In re Chase L.
In this termination of parental rights case, the trial court terminated Mother’s rights on the grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit; (2) abandonment by wanton disregard; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; and (5) persistent conditions. In its brief, DCS conceded that it cannot defend the grounds of failure to establish a suitable home and persistent conditions. As such, we reverse as to the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistent conditions. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bonnie Harmon, et al. v. Hickman Community Healthcare Services, Inc. - dissenting
This suit was brought by the children of a woman who died while incarcerated at Hickman County Jail. Defendant is a contractor of the jail that provides medical services at the jail; a nurse in Defendant’s employment treated the decedent for symptoms of drug and alcohol withdrawal. She passed away shortly after. The children brought this suit under the Health Care Liability Act claiming negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. In due course, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that element of Plaintiffs’ claim; the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and subsequently denied a motion to revise, filed by the Plaintiffs. This appeal followed. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Rashad Dewayne Seay, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
A Wilson County jury convicted Rashad Dewayne Seay, Jr. (“the Petitioner”) of two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance. Following the voluntary dismissal of his direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition, which the postconviction court dismissed as time-barred. Upon review, we conclude that the petition was timely filed, and therefore, reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keith Austin
A Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Keith Austin, for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Defendant was sentenced to twenty-six years’ incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of attempted second degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leigh Ann Urbanavage, et al. v. Capital Bank, et al.
Homeowners in housing development brought suit against their homeowners association, its directors and the bank that assumed management of the development after the developers defaulted on their loans used to finance the development; the homeowners sought damages and other relief arising from the defendants’ alleged failure to fulfill their obligations to properly maintain the subdivision. Plaintiffs asserted claims for tortious interference with their contract rights, breach of fiduciary duties, invalid liens, and slander of title. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the various claims, and plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to the bank on plaintiffs’ claim of tortious interference, and to the homeowners association on its counterclaim for recovery of delinquent assessments; we vacate the award of counsel fees to the association and the order quashing the notice of deposition of a director of the association and the association’s counsel; in all other respects we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas J. Alberts
The Defendant, Nicholas J. Alberts, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Katherine Taylor
The Defendant, Katherine Taylor, was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to 18 years as a Range I offender. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s history of drug use and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
E. Louis Thomas v. Grady Perry, Warden
The pro se Petitioner, E. Louis Thomas, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth O. Williams v. Grady Perry, Warden
The pro se Petitioner, Kenneth O. Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Glenn R. Burkey, Et Al. v. Geoff Post, Et Al.
In this case, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for constructing a gate that interfered with their use of an existing gravel road located on the defendants’ farm. According to the plaintiffs, access to their property required use of the gravel road. The gravel road in question crosses two separate tracts owned by the defendants and runs southwest to northeast from a state highway through the defendants’ farm and then east to west through another tract. Although the plaintiffs claimed that the easement was fifty-feet in width along its entire length, the court found that the section of the road running through the defendants’ farm was a public road with a width of only twelve feet. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for discretionary costs. The plaintiffs appeal the court’s finding concerning the width of the public road and the denial of discretionary costs. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Shawn L. Keck, et al. v. E.G. Meek, Sr. et al.
This case involves a contract dispute concerning four simultaneously executed agreements that, if completed, would have essentially constituted a trade of two parcels of improved real property. The plaintiff buyers entered into the four agreements with the defendant sellers on October 1, 2013, giving the buyers a lease on the sellers’ property, located on Walnut Breeze Lane in Knoxville, Tennessee (the “Walnut Breeze Property”), with an option to purchase that property in the unspecified future. The buyers agreed to trade equity in their own property, located on First Street in Corryton, Tennessee (“First Street Property”), as partial payment for the Walnut Breeze Property if they chose to exercise the option. On January 6, 2014, the parties met for a “closing,” and the buyers conveyed title to the First Street Property to the sellers. However, the “REAL ESTATE SALES CONTRACT” related to the Walnut Breeze Property stipulated that the transfer of title to the Walnut Breeze Property was subject to the existing mortgagee’s approval, which neither party had obtained. The buyers continued to reside at the Walnut Breeze Property, making monthly payments to the sellers until a year later when the buyers vacated the Walnut Breeze Property and stopped making payments. The sellers sent the buyers a notice to vacate three months later. In November 2016, the buyers filed a complaint in the Union County Chancery Court (“trial court”), claiming breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud. The buyers requested $75,000 in compensatory damages, $150,000 in punitive damages, return of the First Street Property, and reasonable attorney’s fees. The sellers filed an answer and subsequent amended answer, denying all substantive allegations and raising affirmative defenses. The sellers concomitantly filed a counterclaim, asserting, inter alia, that the buyers had breached the lease agreement and requesting an award of unpaid rent and reasonable attorney’s fees. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the buyers breached the terms of the lease agreement by withholding payments on the Walnut Breeze Property for three months. The trial court also found that the buyers had exercised their option to purchase the Walnut Breeze Property by signing over title to the First Street Property but that the sellers knew at that time that the buyers could not satisfy the financing condition of the sale. The trial court awarded to the buyers the equity value of the First Street Property as stipulated in the sales agreement concerning that property, minus the value of three months’ unpaid rent, which the trial court awarded to the sellers. The trial court denied the parties’ respective requests for attorney’s fees. The sellers have appealed. Having determined that each party is entitled to some award of attorney’s fees under the overarching contract, we reverse the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remand for a determination of the respective attorney’s fee awards. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Cindy Terry v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District
A medical product sales representative brought suit against her former employer, a hospital, claiming retaliation in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. After a bench trial, the trial court judge entered a verdict in favor of the hospital, having concluded that the employee failed to carry her burden of proof. In spite of dismissing the employee’s case, the trial court awarded the employee a portion of her attorney’s fees as “sanctions” against the hospital for making an allegedly late-filed motion to strike the employee’s demand for a jury trial, which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the employee’s retaliation claim, and we reverse the trial court’s order granting the employee attorney’s fees. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Denton Jones
The defendant, Denton Jones, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, arguing that the State should not have been permitted to aggregate into a single count of theft the value of property taken on five separate occasions from two different locations; that the trial court erred by permitting testimony concerning evidence that suggested the defendant had committed other offenses; that the trial court erred by denying his motions for mistrial, including one based upon an alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland; that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial entitle him to a new trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Franklin James Howe
The Defendant, Franklin James Howe, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
LaSonya Robertson v. Clarksville-Montgomery County School System
This is a slip-and-fall case. A middle school teacher injured herself when she fell in the hallway outside her classroom on a wet floor. A custodian had been mopping the hallway prior to her fall, and the teacher alleged that the custodians had negligently and misleadingly placed wet-floor signs on the opposite side of the hallway, which did not warn her of the wet floor on her side of the hallway. Thereafter, the teacher brought suit against the school district pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the custodians guilty of negligence and assigned seventy-five percent of the fault to the school district and twenty-five percent of the fault to the teacher. A judgment was entered against the school district in the amount of $180,000.00, after reduction for the teacher’s comparative fault. The school district appeals, contending (1) that it is immune from suit; (2) that it was not negligent; and (3) that any negligence it may have committed is outweighed by that of the teacher’s comparative fault. The teacher argues that the trial court erred in assigning any of the fault to her. We affirm in part and reverse in part |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
LaSonya Robertson v. Clarksville-Montgomery County School System - Dissent
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case. The evidence presented at trial indicates that the school system’s “mopping policy” was actually part of a larger “Departmental Safety Program” directed toward all Clarksville-Montgomery County School System employees. For the “Custodial Department,” the program provided, “[w]hen mopping floors, cleaning up spills, or anytime the floor becomes wet for whatever reason, always put the wet floor signs out until the area is completely dry.” For “Professional Staff,” the program provided, “[a]lways pay close attention to wet floor signs or wet floor conditions to avoid slips and falls.” |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KEILYN O. ET AL.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children. The juvenile court found six statutory grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to one of the statutory grounds and that two other statutory grounds did not apply in this instance. But the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support three grounds for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interest. So we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KEILYN O. ET AL. - concurring
I concur fully in the majority’s opinion in this case. I write separately solely to express my opinion that inasmuch as the majority opinion relies on this Court’s decision in In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2447044, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018), for the standard of proof concerning Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14) (2017), I believe that this statutory ground allows termination of parental rights if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “has failed to meet the requirement of manifesting both a willingness and an ability to assume legal and physical custody of the child or has failed to meet the requirement of manifesting both a willingness and an ability to assume financial responsibility of the child.” See In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *12-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018); see also In re Neamiah R., No. E2017-02000-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2331868, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2018). |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke, III
In this post-divorce matter, the trial court ordered the father, Harold W. Duke, III (“Father”), to deposit $5,729.17 and $5,312.50 per month, respectively, into the educational accounts of the parties’ two daughters. The court determined that the children’s separate trust accounts were not required to be utilized to fund their college expenses. The court also awarded the mother, Kathryn A. Duke (“Mother”), $4,006.00 for attorney’s fees incurred in pursuing a civil contempt petition against Father, as well as $25,000.00 for attorney’s fees and $1,237.50 in discretionary costs related to establishment of the proper amounts to be contributed by Father to the educational accounts. Father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We decline, however, to award Mother attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quincy D. Scott
Defendant, Quincy D. Scott, appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery for which he was sentenced to seventeen years as a Range II, multiple offender at 85%. On appeal, Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of various errors at trial entitled him to a new trial. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chris Jones v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Chris Jones, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief upon the post-conviction court’s determination that it was filed outside the statute of limitations and that the Petitioner failed to prove that his mental incompetence required its tolling. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark IV Enterprises, Inc., Et Al. v. Bank Of America, N.A., Et Al.
Appellants’ employee embezzled funds from Appellants using the employee’s Bank of America account. The employee wrote checks on Appellants’ accounts to legitimate third party vendors but deposited the checks into her own personal account by way of Bank of America’s ATMs. Appellants filed suit against Bank of America alleging that the bank’s failure to either prevent this activity or alert Appellants thereto constituted causes of action for aiding and abetting conversion, aiding and abetting fraud, civil conspiracy, and negligence. The trial court granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss Appellants’ claims for aiding and abetting fraud and conversion and for civil conspiracy based on Bank of America’s lack of knowledge of Appellants’ employee’s wrongdoing. The court subsequently granted Bank of America’s motion for summary judgment on the remaining negligence claim finding that the bank owed no duty to Appellants. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christle Stanley Et Al. v. Fidel Castro Segura Et Al
This is an uninsured motorist case. Appellee State Farm Insurance Companies denied Appellants’ uninsured motorist coverage after the uninsured motorist, defendant, discharged the claim in bankruptcy. The trial court granted State Farm’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion, finding that the policy language that State Farm was liable for “bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the [uninsured motorist],” relieved State Farm from providing coverage after the uninsured motorist discharged the claim in bankruptcy. Because the order appealed is not final, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
M. Latroy Alexandria-Williams v. Mark Goins, et al.
This is an extraordinary appeal, filed pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, seeking review of an injunction entered with respect to the August 2, 2018 Democratic primary ballot for Tennessee’s Ninth Congressional District election. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that an extraordinary appeal should be granted and that the trial court’s injunction should be vacated. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mardoche Olivier v. Travis Excavating, et al.
Trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint due to its failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |