Daniel Renteria-Villegas et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County et al.
M2011-02423-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kevin H. Sharp

We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether the October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, by and through the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office, violates the Charter of Nashville and Davidson County or other state law. We conclude that the Memorandum of Agreement does not violate the Charter or any other state law cited by the plaintiffs.

State of Tennessee v. Mark Joseph Graves
E2011-02471-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge John F. Dugger

The Defendant, Mark Joseph Graves, entered a best interest plea to attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, in exchange for a two-year and one-day sentence, as a Range I standard offender, at thirty percent. As part of the Defendant’s plea agreement, he reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant must allege when the illegal activity occurred. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

Tony L. Pirtle v. State of Tennessee
W2011-00925-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

The petitioner, Tony L. Pirtle, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and facilitation of aggravated rape. The petitioner received an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing, alleging that testing would exonerate his co-defendant and, thereby, exonerate the petitioner. The court denied the motion, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Eddie Joe Whitaker
E2011-01372-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Shayne Sexton

Defendant, Eddie Joe Whitaker, was indicted by the Campbell County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (DUI). Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to 11 months and 29 days to be served at 75 percent incarceration. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; and 2) his sentence was excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Joshua Jermaine Whitehead
E2012-00312-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

Joshua Jermaine Whitehead (“the Defendant”) pled guilty in February 2004 to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery and one count of aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced in May 2004 as a Range I offender to an effective sentence of nine years, suspended after service of one year. Due to repeated probation violations, the Defendant eventually served his entire sentence in confinement. The Defendant was released on August 19, 2011. On October 5, 2011, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he was not informed of the lifetime community supervision consequence of his conviction for the sex offense. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Anthony Troy Williams
M2012-00242-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mark J. Fishburn

Appellant, Anthony Troy Williams,was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for driving on a canceled, suspended or revoked license, second offense. Appellant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to six months in jail and a fine of $2,500. On appeal, Appellant, pro se, challenges the constitutionality of the State’s requirement that he have a license to drive in Tennessee. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant was properly convicted of driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Steven Linton Griffith v. State of Tennessee
E2011-01506-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery

Petitioner, Steven Linton Griffith, was convicted in Sullivan County of both the sale and delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone. See State v. Steve Griffith, No. E2008-01962-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1956713, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jul. 8, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2009). The trial court merged the convictions into a single judgment. Appellant appealed. Id. This Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on appeal. Id. Appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. Appellant argues on appeal that the petition was improperly denied. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

In Re: Conservatorship of Leah Angelique Thomas - Cathey J. Tillman, Conservator v. Ronald Marvell Thomas
W2012-00349-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen D. Webster

The probate court appointed a conservator for a disabled young adult. The court awarded attorney’s fees to the petitioner who was appointed as conservator, and to the guardian ad litem, to be paid from the estate of the disabled ward. The court also ordered that another party, who originally sought to be appointed as conservator but withdrew his petition before the hearing, would likewise receive an award of attorney’s fees to be paid from the estate of the ward. The conservator appeals, arguing that the probate court lacked the authority to make such an award to the party who withdrew his petition. We agree, and therefore, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees and remand for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Louis W. Alford
M2012-00114-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Vanessa A. Jackson

Appellant, Louis W. Alford, was convicted of second degree murder in Coffee County in 1990. As a result, Appellant received a forty-year sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s sentence and conviction. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01C019110CC00300, 1992 WL 50968, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 19, 1992), perm. app. denied, concurring in results only (Tenn. Jun. 15, 1992). In a separate case, Appellant pled guilty to several charges and received a four-year sentence. This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to the second degree murder sentence. On direct appeal from the burglary conviction, this Court remanded the matter for resentencing because the judgment form failed to reflect the range of punishment. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01-C01-9007CR00170, 1991 WL 4951, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 24, 1991). On remand, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender. Appellant again initiated an appeal, arguing that his five prior felonies could not be used to enhance his sentence because they pre-dated the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. This Court affirmed the sentence on appeal. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01C01-9108CC00227, 1992 WL 50963, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 19, 1992), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jun. 8, 1992). Appellant filed a motion to correct his sentence in September of 2011, in which he complained about the miscalculation of his parole date and joinder of his sentences for burglary and second degree murder. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, a notice of appeal. The trial court issued a second order in which it determined that it had no authority to order the relief sought by Appellant. Appellant filed a notice of appeal. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that Appellant does not have an appeal as of right from the order under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Dale England, et al. v. Robert England, et al.
E2011-02094-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Billy J. White

This case is a property dispute between two brothers regarding the width of a right-of-way that affects both their properties. The plaintiff claims the right-of-way is eight feet wide and the defendant should be prevented from expanding the gravel road that runs along the right-of-way to 25 feet because the expansion would require the plaintiff to remove fences, septic tanks, and other permanent structures. The trial court ruled that the right-of-way created by the brothers’ father was intended to be 25 feet wide. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Oscar E. Ochoa and Beatriz Ochoa
E2011-01572-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amy Reedy

Defendants, Oscar E. Ochoa and Beatriz Ochoa, were indicted by the Bradley County Grand Jury for possession of between 10 and 70 pounds of marijuana with intent to sell. Defendants filed applications for Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court’s ruling that the State did not abuse its discretion when the Assistant District Attorney General denied Defendants’ applications for pretrial diversion. Defendants’ cases were consolidated on appeal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the State’s denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Charles Robert Braun, Jr. v. Nita Lynn Braun
E2012-00823-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dennis W. Humphrey

This is a post-divorce appeal. Stepfather assumed a parental role over Mother’s child from a previous relationship even though only one child was born of the relationship between the Parties. Following an agreed divorce, the court ordered Stepfather to submit child support for both children. The court reasoned that as a result of Stepfather’s participation in a petition to terminate the biological father’s parental rights to Mother’s child, the Child lost any right to support from his biological father. Stepfather appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court but remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Charles Robert Braun, Jr. v. Nita Lynn Braun - Concurring
E2012-00823-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dennis W. Humphrey

I do not disagree with the majority opinion’s decision to remand this case to the trial court so it can consider whether an upward deviation in the child support for Titus Braun is appropriate. I write separately to point out that the majority opinion should not be read as carte blanche to transfer automatically – and without legal justification for doing so – the difference between (a) the support previously ordered for two children and (b) that which would have been ordered for one child, as the amount of an upward deviation in the support for Titus. A court cannot do indirectly what it cannot legally do directly. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 3:05-CV-0475, 2006 WL 3436064 at *2 (N.D. Tex., Nov. 29, 2006).

Summer Bay Management, L.C., et al., v. Gatlinburg Town Square Members' Association, Inc., et al.
E2012-01276-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Telford E. Forgety, Jr.

This Court issued a Show Cause Order setting forth that the Notice of Appeal filed in this case is not "a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights and liabilities of the parties"of which "an appeal of right would lie."

Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke, III
M2012-01964-COA-10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge James G. Martin, III

The father in this post-divorce action has filed a petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of his August 13, 2012, motion for recusal. We have reviewed the petition pursuant to the de novo standard of review as required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.06, and we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke, III - Concur/Dissent
M2012-01964-COA-10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge James G. Martin, III

I agree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s denial of Father’s recusal motion. However, I would have held that the grounds previously raised by Father two years earlier were not subject to our review under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B and, therefore, would have dismissed that part of the appeal. I would affirm denial as to the new grounds upon the reasoning set out in the majority opinion.

Merlina Elijah (Williams) Draper v. Ryan Ashley Williams
M2011-00875-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. L. Rogers

This case involves the modification of a parenting plan. The trial court modified the parenting plan upon its finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred such that primary residential custody with Mother was no longer in the child's best interest. On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred in granting primary residential custody to Father, and Father argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney’s fees. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tina Marie Hodge v. Chadwick Craig
M2009-00930-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jim T. Hamilton

This appeal requires the Court to determine whether current Tennessee law permits the
former husband of a child’s mother to pursue a claim against his former spouse for
intentional or negligent misrepresentation regarding the identity of the child’s biological
father. Following the dissolution of their nine-year marriage, the former husband of the
child’s mother discovered that he was not the child’s biological father. He filed suit against
the child’s mother in the Chancery Court for Maury County, alleging that she had
intentionally misled him into believing that he was the child’s biological father. Following
a bench trial, the trial court found that the mother’s former husband had proved that his
former wife had intentionally misrepresented the parentage of the child and awarded him
$134,877.90 in compensatory damages for the child support, medical expenses, and
insurance premiums he had paid following the divorce, emotional distress, and attorney’s
fees. The child’s mother appealed. Even though the Court of Appeals determined that the
evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the child’s mother had intentionally
misrepresented the identity of the child’s biological father, it (1) reversed the damage award
based on the post-divorce payments for child support, medical expenses, and insurance
expenses on the ground that these damages amounted to a prohibited retroactive modification
of a child support order, (2) reversed the damage award for emotional distress, and (3)
reversed the award for attorney’s fees. Hodge v. Craig, No. M2009-00930-COA-R3-CV,
2010 WL 4024990, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2010). The former husband filed an
application for permission to appeal arguing that Tennessee should permit recovery in cases
of this sort for intentional or negligent misrepresentation of a child’s paternity. We have
determined that the existing common-law action for intentional misrepresentation
encompasses the claims made in this case by the former husband and that the trial court’s
damage award based on the former husband’s post-divorce payments for child support,
medical expenses, and insurance premiums is not an improper retroactive modification of the
former husband’s child support obligation.

State of Tennessee v. Wanda F. Russell
M2010-00852-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge David M. Bragg

A defendant was indicted on four counts of theft. At trial, the trial court ruled that the defendant’s prior misdemeanor convictions for passing worthless checks were admissible to impeach her credibility pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609, which states that a conviction punishable by less than one year of imprisonment is admissible if the crime involves dishonesty or false statement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-121 (2010). The defendant elected not to testify, and the jury convicted her on three of the four counts of theft. We hold that the crime of passing worthless checks involves an element of dishonesty or false statement and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the defendant’s prior convictions could be used to impeach her credibility if she testified. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

Mitzi Bayne Ruth, executrix of the Estate of Fred W. Bayne, et al., v. Home Health Care Of Middle Tennessee, LLC, et al.
E2011-02681-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant

This action was appealed before to this Court and this appeal follows our remand back to the Trial Court for determination of the ambiguous terms found in the contract between the parties. Upon remand, the Trial Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and made a finding as to what the parties intended as to the terms of the contract previously found ambiguous. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court's determination of what the document provided and determined the rights of the parties, and remand.

Pete C. Jenkins v. State of Tennessee
M2011-02240-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt

On March 31, 1994, the petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to fifteen years for each count. The plea agreement required the sentences to be served consecutively. The petitioner brought a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose consecutive sentences and that the judgments were consequently void. The trial court denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

State of Tennessee v. William Thomas Mayers
M2011-00954-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, and theft of property over $500, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 25 years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss his indictment or suppress testimony regarding destroyed evidence; (2) allowing the State to present certain photographs taken of the defendant, on grounds that they were not properly authenticated; and (3) ordering him to serve his sentence on the attempted aggravated burglary consecutively to his sentence for aggravated burglary because both crimes should have been considered part of the same criminal episode. We conclude that the defendant has waived the first claim by virtue of his failure to prepare an adequate brief and record and that the trial court did not err by allowing admitting the photographs and ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly.

Kevin DeWitt Ford v. State of Tennessee
M2011-02105-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl Blackburn

On January 18, 2011, Petitioner, Kevin DeWitt Ford, filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. He subsequently submitted two amended petitions, also pro se. Petitioner attacked seven convictions in the Davidson County Criminal Court for aggravated robbery. Petitioner pled guilty to the offenses but reserved for appeal a certified question of law. On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions. State of Tennessee v. Kevin DeWitt Ford and Clifford Sylvester Wright, No. M2003-00957-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 677280 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2005) perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005). Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition was denied by the trial court. This Court affirmed. Kevin DeWitt Ford v. State of Tennessee, No. M2007-01727-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 564226 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2009) perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2009). The coram nobis court dismissed the petition, as amended, without an evidentiary hearing, on two bases. First, the petition was filed outside the applicable statue of limitations. Second, even if the petition had been timely field, it did not state a cognizable claim for a writ of error coram nobis. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Earl Thomas Burgess v. Ford Motor Company
M2011-00654-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen H. Lyle

A management employee working for Ford Motor Company was to become an employee of Ford’s wholly owned subsidiary when the subsidiary was made an independent company. The manager wanted to remain employed by Ford and sought to transfer back to an hourly position before the spinoff took effect. The manager’s supervisor promised the manager his benefits and pay would not change as an employee of the subsidiary and that he could return to an hourly position with Ford after the spinoff until such time that the subsidiary was purchased by a third party. The subsidiary was purchased by a third party five years later, but Ford did not permit the employee to transfer back to Ford at that point. After the employee asked to transfer back to Ford, Ford offered its hourly employees a special retirement plan whereby they were offered lifetime health and pension benefits. The employee would have been eligible to participate in this plan if he had been allowed to transfer back to Ford. The employee filed suit against Ford, claiming promissory estoppel and seeking damages based on the amount he would have received under the special retirement plan. A jury found Ford liable for promissory estoppel and awarded the employee damages. Ford appealed, arguing (1) the employee’s claim was preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and (2) the employee failed to prove all the elements of promissory estoppel. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

Michael B. Adams v. State of Tennessee
E2012-01476-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner William O. Shults

This Court issues a show cause order on July 19, 2012, directing the pro se incarcerated appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant is seeking a review of the decision on a claim pending on the small claims docket of the Tennessee Claims Commission. "No appeal may be taken from a commissioner's decision regarding claims appearing on the small claims docket." Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-403(a)(2).