State of Tennessee v. Dane Sayles, Alias Bradley Harper
Dane Sayles, alias Bradley Harper (“the Defendant”), was convicted by a jury of possession with the intent to sell or deliver three hundred grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to forty years to be served consecutively to previous sentences the Defendant received in Pennsylvania. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the stop and search of his vehicle, as well as the seizure of cell phone text messages. The Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in “permitting the State to continue adding witnesses in the middle of trial whose names were not provided in discovery.” Finally, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles T. Hartley v. Arvil Chapman, Warden
The petitioner, Charles T. Hartley, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging that his sentence for attempted aggravated sexual battery was illegal because the judgment of conviction reflected that, as a child predator and a violent offender, he must serve one hundred percent of the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Davis
The Defendant-Appellant, John Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of a single count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received a twelve-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Will J. Milton v. Saeed Etezadi, M.D.
This case presents the issue of whether proper service of process was accomplished regarding the defendant, Saeed Etezadi, M.D. Plaintiff, Will J. Milton, filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Etezadi on April 14, 2003. The complaint and summons were served upon Dr. Etezadi’s office manager, with a notation appearing on the summons that service was accepted as “agent.” Dr. Etezadi filed an answer which, inter alia, raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Mr. Milton voluntarily dismissed that action and subsequently re-filed within one year of the non-suit. In connection with the second action, the complaint and summons were allegedly served upon Dr. Etezadi at his office. Dr. Etezadi filed an Answer, again raising the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Dr. Etezadi also asserted that all applicable statutes of limitation and repose had expired. He later filed a motion to dismiss. Following the hearing, the trial court dismissed the claims against Dr. Etezadi, finding that there was no service of process in either action. Mr. Milton appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Crystal Miranda Kirby v. State of Tennessee
A Campbell County jury found petitioner, Crystal Miranda Kirby, guilty of first degree premeditated murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced her to an effective life sentence. On direct appeal, this court ordered the merger of the two murder convictions but denied relief in all other respects. Petitioner then filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, claiming that the State violated her due process rights under Brady v. Maryland by withholding two video-taped statements that were allegedly exculpatory in nature. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Lydell McCray
The Defendant, Glenn Lydell McCray, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-102 (2010) (aggravated assault), 39-17-1307 (2010) (felon in possession of a firearm). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty years for especially aggravated kidnapping, eight years for each aggravated assault, and three years for illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court ordered consecutive sentences for the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault convictions, for an effective forty-six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (3) the court erred by failing to merge the aggravated assault convictions, and (4) the court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Although the jury was not properly instructed regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Lydell McCray - concurring in part and dissenting in part
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that aggravated assault involves some form of confinement in this case. In State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 578 (Tenn. 2012), the supreme court held, |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dominic Lyons
In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s ruling suppressing the out-of-court identification of the defendant via a photograph array and the subsequent in-court identification by the same witness at the suppression hearing. The State contends that the trial court erred by deeming the identification procedure unduly suggestive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John McLaughlin v. John L. Tweedall, et al
The final judgment from which the appellant seeks to appeal was entered on December 3, 2012. The only Notice of Appeal “filed” by the appellant on December 28, 2012, was submitted to the trial court clerk via facsimile transmission in violation of Rule 5A.02(4)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal is dismissed. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raynell Hopson
The Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to four years, suspended after three months and nineteen days in confinement. In January 2012, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation. After a hearing on the allegation, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court did not err. The trial court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kelvin Winn
The defendant, Kelvin Winn, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the identification of him from a photographic array; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a jailhouse informant to testify without limitations; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to lead witnesses over his objection; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of duplicative photographs; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nora Hernandez
The defendant, Nora Hernandez, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order revoking her probation and denying her bid to vacate her convictions and sentences. Because this court lacks jurisdiction of the claim relevant to the defendant’s motion to vacate, that portion of the appeal is dismissed. Because the record supports revocation of her probation, the judgment of the trial court ordering the same is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Troy Allen Pruitt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Troy Allen Pruitt, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2007 convictions in that court of aggravated robbery and fraudulent use of a credit card. Because the petitioner failed to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and because binding law-of-the-case determinations from his direct appeal defeat his claim of prejudice, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael McVay
A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Michael McVay, with rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, rape, and sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve 25 years for rape of a child, 20 years for aggravated sexual battery, 20 years for rape, and 10 years for sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court ordered all sentences to run consecutively, with a 100% release eligibility for the first three counts - child rape, aggravated sexual battery, and rape, and a 35% release eligibility for count four, sexual battery by an authority figure, for an effective sentence of 75 years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant presents the following issues: (1) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s sexual behavior; (2) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior complaint of sexual assault; and (3) the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Additionally, the State contends the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant on two of his four convictions. After thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions. However, the trial court’s sentencing order is vacated in part and this case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bruce L. Robinson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Bruce L. Robinson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding in Missouri v. Frye , __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), established a new constitutional right that did not exist at the time of his guilty pleas, thereby requiring retroactive application. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the petition as time-barred. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Martin William Huffman v. Angela Shayne Huffman
This is the second appeal of a post-divorce decision concerning child support. In the first appeal, we determined that the trial court erred in failing to make the required findings to justify an upward deviation in child support, thus we vacated the award of child support and remanded for a determination of the appropriate amount. Following the hearing on remand, the trial court set the appropriate amount of child support and determined that Father had overpaid child support. The court did not award Father a judgment or credit in the amount of his overpayment, and Father appeals. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award Father a credit or judgment in the amount of his overpayment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Scott Reynolds v. State of Tennessee
Larry Scott Reynolds ("the Petitioner") was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court failed to make "sufficient findings of fact to allow meaningful review" and "erred in questioning the Petitioner and in making other comments" at the post-conviction hearing. The Petitioner also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of Levi D.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds that Mother was incarcerated under a sentence of more than 10 years and her child was under the age of eight at time of sentencing, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that Mother was convicted of the intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent, see Tenn. Code Ann. 36-1-113(g)(7). Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Trae Wagster
Brandon Trae Wagster (“the Defendant”) was indicted for driving under the influence and violation of the implied consent law. He filed a motion to suppress, challenging the legality of the stop of his vehicle. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion and dismissed the charges against him. The State appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the Defendant’s charges. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sandra Beavers v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Sandra Beavers, pled guilty to sale or delivery of less than .5 gram of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II offender to ten years, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. After her release from jail, the Petitioner violated a condition of her probation that required that she successfully complete the Next Door rehabilitation program, and the trial court revoked her probation. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to her attorney’s failure to communicate with her and failure to request a bond hearing. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael David Fields
Appellant, Michael Fields, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for two counts of first degree murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, he was convicted as charged. The jury determined that the sentence for the first degree murder counts should be life without parole. The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions into the first degree felony murder convictions. The trial court imposed a twenty-five-year sentence for each especially aggravated robbery conviction. The twenty-five-year sentences were ordered to run concurrently to the life sentences. The two life sentences were ordered to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to a previously imposed sentence of life plus forty years. Appellant presents several arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to change venue; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for the trial judge to recuse himself; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial when there was juror contact with the prosecuting officer; (4) there was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (5) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (6) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Appellant’s proffered expert witness, Dr. Charlton Stanley; (7) the trial court erred in allowing the use of a stun belt on Appellant during the trial; (8) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (9) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (10) the trial court erred in imposing the sentence for especially aggravated robbery and in ordering consecutive sentences. Appellant argues several smaller miscellaneous issues concerning evidentiary rulings, closing argument of the State, the denial of his request to have both of his attorneys present separate closing arguments, the denial of funds to pay an expert witness, and the failure to assure that Appellant received his prescribed medication in jail. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v. Tower Music City II, LLC, et al
In this condemnation action, the condemning authority appeals the jury’s valuation of property taken and award of compensation to landowner. Finding that the valuation of the property is within the range of opinions of fair market value testified to at trial, that the jury was properly instructed, and that the court’s conduct of the trial was proper, we affirm the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v. Tower Music City II, LLC, et al - Concur
I write separately to address two issues. The first pertains to jury instruction T.P.I. 11.15 and the failure to give a curative instruction when requested by the jury. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Martin v. James Taylor Milstead and Dana Underwood Milstead
Purchaser of land brought action to recover damages for shortage in acreage and road frontage of property purchased; sellers contended that sale was in gross rather than by acre. Trial court determined that there was a discrepancy between the amount of land both parties thought was being sold and the amount determined by a survey to have been sold, and that sellers did not own land which would provide access to the property; accordingly, it granted purchaser judgment for the discrepancy in the amount of land conveyed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Warren | ||
Estate of Dan Stephen Pitsenberger v. Dennis Dean and Glenda Dean
Executrix of an estate filed a complaint against the officers of a corporation in an effort to pierce the corporate veil and recover a debt she alleges is due from the corporation to the estate of her late husband. The trial court granted her motion for summary judgment and awarded her a $52,000 judgment. The individuals appealed, asserting genuine issues of material fact should have precluded the trial court’s award. We conclude the trial court erred in awarding damages at the summary judgment stage because material facts are in dispute regarding whether a debt actually exists and regarding the amount of money that is at issue. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals |