APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This cause comes to us on a common law writ of certiorari to review a fee dispute in a post-conviction proceeding involving an indigent defendant, David McNish. The issue is whether an attorney appointed to review the records in a post-conviction proceeding may exceed the maximum allowable rates for attorneys representing indigent defendants. We hold that: (1) Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13 (1996) required an attorney performing services as an "expert" to obtain prior approval for an hourly rate in excess of the hourly rate provided for attorneys in Rule 13; and (2) the trial court should have explicitly set forth the approved "expert" hourly rate in its order if such rate was intended to exceed the normal hourly rate provided for attorneys in Rule 13.

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, has been charged on four counts of murder, eleven counts of rape, fourteen counts of kidnapping and three counts of robbery. The State filed notice of intention to seek the death penalty. In November of 1992, the petitioner, Herbert S. Moncier, and a second attorney were appointed pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 13 to represent Huskey. Tennessee Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 13 § 1 permits appointment of two attorneys for one defendant in capital cases. The petitioner sought additional reimbursement in the trial court for two additional attorneys, for paralegals and for various other expenses. The trial judge entered an order granting reimbursement for two additional attorneys not to exceed $ 10,000.00 and for paralegals at $ 15 per hour not to exceed $ 5,000.00. The order was entered nunc pro tunc to the date of the petitioner's appointment.

We granted this appeal to determine whether we should retain "the Distretti Rule1" adopted by this Court sixty-seven years ago. The rule provides that before a death will be considered accidental under the terms of an insurance contract, the means, as well as the result, must be involuntary, unexpected, and unusual.

This case arose out of a petition for order of contempt filed in this Court by the Board of Professional Responsibility against John Mark Hancock. The petition alleged that Hancock violated an order of suspension previously entered by this Court by failing to comply with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 18, which requires a suspended attorney to notify clients of an order of suspension, move for withdrawal from pending cases, provide notice to adverse attorneys when clients have not obtained substitute counsel, and refrain from taking new cases.

The incidents both involved physical altercations, one of which resulted in Davis’s conviction for simple assa ult. This matter is before the Court to determine whether the respondent, Guy S. Davis, should be held in contempt for practicing law after the entry of a thirty-day temporary suspension.

We granted this appeal to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted in this case involving claims for recision of contract and unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on both issues. Upon review, we affirm the appellate court as modified.¹

We granted permission to appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 11 to Howard E. King, the appellant, in order to address the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b)(2) (Supp. 1994),1 which requires trial courts to instruct juries regarding parole and release eligibility when a jury instruction on the sentencing range is requested by either party. Because we find that the statute does not violate the separation of powers doctrine or deprive the appellant of his due process right to a fair trial, we conclude that the statute, as applied under the circumstances of this case, is constitutional.

This case arose out of a petition for order of contempt filed by the Board of
Professional Responsibility alleging that Danny Kaye Dockery violated an order of
suspension previously entered by this Court by failing to comply with Tenn. Sup. Ct.
R. 9, § 18. The provisions of Rule 9 require a suspended attorney to notify clients of
an order of suspension, move for withdrawal from pending cases, provide notice to
adverse attorneys when clients have not obtained substitute counsel, and refrain
from accepting new clients.

Twenty former employees of “HealthTrust,” a ____________ sued  HealthTrust and its “successor in interest,” Columbia Health Care Corporation, to recover share of stock (or the value thereof) which they had  purchased with earned bonuses and for the value of shares of stock due some of the plaintiffs due them upon discharge. Two of the plaintiffs nonsuited, leaving eighteen.