Thomas M. Gautreaux v. Internal Medicine Education Foundation, Inc.
This case1 involves the interpretation of a portion of the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503. The trial court found that despite the fact the defendant foundation qualified for the statutory exemption set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(d)(1), the entity is subject to the Tennessee Public Records Act because it is the functional equivalent of a public agency. The foundation has appealed. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lontrell Williams
The defendant, Lontrell Williams, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when finding that he had violated the terms of his probation. He, therefore, requests that this court remand for a new probation revocation hearing. The State concedes that the trial court applied an incorrect standard and joins in the defendant’s request for a new revocation hearing under the appropriate standard. We agree that the trial court erroneously based the revocation of the defendant’s probation on a probable cause, rather than a preponderance of the evidence, standard. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new probation revocation hearing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Beth Vancleave v. Reelfoot Bank
This is a retaliatory discharge case. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant bank. The plaintiff was asked by a customer to open an account in a manner that the plaintiff believed was illegal. The plaintiff refused to do so, and shortly afterward was terminated by the bank. The plaintiff employee filed suit against the bank, asserting claims of common law and statutory retaliatory discharge. After discovery, the bank filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, finding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under either theory because the purported violation of the various statutes and regulations cited by the plaintiff employee did not implicate an important public policy or an illegal activity affecting the public health, safety or welfare. The trial court also found the plaintiff employee, in refusing to open the requested account, had no intent to further the public good, but sought only to protect the bank. The plaintiff employee appeals. We reverse, finding that some of the statutory provisions at issue implicate important public policy and can constitute the basis for a retaliatory discharge claim, and that intent to further the public good is not a required element. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Grapevine Trucking, LLC. v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, et al.
Grapevine Trucking, LLC (“Grapevine”) sued Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (“Carolina Casualty”) and American Southern Insurance Company (“American Southern Insurance”) alleging breach of insurance contracts. The Trial Court granted Carolina Casualty summary judgment dismissing them from the suit. The Trial Court also granted Grapevine partial summary judgment finding that the theft of a truck and trailer covered by Grapevine’s policy with American Southern Insurance had occurred and that American Southern Insurance was liable. The issue of damages was tried, and the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the combined value of the stolen truck and trailer was $53,000 and that Grapevine was entitled to a judgment against American Southern Insurance for $53,000, plus state sales tax on Grapevine’s loss in the amount of $3,710. American Southern Insurance appeals. We affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demario Johnson Aka Leo Scott
The defendant, Demario Johnson, a.k.a. Leo Scott, was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court improperly responded to a juror’s question; and the trial court erred in admitting photographs into evidence. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Alan Watermeier v. Sherry Dunaway Moss AND Thomas R. Moss III
This is a petition to establish parentage case. Father/Appellant appeals from the dismissal of his petition. Finding that the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-304(b)(2) have not been met and that Appellant is the child’s biological and legal father, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Jeffrey Mauro Cusatis vs. Robert R. Casey, M.D.
In this appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Rachel Sumner v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Health
Appellants, citizens of Davidson County, sought review of the County’s mosquito control policies, which were in effect in 2005. Upon review, the Appellee, Metropolitan Board of Health of Nashville and Davidson County, denied Appellants’ claim for lack of standing. The trial court granted Appellants’ common law writ of certiorari and affirmed the Board’s findings. Upon review, we conclude that the Appellants’ have no standing, and that the issues presented are rendered moot based upon the County’s adoption of a new mosquito control policy in 2008. Affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Delarie Katrice Purnell
The Defendant, Delarie Katrice Purnell, pled guilty to sale and delivery of a Schedule VI controlled substance (counts 1 and 2), sale and delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (counts 3 and 4), sale and delivery of a Schedule I controlled substance (counts 5 and 6), speeding (count 7), and simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance (count 8). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing. The Defendant appeals, arguing that her sentence is excessive and contrary to law. Citing the Defendant’s previous criminal convictions and criminal conduct, the court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of ten years as a Range I Standard Offender. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcel Eluhu, M.D. v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., Centennial Medical Center
Cardiologist whose hospital privileges were revoked brought suit against the hospital asserting multiple causes of action, including breach of contract. Finding the hospital entitled to immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and the Tennessee Peer Review Law, the chancellor granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on all claims for monetary damages. The court subsequently granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. We have concluded that the court erred in granting summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief other than the breach of contract claims. Otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Christopher Brown
The pro se Defendant, Anthony Christopher Brown, appeals as of right from his convictions for possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, arising from his bench trial in Davidson County Criminal Court. He received an effective sentence of three years as a Range I, standard offender. The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronnie Jackson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ronnie Jackson, Jr., pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. As part of his plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years for his aggravated robbery conviction and three years for each of his aggravated assault convictions, those sentences to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. He now appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order denying post-conviction relief, contending that this denial was error because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and, consequently, entered his pleas involuntarily and unknowingly. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel failed to properly investigate his case and prepare a defense strategy, that trial counsel pressured him into pleading guilty, and that by entering an Alford1 plea, he believed he could continue to challenge pre-trial constitutional issues. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marquis Day v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Marquis Day, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief, as it relates to the petitioner’s convictions of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder, fabricating evidence, and the unlawful possession of a weapon. On appeal from the judgment of the post-conviction court, the petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony T. Dean
The Defendant, Anthony T. Dean, appeals from an order of the trial court denying his motion for reduction of sentence. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the motion. We affirm the order of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antoine Devin Gray, aka Antoine Devin West
The Defendant, Antoine Gray, aka Antoine Devin West, challenges the sentencing decision of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. Following his guilty pleas to possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, aggravated assault, and misdemeanor evading arrest, the trial court imposed an effective five-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alpheus Lerone Lowe
At the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of DUI, third offense. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days with all but 120 days suspended. The rest of the sentence was to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of DUI and that the trial court erred in neglecting to give the Allen or dynamite charge when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient and that the use of the Allen or dynamite charge is no longer approved of by our supreme court. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darrell Jennings v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Darrell Jennings, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder and felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions, and the petitioner received a life sentence. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamar Jermaine Thomas
A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Lamar Jermaine Thomas, of possession with the intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony; possession with the intent to sell morphine, a Class C felony; possession with the intent to sell dihydrocodeinone, a Class D felony; possession with the intent to sell more than one-half once of marijuana, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was subsequently given an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts of guilt. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Scott Lomax and Ophelia Lomax
The defendants, Jason Scott Lomax and Ophelia Lomax, were each convicted of aggravated child abuse by causing serious bodily injury and aggravated child abuse by neglect or endangering a child. These offenses were merged and each defendant was sentenced to serve eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction at 100 percent. On appeal, the only issue raised by the defendants is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain their convictions for aggravated child abuse by causing serious bodily injury. Following a review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the defendants’ convictions. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jimmy Lee Taylor, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jimmy Lee Taylor, Jr., appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated burglary and his effective sentence of seventeen years at one hundred percent. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to explain the consequences of his plea and because trial counsel did not spend adequate time meeting with him. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lee Hanning - Concurring
I concur, but on a different basis. “Whether the stop of a vehicle is considered ‘reasonable’ depends on whether the officer had either probable cause or an ‘articulable and reasonable suspicion’ that the vehicle or its occupants were subject to seizure for a violation of the law . . . . The level of reasonable suspicion required to support an investigatory stop is lower than that required for probable cause.” State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 902 (Tenn. 2008). Reasonable suspicion must be supported “by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Hughes v. State, 588 S.W.2d 296, 305 (Tenn. 1979). |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Lee Hanning
This appeal involves the detention and questioning of the driver of a truck tractor and trailer based upon an anonymous tip of reckless driving from a citizen. A police officer received a dispatch that a caller had reported a black “18-wheeler” bearing a “Smith Brothers” logo was being driven recklessly in a northbound direction on the interstate and had just exited at the Highway 72 ramp. The police officer was in a parking lot very close to the exit ramp at the time he received the call. He responded immediately and observed a black “semi-truck” parked in the emergency lane of the northbound exit ramp. The officer turned his blue lights on, drove down the ramp, and pulled in front of the truck. After observing a Smith Transport logo on the door of the truck tractor, questioning the driver, and administering field sobriety tests, the officer arrested the driver for driving under the influence. The driver entered a conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence and reserved the certified question of whether the warrantless detention and questioning of the driver violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee. We hold that in this case the anonymous tip reporting reckless driving indicated a sufficiently high risk of imminent injury or death to members of the public to warrant immediate intervention by law enforcement officials and justified the brief investigatory stop because the offense was reported at or near the time of its occurrence, and the report indicated that the caller was witnessing an ongoing offense; the report provided a detailed description of the truck, its direction of travel and location; and the investigating officer verified these details within moments of the dispatch reporting the tip. |
Loudon | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Darius Montez Edwards
Appellant, Darius Montez Edwards, was indicted in April of 2007 by the Davidson County Grand Jury for premeditated first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to facilitation of first degree murder and facilitation of attempted first degree murder in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charge. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty-four years for facilitation of first degree murder and eleven years for facilitation of attempted first degree murder. Appellant appeals his sentence. We determine that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant and, therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Damion Seals
The defendant, Damion Seals, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to five years as a Range I offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of: The Estate of Lucille Annetta Schisler
Two of a deceased mother’s six children appeal a jury’s specific findings that their mother’s last will was invalid because they had a confidential relationship with their mother and unduly influenced her to execute the will. Plaintiffs, the decedent’s four other children, commenced this action to contest the will the appellants offered for probate. On appeal, the appellants contend there is no material evidence to support the jury’s findings that they had a confidential relationship with their mother or that they exerted undue influence. Appellants also contend the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a criminal conviction of one of the appellants. Whether to admit the evidence was within the sound discretion of the trial court and we find the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence; moreover, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that evidence of the crime was only relevant as it pertained to motive and intent to influence the testatrix to change her will. As for the jury verdict, we find substantial and material evidence that supports the jury’s findings in the record. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals |