Donald Chill et al v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
E2012-01675-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons

Donald Chill and his wife, Martha Chill, brought this action against their homeowner’s insurance carrier, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Insurer”), alleging breach of contract by virtue of its refusal to pay for their loss caused by an earthquake. The insurance policy required suit to be brought within one year of the loss. The Chills filed their complaint almost seven years after the loss and over three and a half years after the Chills refused to accept Insurer’s offer to settle the claim for $88,086.49. The trial court granted Insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the lawsuit was not timely filed. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Loudon Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Jerome R. Flanigan
E2012-01852-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge John F. Dugger, Jr.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it denied him the opportunity to discover past allegations and cross-examine the victim about them; (3) the trial court erred when it denied his request to access the victim’s mother’s diary regarding the events; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Hawkins Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Joshua Brandon Tate
M2011-02128-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Monte Watkins

Appellant, Joshua Brandon Tate, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for seven counts of sexual battery, eight counts of rape, and one count of solicitation of a minor. A jury found Appellant guilty on all counts. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years. The trial court granted a portion of Appellant’s motion for new trial, vacating the rape convictions in counts seven through twelve, and the conviction for sexual battery in count thirteen. As a result, Appellant’s effective sentence was reduced to eleven years. On appeal, the following issues are raised for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the recordings of the victim’s interview; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony about Appellant’s failure to attend voluntary interviews with the police; and (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony about Appellant’s failure to attend voluntary interviews with the police. After a review of the record, we determine: (1) the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court properly admitted prior consistent statements of the victim in order to rehabilitate her testimony following cross-examination. However, the trial court erred in admitting testimony to the effect that Appellant failed to attend voluntary police interviews, and this error requires reversal for a new trial.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Marlon Sontay
M2012-01579-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth Norman

Appellant, Marlon E. Sontay, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for four counts of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of rape. Appellant was convicted by a jury of all counts. Appellant was sentenced to twenty five years for each count of rape of a child, eight years for each count of aggravated sexual battery, and eight years for rape. The trial court ordered Count Two for rape of a child to run consecutively to Count One for rape of a child. The remaining counts were ordered to run concurrently to each other, for a total effective sentence of 50 years at 100%. Appellant filed a timely motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. Appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; (2) whether the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony of statements made by the victim during the testimony of the nurse practitioner who performed the victim’s medical examination; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (4) whether the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant; and (5) whether the trial court erred in declining to find Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-504, 39-13-522, and 39-13-523 unconstitutional. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we hold that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress where Appellant voluntarily confessed to detectives; (2) Appellant has waived any issue with regard to the admission of hearsay testimony by failing to object to the testimony at trial and raise the issue in a motion for new trial; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions for rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant within the range of punishment for his convictions; and (5) the trial court did not err in refusing to find Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-504, 39-13-522, and 39-13-523 unconstitutional. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

The Commissioners of the Powell-Clinch Utility District v. Utility Management Review Board
M2012-01806-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

Respondent utility district commissioners appeal the trial court’s determination that a ground for removal from office added to Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-82-307(b)(2), as amended effective June 2009, may be applied retrospectively to acts occurring prior to the effective date of the amendment to remove them from office. They also appeal the trial court’s determination that the additional ground for removal of commissioners, “failing to fulfill the commissioner’s or commissioners’ fiduciary responsibility in the operation or oversight of the district,” is not unconstitutionally vague. We reverse retrospective application of the additional ground for removal contained in the statute, as amended; hold that the statute is not void for vagueness; and remand.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Robert Beaver v. Ford Motor Company
M2012-02088-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Vanessa A. Jackson

In this appeal we are asked to construe the scope of the Tennessee Lemon Law and to determine whether it applies to Plaintiff’s vehicle. For the following reasons,we find the law applicable to vehicles with a “gross vehicle weight” of 10,000 pounds or less, and we affirm the trial court’s conclusions that Plaintiff is entitled to protection and relief thereunder.

Coffee Court of Appeals

James Perry Hyde v. State of Tennessee
E2012-01243-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas Wright

Petitioner, James Perry Hyde, has appealed from the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his Petition for Forensic DNA Analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section Title 40, Chapter 30, Part 3. After review of the entire record, we conclude that the analysis sought by Petitioner is not included within the statutory definition of “DNA analysis.” We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Hamblen Court of Criminal Appeals

Amanda Leenhouts v. Gert Jan Leenhouts
M2012-01844-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phillip R. Robinson

This appeal involves a motion to set aside a default judgment. The wife filed a complaint for divorce. The husband was served with process. After the husband failed to file an answer, the wife filed a motion for a default judgment. The husband filed no response to the motion. The trial court granted the wife a default judgment and held a hearing on the wife’s divorce complaint. The husband did not appear at the hearing. Based on the evidence wife presented at the hearing, the trial court divided the marital estate. The husband then filed a motion to set aside both the default judgment and the divorce decree. The trial court denied the husband’s motion, and the husband now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Sandy Jane Smart v. Brian Wayne Smart
M2012-00818-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Buddy D. Perry

Mother and Father were divorced in 2007 and granted joint custody of their then-six year old child. Mother filed a petition for modification in which she asked to be named the primary residential parent because the joint arrangement was not working for the parties and was not in Child’s best interest. Trial court granted Mother’s petition to be named primary residential parent, but directed that major decisions for Child should be made jointly. Father appealed, arguing that trial court erred in finding material change of circumstances had occurred since the initial parenting plan was entered and that the comparative fitness analysis favored Mother as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed trial court’s judgment regarding major decision making. We affirm trial court’s judgment modifying the parenting plan to name Mother the primary residential parent and amend the plan to have Mother make major decisions for Child rather than both Mother and Father jointly. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Mother’s attorney fees but award her reasonable fees incurred on appeal.

Franklin Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. James Anthony Johnson, Jr.
E2012-01212-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bob R. McGee

The Defendant, James A. Johnson Jr., pleaded guilty in the Criminal Court for Knox County to possession with the intent to sell marijuana within 1000 feet of a school, a Class E felony, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced to three years for possession with the intent to sell marijuana with two years of the sentence to be served at 100% and the remaining year to be served at 30%, three years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to be served consecutively to the marijuana sentence, eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia to be served concurrently with the marijuana sentence, and six months for driving on a suspended license to be served concurrently with the marijuana sentence. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop and subsequent arrest and searches that led to his convictions. Because the certified question was not properly reserved, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Timothy William Jelks v. State of Tennessee
M2012-00984-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Paul G. Summers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dee David Gay

Timothy William Jelks seeks post-conviction relief from a guilty plea and conviction for aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402. Jelks claims his counsel failed to advise him properly during his plea bargain and asserts the one (1) year statute of limitations should be tolled due to new constitutional rights established by the United States Supreme Court. Finding no merit to the assertions of the appellant, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court in all aspects.

Sumner Court of Criminal Appeals

Henry J. Nagorny v. Sheriff Scott Layel
E2012-01705-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard Vance

This appeal arises from a dispute over the calculation of jail time credits. Henry J. Nagorny (“Nagorny”), an incarcerated individual, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court for Grainger County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to compel Sheriff Scott Layel to award him jail behavior credits that allegedly were due him. The Trial Court dismissed Nagorny’s petition sua sponte, stating that the calculation of credits is an administrative matter. Nagorny filed this appeal. We hold that the Trial Court, stating no compelling substantive basis for its decision, erred in dismissing Nagorny’s petition sua sponte. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for proceedings consistent with our Opinion.

Grainger Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Terry Marcum
E2012-01846-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Vance

The Defendant, Terry Marcum, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revoking his probation for two counts of domestic assault and ordering him to serve his consecutive sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Sevier Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Matthew Brian Graham
M2012-01824-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Paul G. Summers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

Appellant, Matthew B. Graham, pled guilty to attempted abuse of a child, under 8 years of age, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated, section 39-15-401, a Class E felony. On the same day, he pled guilty to three informations, each charging him with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated, section 53-11-402. Appellant received a two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the attempted child abuse and each of the possession of a controlled substance pleas. Appellant’s total effective sentence was 8 years, to be suspended on state supervised probation. Appellant violated his probation and was ordered to serve the remainder of his 8 year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant filed a motion to modify sentence to allow him to go back on probation. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to modify the sentence.

Rutherford Court of Criminal Appeals

David Scott Winfrey v. State of Tennessee
M2012-01148-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Paul G. Summers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dee David Gay

On April 10, 2008, the petitioner entered a no contest plea to twenty-nine Class A misdemeanors consisting of one count of aggravated criminal trespass, one count of stalking, thirteen counts of harassment, and fourteen counts of violation of an order of protection. State v. Winfrey (Winfrey II), No. M2009-02480-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4540288, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2010). The petitioner was ultimately sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction, with ten of the sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of just under ten years. The trial court ordered three of the consecutive sentences to be served in confinement and the remaining seven to be served on probation. The petitioner was arrested on December 8, 2010, during the pendency of his appeal; and after a hearing held in April 2011, the trial court revoked the petitioner’s probation and ordered him to serve his remaining seven consecutive eleven-month-twenty-nine-day sentences in confinement. The petitioner did not file a direct appeal. Instead, on March 15, 2012, the petitioner filed a motion to serve the balance of his sentence on probation. In the alternative, the petitioner sought to have the court set aside the probation revocation pursuant to the writ of error coram nobis based on the expunction of the record of his December 2010 arrest due to a stay of probation in effect at the time. The trial court denied both the motion to serve the remaining sentence on probation and the petition for the writ of error coram nobis, as well as an oral motion for the judge’s recusal. The petitioner appeals. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error and accordingly affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Sumner Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Clifton Williams, Jr.
M2012-00902-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Paul G. Summers
Trial Court Judge: Judge David Bragg

A jury convicted the defendant, Clifton Williams, Jr., of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. The defendant also pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to eight years’ confinement for the manslaughter conviction and four years’ confinement for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, to be served consecutively. The defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for manslaughter. The defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to include the definition of curtilage in the self-defense instruction, in enhancing the defendant’s sentences, and in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

Rutherford Court of Criminal Appeals

Vario Talley v. State of Tennessee
W2012-01478-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Mark Ward

Vario Talley (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated robbery and carjacking. In his petition, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his counsel at trial was ineffective in failing to object to the admissibility of video surveillance evidence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

In The Matter of: Skylar B. D.
M2013-00256-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barry R. Brown

The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm.

Sumner Court of Appeals

In the Matter of: Waylon R. D.
M2013-00331-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barry R. Brown

The Department of Children’s Services filed two petitions to terminate the parental rights of a mother to each of her two children after they were found to be dependent and neglected. The mother was served with both petitions, but she failed to appear at the proceedings where the court heard evidence about her persistent drug use and the Department’s attempts to help her overcome the problems that prevented her from safely parenting her children. The trial court found that the Department had established two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence that applied to both petitions: persistence of conditions and substantial failure to comply with parenting plans. The court also found that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed. We affirm.

Sumner Court of Appeals

Linda Alexander Owens v. James Emery Owens
M2012-01186-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phillip E. Smith

Wife was awarded rehabilitative alimony in 2004 that was to terminate in 2012. In 2009 Wife filed a petition to increase the duration and amount of her alimony, or, in the alternative, for an award of alimony in futuro. The trial court found Wife was in need of support, but it denied Wife’s petition, finding Wife had not used all reasonable efforts to rehabilitate herself. On appeal we find Wife’s inability to be rehabilitated as that term has been defined by the legislature warrants a modification of Wife’s alimony award. We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s petition for alimony and conclude Wife is entitled to alimony in futuro but in a lesser amount. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Wife’s request for attorney’s fees.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Lillie Franchie Huddleston v. Robert Lee Huddleston
M2012-00851-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ronald Thurman

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of property, specifically the appreciation in value of farm property he owned in his own name prior to the marriage as marital property and of a life insurance policy owned by Wife as her separate property. Finding that the court erred in its classification of the increase in value of the farm property, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.
 

Putnam Court of Appeals

David Kwasniewski v. Scott Donna Lefevers
M2012-01802-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge John D. Wootten, Jr.

Lessor and Lessee executed a lease agreement that gave Lessee an option to purchase the rented property during a two-year period. A purchase and sale agreement was executed the same day outlining the terms of the sale if the option were exercised. Lessee did not exercise the option during the period specified, and Lessor sued the Lessee for breaching the purchase and sale agreement. Lessee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted. Lessor appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. Because Lessee did not exercise the option to purchase the property, the purchase and sale agreement did not become operative.
 

Wilson Court of Appeals

In Re: Aayden L. B. et al
M2013-00571-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amy V. Hollars

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on several grounds and determined that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm.
 

DeKalb Court of Appeals

Anne Groves, Individually And As Next Of Kin Of Charles Groves v. Christopher Colburn, M.D.
M2012-01834-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda Jane McClendon

Plaintiff filed a complaint against a hospital in which she asserted claims for medical malpractice and wrongful death. She later amended her complaint to add a party and did not contemporaneously file a certificate of good faith. The trial court dismissed the second complaint with prejudice based upon the court’s determination that plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. We affirm the trial court.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Michael Gibbs, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
E2012-02690-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Eblen

Petitioner, Michael Gibbs, Jr., filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Morgan County Circuit Court, claiming that his sentence was expired and that he was being illegally restrained. The State filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing petitions for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court granted the State’s motion and summarily dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Morgan Court of Criminal Appeals