State of Tennessee v. Anthony Poole
A Shelby County jury convicted the appellant, Anthony Poole, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This appeal followed, with the appellant arguing that the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury to disregard a hearsay statement by the victim; (2) excluding the testimony of a mental health expert; (3) giving a sequential, “acquittal-first” instruction to the jury; and (4) imposing a twenty-four-year sentence in contravention of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Upon review, we modify the appellant’s sentence to nineteen years. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Brown
The defendant, Patrick Brown, was convicted of criminal attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twelve years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; the trial court erred in allowing the State to reopen its case in chief; and he was sentenced improperly. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Grand Valley Lakes Property Owners’ Association, Inc. v. Harold R. Gunn and Patsy R. Gunn
This is an appeal from the grant of a voluntary dismissal. The plaintiff homeowners’ association sued the defendants in general sessions court for dues owed. The homeowners’ association was awarded a judgment. The defendants appealed to the circuit court below, seeking a de novo hearing. For several years, the appeal remained pending with no activity. In the meantime, the defendants sold the subject property. The judgment due to the homeowners’ association was paid by the purchaser of the subject property to remove any cloud on the title. Having been paid, the homeowners’ association filed a notice of satisfaction of judgment in the circuit court. The defendants filed a motion to set aside the satisfaction of judgment. The circuit court entered an order dismissing the defendants’ appeal. The circuit court later denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the satisfaction of judgment. From that order, the defendants now appeal. We find that the circuit court order is not final and appealable. Therefore, we dismiss the defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Homer T. Rivers v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Homer T. Rivers, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions on one count of delivery of a schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), a Class B felony, and one count of simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance (marijuana), a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Brennon Harville and Jimmy Harville, Sr.
The State filed this action to terminate the parental rights of both parents to their three minor children. Upon hearing the evidence, the Trial Judge terminated the parental rights of both parents on several grounds. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derrick Sorrell
The defendant, Derrick Sorrell, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the indictment was improper, that the trial court improperly admitted evidence, and that the trial court did not adequately instruct the jury. After careful review, we conclude no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Wolfe
The defendant, Tony Wolfe, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, he argues that: 1) the trial court was prejudiced against defense counsel during the course of the trial; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by conducting trial during the evening; 3) the assistant district attorney general intentionally distracted trial counsel during the course of the trial; 4) the jury did not see all the exhibits presented during trial; 5) the assistant district attorney general manipulated the slide projector during trial; 6) the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant to remove his clothing and show his scars from injuries sustained in a 1997 shooting; and 7) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for the jury to visit the crime scene. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Penny Wells v. Nissan North America, Inc., et al.
This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008). An employee who sustained a workplace injury in 1997 but who did not miss any work filed suit in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County in 2006 seeking a reconsideration of the 2003 settlement of her workers' compensation claim arising out of that injury. In response to the employer's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the suit was time-barred under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-241(a)(2) (2008) because it was not filed within four hundred weeks following her return to work, the employee insisted that the time for seeking reconsideration should begin to run from the date in 2003 that she reached maximum medical improvement, rather than from the date she returned to work in 1997. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, and the employee appealed. We affirm the trial court based on the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6- 241(a)(2). |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Carnell Pittman
In February 2006, the Madison County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Larry Carnell Pittman, on one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of all three counts of the indictment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-eight years as a Range II, violent offender for his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, nineteen years as a Range II, multiple offender for the aggravated robbery conviction, and nine years as a Range II, multiple offender for the conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered that all sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a continuance; (3) the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court imposed excessive sentences. After reviewing the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: B.L.S.C., D.L.S., & D.J.C.
Mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her three children based upon four separate grounds. Finding clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s determinations on the grounds of mental incompetence and persistence of conditions, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Jackie Jackson, Administrator of the Estate of Karon Jackson v. Johnny Joyner, M.D., et al.
The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude portions of Plaintiff’s expert’s deposition testimony and awarded Defendants summary judgment. We vacate the award of summary judgment, reverse the trial court’s order excluding testimony of the expert witness, and remand for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Cortney Davis v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner filed a Petition styled “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” which the trial court treated as a petition for writ of certiorari. We affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the petition, but on the basis that the petition was not supported by oath or affirmation nor does it state that it is the first application for a writ. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Lamont Coleman
The defendant, Thomas Lamont Coleman, was found guilty following a bench trial of violating the implied consent law. He appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding him guilty absent a showing by the State that the breathalyzer test was administered in accordance with the standards set forth in State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Justin Postles v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Johnny Justin Postles, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief as it relates to the petitioner’s convictions for aggravated criminal trespass and assault in case assignment 04-720, and aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and theft under $500 in case assignment 04-721. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Mark McDade
The defendant, David Mark McDade, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to four years in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying the defendant full probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Anthony Buntley
The defendant, Mark Anthony Buntley, was convicted by a jury of bribing a witness, a Class C felony. For his conviction, the defendant was sentenced to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Toneka Y. Reid
The defendant, Toneka Y. Reid, appeals as of right from her jury conviction in the Williamson County Circuit Court of theft of property valued at five hundred dollars or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in jail. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress and in denying probation or alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Seramur vs. Life Care Centers of America, Inc.
Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant, brought this action to enforce an employment contract for benefits allegedly due under the contract. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the grounds that a provision in the employment contract to which the parties originally agreed to, was an unenforceable contract, as the provision amounted to an agreement to agree and dismissed the action. On appeal, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Byron Lebron Roshell - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that proof of prior drug sales by the defendant was properly admitted. I conclude that this proof was prejudicial and essentially irrelevant to the issues in the trial. I would reverse the judgment of conviction and grant a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Byron Lebron Roshell
Defendant-Appellant, Byron Lebron Roshell, appeals his conviction by a Davidson County jury of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2006). He argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting a former co-defendant’s testimony that he had bought drugs from Roshell in the past and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gerry Gallimore, et al. v. Reba Gallimore
This case involves a dispute between a decedent’s ex-wife and the decedent’s heirs. When the decedent and the ex-wife divorced, their marital dissolution agreement provided that the decedent would receive certain real property. When the decedent died four years later, the ex-wife had not executed a quitclaim deed conveying her interest in the property to the decedent. Therefore, the heirs filed this action to quiet title. The ex-wife claimed that the decedent wanted her to retain her interest in the property, and she claimed that the heirs were barred from seeking relief under the doctrines of laches and waiver. The trial court found in favor of the heirs, and the ex-wife appeals. We affirm. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Corey Moten v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Corey Moten, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the suppression of his statement on the grounds that it was involuntarily given. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kassy Janikowski v. Dwight Barbee, Warden (State of Tennessee)
The petitioner, Kassy Janikowski, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court order dismissing her petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Bufford
The defendant, Anthony Bufford, pled guilty in October 2005 to driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and violating the seat belt law, a Class C misdemeanor. For the Class E felony, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to four years in community corrections with sixty days to be served in jail. For the Class A misdemeanor, he received eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on probation in the community corrections program. For the Class C misdemeanor, the defendant received thirty days’ incarceration at seventy-five percent. All sentences were to be served concurrently. The trial court revoked the defendant’s community corrections sentence in April 2008 after finding that the defendant failed to remain drug-free. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in removing him from community corrections and ordering him to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Damien Clark
The defendant, Damien Clark, appeals from his conviction by a jury in the Criminal Court for Shelby County for second degree murder, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to twenty years’ confinement as a violent offender. He contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder, (2) the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior robbery conviction as character evidence, (3) the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior robbery conviction when the probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and notice of impeachment was “inadequate and inaccurate,” and (4) the jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit the defendant of second degree murder before examining voluntary manslaughter as a conviction offense deprived the defendant of his constitutional rights to due process and to trial by jury. Although the required procedure was not used to admit the defendant’s prior conviction, we conclude the errors were harmless, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |