APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in order to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion1 in admitting testimony concerning the results of a certain method of DNA analysis. While we have previously considered the admission of the results of DNA analysis using the “restriction fragment length polymorphism” (RFLP) method, we address for the first time the admission of testimony regarding DNA analysis using the “polymerase chain reaction” (PCR) method. PCR is to be distinguished from RFLP, the method more statistically precise and firmly established in both the scientific and legal community. After a jury-out hearing, the trial court admitted expert testimony about the results of the PCR analysis performed on the defendant’s clothing, and the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court’s determination.

We accepted the State’s application for review in this cause in order to determine the validity of an indictment which charged aggravated rape.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals held the indictment void and the subsequent conviction invalid because the language of the indictment failed to allege a culpable mental state.

In this appeal,1 we must determine whether a false response from an individual to an inquiry made by a law enforcement officer constitutes a false report within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-502(a)(1) (1991). After careful review, we hold that § 39-16-502(a)(1) applies to statements volunteered or initiated by an individual but does not apply to statements made in response to inquiries by law enforcement officers. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

The defendant, Merlin Eugene Shuck, was convicted of one count of solicitation to commit first degree murder and two counts of solicitation to commit especially aggravated kidnaping. The defense theory at trial was entrapment, and in support of that defense, Shuck sought to introduce expert testimony from a neuropsychologist that he had suffered a cognitive decline and significant
deterioration of his cognitive abilities which rendered him more susceptible to inducement than the average person. The trial judge refused to admit the testimony finding that it would invade the province of the jury. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial. Thereafter, we granted the State permission to appeal to consider whether expert psychological testimony about a defendant’s susceptibility to inducment is admissible under Tennessee law to establish entrapment.

This appeal addresses the General Assembly's power to delegate rulemaking authority to administrative agencies. The Court of Appeals held  that the General Assembly could not constitutionally delegate power to the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Commission ("TWRC") to add or delete animals from the dangerous species list. We reverse and hold that the legislature may delegate power to add and delete items from a statutory schedule absent explicit guidance standards. The legislature, however, must provide a basic standard accompanied by a general policy when delegating in areas concerning public health, safety, and general welfare.

We granted the State's application in this case to determine whether the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995 (“the new Act”), provides to petitioners for whom the statute of limitations had expired under the old Act additional time in which to file petitions for post-conviction relief. We conclude that although the language of the new Act is ambiguous, the legislative intent is clear: petitioners for whom the statute of limitations expired prior to the effective date of the new Act, i.e., May 10, 1995, do not have an additional year in which to file petitions for post-conviction relief. Thus, the petition filed by Arnold Carter is barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the petition is dismissed.

We review this cause to determine whether detention immediately after arrest, purposely continued because of the accused’s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, constitutes punishment that prevents, under double jeopardy principles, punishment upon conviction. Because we find that jeopardy did not attach to the proceedings before the judicial commissioner and because the detention, even if punitive, did not constitute punishment for the charged offenses, we find no double jeopardy violation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, the indictments are reinstated, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

We granted this consolidated appeal to determine whether permanent total disability can be awarded when an anatomical disability rating is less than 16.7 percent. In Seiber v. Greenbrier Industries, Inc., 906 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1995), this Court adopted a panel decision holding that the limits in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241 (1996 Supp.) precluded an award of total disability when the anatomical impairment was less than 16.7 percent. A later, but unpublished, workers' compensation panel decision held that the limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(b) are not applicable to permanent total disability claims. Warren v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 03S01-9506-CV-00061 (Nov. 29, 1995, at Knoxville). We granted review to reconcile these two cases and decide this issue. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the panel's findings in Warren and hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241's limitations on permanent partial disability do not apply to awards of permanent total disability.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Chancery Court in a worker's compensation case, in which the trial court granted the employee's motion for non-suit and then entered a judgment of no liability for the employer on its counterclaim. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded.

This case presents for review with the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's denial of a claim of paternity. For the reasons set forth, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded. 

This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's award of summary judgment denying the plaintiff's claims under the uninsured motorist statute. That decision is reversed, and the case is remanded.