21-202 and Plaintiffs allege no damages caused by the presence of wood-destroying insects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The narrow question presented by this appeal is whether Tennessee recognizes the tort of negligent misrepresentation by nondisclosure. While the Sears family’s complaint faces a daunting battle on other fronts, I would not extinguish it at this stage of the proceeding by holding as a matter of law that a professional person cannot supply the false information required by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977) by silence.

 

Because the record confirms that the appellant did not perfect an appeal from an adverse decision of the general sessions court within ten days of that decision, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the late attempted appeal.

These consolidated claims against the State of Tennessee ("State") arise out of an automobile accident which resulted in the death of James R. Madison and personal injury to Mary E. Madison, Kenneth R. Madison, and Wilma J. Madison (collectively referred to as "Claimants"). The State filed a motion for summary judgment which the Claims Commission ("Commission") granted based primarily on Claimants' failure to file a timely response. The Commission later set aside its order granting the State's summary judgment motion and ordered Claimants to file a response to that motion no later than March 19, 2003. Claimants filed their response to the motion for summary judgment on March 18, 2003. On May 14, 2003, apparently acting under the misapprehension that Claimants still had not responded to the motion for summary judgment, the Commission dismissed the claims based on Claimants' violation of its previous order directing them to respond. We vacate the dismissal of these claims and remand for further proceedings.

This is a legal malpractice case. The client filed suit in federal court against a municipality for the
death of her husband under the Governmental Tort Liability Act and U.S.C. § 1983. The federal
court dismissed the GTLA claim but retained the §1983 claims. The client dismissed her attorneys, hired new counsel and filed the GTLA claim in state court. The state court dismissed the GTLA claim because, while the GTLA claim was pending in federal court, the applicable statute of limitations expired. The client sued her original attorneys for malpractice. Shortly thereafter, the client settled the remaining § 1983 claims against the municipality. The defendant attorneys filed a motion for summary judgment in the malpractice case, arguing that the settlement with the municipality on the §1983 claims mandated dismissal of the legal malpractice claim. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion. The client appealed. We reverse, holding that the damages sought in the legal malpractice lawsuit are separate and distinct from the damages sought in the underlying lawsuit, and therefore settlement of the underlying lawsuit does not shield the former attorneys from liability.
 

This appeal is the continuation of a protracted dispute between Tennessee State University and a faculty member stemming from his termination for sexually harassing a student. After the courts vacated the dismissal, the university and the Tennessee Board of Regents established a process of transitional reinstatement. The professor objected and refused to report to work. Thereafter, the professor filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Davdison County to hold the university and the board in contempt. The trial court heard the matter without a jury and declined to hold either the university or the board in contempt. The professor has appealed. We affirm because orders declining to grant contempt petitions are not appealable.

This appeal involves the dissolution of a 28-year marriage by default. The wife filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Maury County and, after the husband failed to file a timely answer, filed for a default judgment. The trial court granted the default judgment even though the husband had filed an answer and counterclaim on the day before the hearing and later denied the husband's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.02 motion to set aside the default. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the default judgment but erred by refusing to later set the default judgment aside.

The Trial Court ordered the father to pay one-half of the daughter's college expenses pursuant to the parties' Marital Dissolution Agreement, and reimburse the mother for one-half of expenses already paid. On appeal, we affirm.

I disagree with the standard of review employed by the court in this case for the reasons
discussed at more length in In Re Z.J.S., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 21266854, at
*18-22 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 3, 2003) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed; Estate of Acuff v.
O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527, 533-37 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2001). However, I would reach the same result
employing the standard of review recited in Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527 at 537. Therefore,
I concur with the court’s decision to reverse the order terminating R.G.L.’s parental rights.

This case is an appeal from a wrongful death claim in which the Defendant was found only fifty percent at fault. The Plaintiffs appeal to this Court for review of two procedural issues. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological father whose daughter was surrendered to a licensed child-placing agency without his knowledge. Soon after notifying the biological father that it had custody of the child, the agency filed a petition in the Davidson County Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court concluded that the biological father had abandoned his daughter and that the child’s best interests required terminating her biological father’s parental rights. We have determined that the agency has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the biological father has abandoned his daughter.
 

In this appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County the Plaintiff/Appellant, Peggy Pistole, argues that the trial court erred in excluding witness testimony upon grounds that their identity was not disclosed in Ms. Pistole's response to interrogatories. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

This appeal is the second in a 24 year long dispute over a proposed raceway in Lincoln County. After hearing additional proof as this Court required in West v. Luna, No. 01A01-9707-CH-00281, 1998 WL 467106 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998), the trial court entered a new injunction prohibiting the defendant Luna from operating a race track on Old Boonshill Road in Lincoln County. In this appeal, Mr. Luna challenges the trial court's injunction as noncompliant with our decision in the first appeal, and in imposing a noise limitation effectively making the race track a nuisance per se. We affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves the lower court's award of a garnishment judgment against Accuride Corporation, as well as its subsequent denial of Accuride's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the lower court and remand for further proceedings.