Cayetano Flores v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Cayetano Flores, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by operating under a conflict of interest, inadequately discussing various aspects of the case and the details of the plea agreement, and failing to file a motion to sever. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the prost-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James D. Wooden
We granted this appeal to determine whether a party filing a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (“Rule 36.1”) states a colorable claim for relief for correction of an illegal sentence by alleging that the trial court increased his sentence above the statutory presumptive minimum sentence but failed to find enhancement factors justifying the increase. Answering this question requires us to determine the meaning of two terms used in Rule 36.1—“colorable claim” and “illegal sentence.” We hold that the definition of “colorable claim” in Rule 28, section 2(H) of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court applies to the term “colorable claim” in Rule 36.1. Additionally, we conclude that the definition of “illegal sentence” in Rule 36.1 is coextensive with, and actually mirrors, the definition this Court has applied to the term for purposes of habeas corpus proceedings. Compare Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a), with Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2011). Taking the allegations of the Rule 36.1 motion in this case as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the moving party, we conclude that the moving party has failed to allege a colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the trial court’s denial of the Rule 36.1 motion is affirmed. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Adrian R. Brown
We granted this appeal to determine whether Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (“Rule 36.1”) permits parties to seek correction of expired illegal sentences. We hold that Rule 36.1 does not expand the scope of relief available for illegal sentence claims and therefore does not authorize the correction of expired illegal sentences. We also conclude that a Rule 36.1 motion alleging that a trial court failed to award pretrial jail credit is insufficient to state a colorable claim for relief from an illegal sentence. Applying these holdings, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion. |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
Timothy Messmaker v. Heather L. Messmaker
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for recusal filed by Timothy Messmaker ("Former Husband") in the parties' post-dissolution modification proceedings. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Former Husband, and finding no error in Trial Court's ruling, we affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Dejuan Webster v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joseph Dejuan Webster, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. The Petitioner appealed, arguing that there was newly discovered evidence. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Joseph Dejuan Webster, No M2007-00050-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2229208, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 29, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). In May 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that one of the key witnesses against him at trial had recanted her trial testimony in a sworn statement. The coram nobis court held a hearing, and, after expressing doubt as to the witness’s testimony, dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred and asserts that he is entitled to coram nobis relief on the basis of the witness’s recanted testimony. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Virginia Louise Burke et al v. Huntsville NH Operations LLC d/b/a Huntsville Manor
The notice of appeal in this matter was filed with the trial court after expiration of the thirty-day deadline provided in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. This Court subsequently ordered the appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. In response, the appellants filed a motion with the trial court, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01, seeking alteration of the filing date on the notice of appeal. The trial court granted such relief while the appeal was pending in this Court, despite the absence of a remand. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which was deferred to the panel deciding this case. We conclude that absent a remand from this court, the trial court was without jurisdiction to act on the Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01 motion while this appeal was pending. We therefore dismiss this appeal as untimely. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Hollar v. Deicy C. Hollar
In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s decision to invalidate the parties’ antenuptial agreement and the trial court’s classification and division of the marital estate. The trial court declined to enforce the antenuptial agreement because, inter alia, Wife could not read the agreement - she could not speak or read English - and she was not represented by counsel. Finding that the evidence does not preponderate against any of the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Pickett | Court of Appeals | |
Cassidy Lynne Aragon v. Reynaldo Manuel Aragon
Father and Mother were divorced in April 2010; a parenting plan was entered into providing that the parties would share equal parenting time. In March 2012, pursuant to the parental relocation statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108, Father notified Mother that he intended to relocate to Tucson, Arizona, for an employment opportunity and filed a petition requesting to modify the parenting plan and relocate. Mother filed a petition in opposition to relocation, stating, inter alia, that Father’s proposed move served no reasonable purpose. The trial court determined that Father’s move served no reasonable purpose; the court did not make the best interests determination as required by the relocation statute. Father appealed and this court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the court to consider the best interests of the child and to make findings in that regard. On remand, the court made findings relative to the factors as designated in the relocation statute and concluded that relocation was not in the best interests of the child. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re Andrea R.
This is the second appeal from a 2008 petition filed by Mother to set Father’s child support obligation for the parties’ five-year-old child, to make an upward deviation to pay for private school, and to determine the amount of retroactive support owed. Father responded, contending that an upward deviation for private school was not appropriate. He also contended that he should be credited for voluntary payments he made throughout the retroactive period. The trial court established Father’s current support obligation, which included an upward deviation for private school; however, the court made no findings to justify the deviation as required by Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240-2-4-.07(2)(a)(1). Father appealed the upward deviation. We reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to “make the requisite findings of fact to determine, inter alia, whether private schooling for the child is appropriate based upon the facts of this case.” In re Andrea A.R., No. M2011-00574-COA-R3-JV, 2012 WL 397475, at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2012). On remand, Mother sought to introduce additional evidence about the appropriateness of private school. The trial court declined to accept additional evidence, relied on the evidence introduced in the first trial, and, based on its written findings of fact, concluded that deviating from the child support guidelines was not appropriate because the parties could not afford private school. The trial court also established Father’s child support obligation for each of the six years preceding the filing of the petition to set support, calculated Father’s total obligation for the retroactive period, determined that Father’s voluntary payments exceeded that obligation, and held that no arrearage was owed. Because Mother filed a new petition to modify the current support obligation, which was consolidated with the above petition, the trial court allowed each party to introduce evidence of their current income. Based on that evidence, the court imputed income to Mother because she failed to provide reliable evidence of her income and modified Father’s child support obligation, which was established pursuant to the guidelines without a deviation. Mother appealed, raising several issues. We affirm in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Darius S.
In this post-divorce custody dispute, Father challenges the trial court’s decision to make Mother the primary residential parent. Because Father failed to file a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Carl Tomlin, et al v. Betty Baxter, et al
This appeal arises from a judgment for a post-foreclosure deficiency owing on a promissory note. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Defendants’ motion for relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 from the final judgment. After Defendants filed an answer to the complaint, they subsequently failed to comply with orders of the court, and, upon motion of Plaintiffs, a default judgment on liability was entered in 2012. The hearing on damages, which was set to be heard four weeks later, was continued by agreement more than a dozen times over two years while the parties attempted to reach a settlement. No settlement was reached, and the hearing on damages was held in May 2014, during which Plaintiffs introduced evidence to establish their damages; however, neither Defendants nor their counsel appeared. Following the evidentiary hearing on damages, the court awarded Plaintiffs damages of $153,328.26, and a final judgment was entered. Three months later, Defendants filed a “Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment” under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, seeking to set aside the May 2014 order on the grounds of excusable neglect. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, Defendants contend the court erred in denying their motion because their failure to attend the damages hearing can be justified by confusion and lack of notice. They also contend the court erred in awarding default judgment because they filed a joint answer to the complaint. We conclude that the damages judgment Defendants sought to have set aside was not a default judgment, but was a final judgment following an evidentiary hearing. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 60 relief from the damages judgment because Defendants failed to establish excusable neglect for not attending the 2014 hearing. We also hold that, although Defendants filed an answer to the complaint, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a default judgment as to liability because Defendants failed to defend the claim in the time frame as ordered by the court. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven J. Ballou
The defendant, Steven J. Ballou, pled guilty to one count of evading arrest, a Class D felony, and received a sentence of five years to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. As part of his guilty plea, the defendant reserved two certified questions of law. In the first question, he argues that an eighteen-month pre-indictment delay caused substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and was an intentional delay by the State to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant. In the second, he contends that the loss of police cruiser dashboard camera videos that contained potentially exculpatory evidence violated his right to a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the first certified question of law and conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the second certified question. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teresa Patterson v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP
This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant-property owner in a premises liability suit. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Theodore Franklin Davis v. Knox County, Tennessee
We granted this interlocutory appeal in order to consider whether Knox County can rely upon the defense of quasi-judicial immunity with respect to the allegations against it in the complaint filed by the plaintiff Theodore Franklin Davis. At an earlier time, Davis entered into a plea agreement in criminal court. In the agreement, he consented to comply with all of the requirements of the Knox County Pretrial Services Office during his six-month probation. One of the requirements was that he would wear a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitoring unit (the SCRAM) to track his alcohol consumption. Pretrial Services – a department of the Knox County Sheriff's Office and an agent of Knox County – installed and monitored the device. Davis alleges that the agents of Pretrial Services were negligent in the installation of, and their refusal to adjust, the SCRAM. He alleges that the SCRAM exacerbated his diabetic condition. Knox County raised the defense of quasi-judicial immunity and later moved to dismiss. The trial court denied Knox County's motion, holding that it was not entitled to raise the defense of quasi-judicial immunity. We hold that Knox County is entitled to assert the defense of quasi-judicial immunity under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-206 (2012). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Parks et al v. Sun Belt Management Company et al.
The plaintiffs voluntarily non-suited an action against the defendants. Later, this suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action was filed. The plaintiffs in their second suit failed to have process issued and served on the defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss based upon this failure. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit. They appeal. We affirm. |
Washington | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In re C.J.A.H.
T.L. (Father) appeals the trial court's judgment terminating his parental rights with respect to his daughter C.J.A.H. (the Child). The court terminated Father's rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support. It did so after an ex parte hearing at which neither Father nor his attorney was present because neither had received notice of the hearing. After subsequent hearings, where Father was present with counsel and introduced evidence, the trial court entered a second order “reaffirming” its earlier termination decision, relying on proof from both the ex parte hearing and later hearings. We hold that the trial court erred in relying on evidence presented at the ex parte hearing. We further hold that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that Father's failure to pay child support was willful. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the petition for termination with prejudice. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tracey Melinda Cook v. Tracy Dean Iverson
Father and Mother divorced in February 2012. Later that same year, Father’s employer notified him that his high-paying sales job would be eliminated. Due to his unemployment, Father filed a petition to modify his alimony and child support obligations. The trial court concluded there was a material change in circumstances and reduced Father’s monthly alimony and child support obligations. Father argues on appeal that the trial court erred by applying an incorrect legal standard; not reducing his alimony and child support obligations further; and declining to reduce his alimony in futuro obligation retroactive to the date of his petition. As an additional issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred in measuring any change in circumstances from the final decree of divorce rather than an agreed order addressing payments to Mother entered after Father learned that he was losing his job. Both Father and Mother seek an award of their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court correctly found a material change in circumstances but erred in imputing income to Father. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Callins v. NSK Steering Systems America, Inc.
Employee aggravated a pre-existing asymptomatic condition in her shoulder while working for Employer and failed to make a meaningful return to work. The trial court found employee to be 100 percent disabled and awarded permanent total disability benefits. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that employee sustained a compensable injury in the absence of anatomical change and in awarding employee permanent total disability benefits. After our review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Robert Morrow v. MBI and/or Mr. Bult's Inc.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, it is undisputed that Employee sustained an injury arising out of and in the scope of his employment; the issue on appeal, however, is whether Employee carried his burden of proving that his work-related injury caused a permanent disability. The trial court found that Employee failed to carry his burden of proving any permanent disability resulting from the injury. Based on our review of the evidence, we agree with the trial court’s finding, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Benton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas Zweig
Petitioner, Douglas Zweig, was convicted in 1981 of attempt to commit a felony: to wit, third degree burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-603 (1975). He was sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days in the Shelby County Correctional Center, but the trial court suspended his sentence to two years of probation after service of thirty days in confinement. In 2014, he filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, requesting that the trial court correct the judgment to reflect that he was convicted of a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The trial court denied his petition. Upon review, we conclude that petitioner’s conviction was a felony and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mario D. Thomas v. State of Tennessee
In this appeal, pro se Petitioner Mario D. Thomas challenges the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cassidy Lynne Aragon v. Reynaldo Manuel Aragon - Dissent
Because I find the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Father lacked a reasonable purpose for relocating, I respectfully dissent. As noted by the majority, we have defined “reasonable purpose” to mean “a significant purpose, substantial when weighed against the gravity of the loss of the non-custodial parent’s ability to participate fully in their children’s lives in a more meaningful way.” Redmon v. Redmon, No. W2013-01017-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1694708, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2014). In my view, such precedent represents a departure from the natural and ordinary meaning of the words found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108, otherwise known as the Parental Relocation Statute. Giving the words “reasonable purpose” their natural and ordinary meaning, from this record, I find that Mother failed to show Father lacked a reasonable purpose for relocating with their child. As such and because no other Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108(d)(1) ground was present that would prevent relocation, I would reverse the trial court and remand with instructions to approve the relocation. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re Telisha B., et al.
Three children were removed from their home as a result of a petition filed by the Department of Children’s Services, alleging that the stepfather was guilty of sexual abuse of the oldest child. After the children were removed from the home, it was found that the Mother knew of but had failed to report previous abuse. The children were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected; the Department later filed a petition for termination of the Mother’s parental rights. Her parental rights were terminated as to all three children on the grounds of severe child abuse and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals the court’s holding that termination of her parental rights was in her children’s best interests. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Richard G. Davis v. Tennessee Rural Health Improvement Association
Plaintiff policy holder filed suit against defendant insurance company after the insurance company denied his claim for benefits. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to utilize the appeals procedure outlined in the contract for insurance before filing a lawsuit. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Emilio Cisneros v. Lindsey Dianna Cisneros
This is a consolidated appeal from two separate actions arising from numerous competing petitions filed by the parents of two minor children. Due to the fact that the parents represented themselves during much of the trial court proceedings and at all times on appeal, the procedural history is muddled, the record is incomplete, and the briefs are of little assistance. The salient facts and procedural history are that a petition for divorce was filed in 2011 at which time both parties were represented by counsel. In December 2012, the trial court entered a final judgment whereby it declared the parties divorced, awarded Mother custody, and set child support. Father appealed, but soon thereafter he filed several petitions to modify custody and support. Mother answered and filed a petition for civil contempt against Father. The trial court found Father in civil contempt for failing to pay child support; he was incarcerated but released when the arrearage was paid. The court also entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Father from having contact with Mother. Father appealed several decisions in the second case. Based on post-judgment facts we agreed to consider, we are advised that Father filed an emergency petition in May 2015 to be granted custody due to Mother’s drug problems. After a hearing, the trial court awarded Father temporary custody, and the children remain in Father’s exclusive custody. Because Father has custody of the children, we are unable to provide Father meaningful relief with respect to this issue. The issues that are currently justiciable include: (1) whether the trial court is biased against Father; (2) the initial award of child support; (3) finding Father in civil contempt; (4) the injunction against Father; and (5) attorney’s fees awarded Mother. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals |